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ABSTRACT - Invention Patent Law; Statutory & Constitutional
Law; Professional Responsibility
Let us give him the mischief and put him in jail and hang
him like they used to for stealing horses. I do not agree with
you at all. You are trying to help a crook. We want to help
the honest man.
-Hon. Frank W. Boykin, Alabama, Chairman, 1946 House
Committee on Patents, in response to the suggestion that a patent
claimant should only recover a reasonable royalty.'
Before 1946, a patent infringement claimant's recovery derived
from two recovery categories enacted by Congress: (i) the recovery
category of damages, which included the definition of claimant's
damages and (ii) the recovery category of profits, which included
the definition of infringer's profits. Through the Patent Act of
1946, Congress eliminated this two-recovery category scheme of
claimant's damages and infringer's profits without changing the
pre-1946 substantive law. Congress did this by enacting a new,
single patent infringement recovery category labeled "general
damages" and by defining general damages as due compensation for
making, using, or selling the invention. Thus, a post-1946
claimant's recovery derived from the recovery category of general
damages, with Congress' definition of general damages including
the infringer's profits and the claimant's damages. After Congress'
1952 textual codification of the 1946 Act, a claimant still recovered
money from a single recovery category that still included the
infringer's profits and the claimant's damages. However, the 1952
textual codification confusingly renamed the 1946 single recovery
category from the "general damages recovery category" to the
"damages recovery category" without substantively changing the
patent infringement recovery law enacted in 1946.
In section IV of the 1964 patent law case of Aro Manufacturing
Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co.2 ("Aro IF'), Justices

1

Recovery in Patent Infringement Suits: Hearingon H.R. 5231 (subsequently amended,

reintroduced, and reported as H.E 5311) Before the House Comm. on Patents,79th Cong. 18

(1946).
2

377 U.S. 476, 141 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 681 (1964).
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Brennan, Stewart, White, and Goldberg circumvented Congress'
single recovery category scheme by usurping Congress' law making
power to revive one of the two pre-1946 recovery categories
eliminated by the 1946 Congress: (i) the pre-1946 recovery category
of damages, with the included definition of claimant's damages
excluding the recovery of the infringer's profits. To account for
unconstitutionally removing Congress' laws relating to the recovery
of an infringer's profits, these four Justices again usurped Congress'
law-making power to create the post-1964 reasonable royalty
recovery category, with a definition of reasonable royalty that
amounts to nothing more than a compulsory license.
Under the great, pestiferous influence of section IV of Aro II, the
lower courts have continued the pre-1946 two-recovery category
scheme eliminated by the 1946 Congress through the practice of
awarding "damages" ("lost profits") under the pre-1946 recovery
category of damages or awarding a "reasonable royalty" under the
post-1964 recovery category of reasonable royalty, despite lacking
the statutory authority under 35 U.S.C. § 284 for either award. An
analysis of the relevant and timely intrinsic and extrinsic evidence
makes it clear that Congress intended 35 U.S.C. § 284 as the
statutory authority for awarding the patent infringement claimant
"compensation"-not damages (lost profits) or a reasonable royalty
as is the current practice. Further, analysis makes it clear that,
among other things, Congress intended for this compensation to be
based on the amount of the infringer's gross income that is proven
as the economic value of the infringer's enrichment to the extent
that the infringer's enrichment is causally connected to the
infringement conduct.
This Article FIRST establishes that there is no adequate or
authoritative judicial analysis of § 284's terms requiring a court in
a patent infringement action to award a reasonable royalty as the
alternative remedy to unavailable damages (lost profits). SECOND,
by loose analogy to the arcane area of patent claim construction,
this Article devises a new, useful, and nonobvious method of
statutory term analysis (STA) and a new, useful, and nonobvious
method of constitutional term analysis (CTA), both of which may be
used in all bodies of law. THIRD, this Article demonstrates this
new STA Method by analyzing the relevant patent statute to prove
that, through the Patent Act of 1946, Congress intended § 284

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol5/iss1/3
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(1994) as statutory authority for the courts to award compensation
in the form of the infringer's profits, contrary to our court's practice
for the last thirty-three years. FOURTH, this Article exposes the
judicial activist method that four Supreme Court Justices used in
Aro II, to usurp Congress' vested power to make all laws, thereby
causing devastating effects on court opinions and the rule of law,
on litigants who seek justice, and on Congress and the entire
judicial system. FIFTH, this Article corrects the Supreme Court's
1964 usurpation of Congress' patent law power by laying out the
background for a "better methodology" '3 in awarding patent
infringement compensation under 35 U.S.C. § 284 and 35 U.S.C.
§ 285 that is consistent with the body Congress' meaning of each
statutory term, the conclusions of this Article, current legal theory,
and existing judicial authority. SIXTH and last, this Article strictly
reminds tribunals and advocates of their professional responsibility
to our chosen profession of law.
APPENDIX I contains the proposed amendments to 35 U.S.C.
§ 284 (1994) and 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1994). APPENDIX II contains 35
U.S.C. § 284 (1994) and 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1994) for comparison to
the proposed amendments. APPENDIX III contains the hard-toobtain text of House Bill 4143 (1945), providing the last piece of an
otherwise accessible House Bill 5311 (1946) legislative history.

'This Article is in response to Chief Judge Markey's request in Fromsonv. Western Litho
Plate & Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568, 1574, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1606, 1612 (Fed. Cir. 1988)

(Markey, C.J.) (hereinafter "Fromson IV") (The current methodology of awarding a "royalty"
that is "truly reasonable" as compensation "must, on occasion, be used for want of a better
methodology').
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I. INTRODUCTION
Courts do not weary of cautioning counsel to distinguish
dictum from decision. They must heed their own warnings.
-- Judge Cardozo, 1918"
The law recognizes three types of properties: real property, said
to be property fixed to the ground, personal property, said to be
moveable items, and intellectual property, which is said to be
property of the mind. The intellectual property of a 35 U.S.C. § 154
(1994)5 patent document is contained as subject matter within the
one or more claims set out at the conclusion of the document as
required under § 112(2). The subject matter of an invention patent
grant (as distinguished from a land patent grant) is either the
§ 101 utility patent, the § 161 asexual plant patent, or the § 171
ornamental design patent. The law protects this subject matter
within a single, written patent claim as intellectual property to the
extent of the matter's scope. Where a wrongdoer practices the
claimed invention without permission under § 271, that wrongdoer
is said to infringe the patent claim. In other words, a § 154 patent
document cannot be infringed; only the § 101, § 161, or § 171
subject matter of the one or more intangible claims fixed within the
tangible § 154 patent document can be infringed through § 271
infringement conduct.
Under § 100(d), inventors, assignees,
assignors, exclusive licensees and others may have standing as a
claimant to sue the infringer, either for § 271(a) direct infringement
or § 271(b)-(g) indirect infringement.
Successfully proving that an accused infringer violated the
United States patent laws 7 through infringement conduct entitles

'Smith v. Hedges, 119 N.E. 396, 399 (N.Y. 1918) (Cardozo, J., dissenting).

'In Parts I, II, HI, and IV of this Article, all incompletely labeled statutory sections refer
to Title 35 of the United States Code unless otherwise noted. In section VI, all incompletely
labeled statutory sections refer to the proposed amendments in Appendix I.
' Because the 35 U.S.C. § 271 patent infringement tortfeasor may also be a plaintiff in
a 28 U.S.C. § 2201 "Declaration of Noninfringement" action where the plaintiffis found liable
on the defendant's counterclaim of 35 U.S.C. § 271 infringement, the patent law terms

.accused infringer' and "infringer' will be used to indicate the wrongdoer in this Article and

the patent law term "claimant" will be used to indicate the wronged party, rather than the

familiar terms of defendant and plaintiff.
7 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1994) (Patents).

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol5/iss1/3
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a claimant to one or more remedies. A finding of § 271 patent
infringement brings into issue the § 2848 primary monetary
awards of (1) compensation and (2) interest and costs. To be
entitled to receive the remedy of compensation, however, the
claimant must first prove during the liability phase of the trial that
the accused infringer's conduct is an act of infringement under
§ 271. Typically, this involves showing that the accused infringer
made, used, or sold the particular claimed invention under
§ 271(a)(1). 9 At the conclusion of the liability phase of a patent
infringement trial, a § 271(a)(1) infringer 0 of a utility invention
patent claim may be viewed as directly infringing the claim under
one of seven infringement conducts: (1) making, (2) using, (3)
selling, (4) making and using, (5) making and selling, (6) using and
selling, or (7) making, using, and selling. Through the infringer's
particular conduct, the infringer will have wrongfully captured the
enrichment embodied within the unharvested portion of the patent
claim grant at issue. The specific infringement conduct will have
generated a certain illegal gross income based on the economic
benefits connected to the "tangible embodiments" made by the

8

For 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1994), see Appendix II.

To prove direct infringement under § 271(a), a claimant would have to successfully
present evidence (1) that the accused infringer (A) practiced the patented invention through
(i) making, (ii) using, (iii) selling, or (iv) offering to sell, the patented invention (B) within the
United States (C) during the patent term (D) without the claimant's authority or (2) that the
accused infringer (A) practiced the patented invention through (i) importing (B) into the
United States (C) during the patent term (D) without the claimant's authority. See 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(a) (1994). Since this author's wording of§ 271(a) expressly delineates the elements of
§ 271(a) and allows for adding infringement conduct items (1XAXv), (1XAXvi), (1XAXvii),
(2XAXii), (2XAXiii), (2XAXiv), etc., to § 271(a) without changing the structure of§ 271(a), this
author recommends that Congress recodify 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1994) using the delineation
provided above.
10 It is improper terminology to refer to an infringer as a "nonwilful infringer" since
patent claim infringement is a strict liability tort. Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d
1538, 1548,35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065, 1072 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (in banc) (holding "[t]he motive,
or motivation, for the infringement [conduct] is irrelevant if it is proved that the infringement in fact caused the loss"); Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d
1512, 1527 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (concluding that "[i]nfringement is ... a strict liability offense.").
In patent law nomenclature, it is the willful infringement conduct that leads to the § 284
(1994) punitive remedy of multiple compensation. Id. Thus, infringement under § 271 is
neither innocent infringement nor nonwillful infringement; the proper terminology is
"infringement."
g
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infringer as well as the more valuable "intangible aspects" of the
intellectual property at issue."
A. MONETARY RELIEF UNDER CURRENT PATENT LAW PRACTICE

To arrive at the current state of patent law infringement remedy,
Congress took two steps. First, Congress enacted the Patent Act of
1946 to amend the 1922 "Revised Statute" (hereinafter "R.S.") 4921
(1922) (patent remedy at equity) as R.S. 4921 (1946) (patent
remedy at equity).1 2 Six years later, through the Patent Act of
1952,13 Congress codified R.S. 4921 (1946) as revised at 35 U.S.C.
§ 284 (1952) without substantively changing the R.S. 4921 (1946)
law. As stated in Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co.,14 "[in
response to a question whether the [1952] Act would effect any
substantive changes [to R.S. 4921 (1946)], Senator McCarran, a
spokesman for the legislation, commented that the [1952] Act
'[codifies] the patent laws.' "15 The 1952 substantive law of patent
infringement compensation under 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1952) has not
changed in the 45 years after the Patent Act of 1952 and is codified
at present as revised at 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1994). Thus, the substantive law of patent infringement compensation under 35 U.S.C.
§ 284 (1994) has remained unchanged since at least 1946. It is
important to note here that "[t]he 1952 Act was approved with
virtually no floor debate.... Perhaps because of the magnitude of
the recodification effort, the Committee Reports accompanying the
16
1952 Act also gave relatively cursory attention to its features.

" King Instruments Corp. v. Perego, 65 F.3d 941, 950 n.4, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1129,
1136 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (stating "[tihe 'entire market value rule' recognizes that the

economic value of a patent may be greater than the value of the sales of the patented part
alone."). The compensable and more valuable"intangible aspects" of the intellectual property
at issue includes, but is not limited to, past market sales, customer loyalty, premium selling
prices, market dominance, present goodwill, future goodwill, and learning curve deprivation.
See generally RUSSELL L. PARR, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INFRINGEMENT DAMAGES: A
LITIGATION SUPPORT HANDBOOK (1993).
12

Patent Act of 1946, ch. 726, 60 Stat. 778 (1946) (codified as revised in 1952 at 35 U.S.C.
§ 284 (1994)).
" Patent Act of 1952, ch. 29, sec. 3, § 284, 66 Stat. 792, 813 (1952) (codified at 35 U.S.C.
§ 284 (1994)).
"4448 U.S. 176, 296 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 385 (1980).

15
16 Id.
Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol5/iss1/3
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The issue of whether the Patent Act of 1946 effected any substantive changes to the law of patent infringement compensation is one
of the focuses of this Article. The thesis of this Article is that there
were no substantive changes, contrary to the Supreme Court's
apparent position.
Under current patent law practice, there are only two types of
§ 284 monetary relief awards: lost profits (sometimes called
damages by the courts and sometimes not) and reasonable royalty.17 A mental comparison of the phrase "lost profits" to the
following is appropriate here: "In patent nomenclature what the
INFRINGER makes is TROFITS,' what the OWNER of the patent
LOSES by such infringement is 'DAMAGES'.""8 (emphasis added)
Rhetorically, if the owner LOSES DAMAGES and the infringer
makes profits, why is the current patent infringement recovery
category for the owner inconsistently labeled "lost profits" and not
labeled "lost damages" as the Duplate definitions suggest (which
itself would be inappropriate)? Where in the statute does the
phrase "lost profits" appear? This is a clue that something is wrong
with current patent legal theory.
Now, to recover the form of compensation labeled "lost profits,"
the claimant must prove two causal connections. First, the
claimant must prove to a reasonable probability that the infringement conduct is causally connected to the claimant's impoverishment (harm suffered). 9 Second, the claimant must prove that the
1

7 Hanson v. Alpine Valley Ski Area, Inc., 718 F.2d 1075, 1078, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 679,
681 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (emphasis added) (stating "[t]here are two methods by which damages
may be calculated under [§ 284]. If actual damages [e.g., lost profits] cannot be ascertained,

then a reasonable royalty must be determined"). Note that § 284 (multiple compensation)
and § 285 (attorney fees) are punitive remedies, not monetary relief (e.g., damages remedies).
For § 284 and § 285, see Appendix II.
" Duplate Corp. v. Triplex Safety Glass Co., 298 U.S. 448, 451 (1936) (quoting Diamond
Stone-Sawing Mach. Co. v. Brown, 166 F. 306, 306 (2d Cir. 1908)) (emphasis added) ("the
Duplate definitions").
1 For new patent law terms of art, see Appendix I. Commonly, there is confusion over
(i) whether it is the "INFRINGEMENT CONDUCT" that must be causally connected to the
claimant's impoverishment (harm suffered)-where the economic value of the claimant's
impoverishment would lead to a certain corresponding monetary value-or (ii) whether it is
the "INFRINGING DEVICE" or "DEVICES COVERED BY THE INFRINGED PATENT' that
must be causally connected to the claimant's impoverishment (harm suffered)-where the
economic value of the claimant's impoverishment would lead to a different corresponding
monetary value. This confusion flows from the facts that only CONDUCT-such as making,
using, or selling-constitutes infringement, but that, as noted by Chisum & Jacobs, it is
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claimant's impoverishment (harm suffered) is causally connected to
the claimant's unrealized income amount (lost profits). In other
words, "to recover lost profits damages [where there are no
proximate cause issues], the patentee must show [to] a reasonable
probability that [under cause in fact's 'but for' test], 'but for' the
infringement [conduct], [the patentee] would have made the sales
that were made by the infringer."" Where the claimant cannot
show both the cause in fact21 and the proximate cause' connections between the claimant's impoverishment and the claimant's
unrealized income, the claimant may only recover the form of
compensation labeled a "reasonable royalty" under current patent
law practice. As expressly stated in part IV of Aro Manufacturing
Co. v. CTR Co. (hereinafter "Aro I/'), "[t]he statute allows the
award of a reasonable royalty."23 However, the statute makes
reasonable royalties a floor amount by stating "but in no event less
than a reasonable royalty."24
The relevant text of § 284 (1994) does not expressly address
whether a court must award a reasonable royalty as the alternative
remedy to unavailable lost profits (damages). The statute states
that "[u]pon finding for the claimant the court shall award the
claimant damages adequate to compensate for the infringement,
but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of
the invention by the infringer, together with interest and costs as

commonplace among patent practitioners to incorrectly say that a DEVICE "infringes.' See
DONALD S. CHISUM & MICHAEL A. JACOBS, UNDERSTANDING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
§ 2F, at 2-233 (1992).
2 Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1545, (Fed. Cir. 1995) (in banc).
2'1See Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minnesota Moline Plow Co., 235 U.S. 641, 648 (1915). See
also Rite-Hite Corp., 56 F.3d at 1546 (establishing that a particular injury suffered by a
patentee is a "but for' consequence of infringement).
22 Rite-Hite Corp., 56 F.3d at 1546 ("Judicial limitations on damages, either for certain
classes of plaintiffs or for certain types of injuries, have been imposed in terms of proximate
cause['s]... 'foreseeability' [test]"). Id. at 1569 ("Being responsible for lost [or diverted] sales
of a competitive product is surely foreseeable; such losses constitute the full compensation
set forth by Congress, as [concluded] by the Supreme Court, while staying well within the
traditional meaning of proximate cause ....
Such lost sales should therefore clearly be
compensable [without showing proximate cause]."). Id. at 1564. While the 'diverted sales"
issue may clearly satisfy proximate cause without judicial discussion, other types of
compensable impoverishment-such as unpatented products, convoyed items, spare
parts-brings proximate cause's foreseeability test into issue.
23 377 U.S. 476, 505, 141 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 681, 693 (1964) (part IV of Aro I).
24 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1994) (reproduced in Appendix II).
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fixed by the court."'
The issue of whether § 284's reasonable
royalty is a floor amount below which § 284's compensation award
may not fall or whether § 284's reasonable royalty is both a floor
amount and an award category in and of itself goes to the main
thesis of this Article. In either situation, there appears to be few
cases where a claimant who lacks exploitation capacity has been
awarded more than this "no less than" floor amount. They are
almost always awarded a reasonable royalty. Certainly, this is a
clue that something is wrong with current patent legal theory.
Section 284 is ambiguous as to whether it permits the court to
award a reasonable royalty since an inferential analytical step is
required before concluding whether § 284 permits the courts to
award a reasonable royalty. Thus, the terms in § 284 must be
analyzed to overcome this ambiguity. As will be shown next,
however, there is no adequate or authoritative judicial analysis of
§ 284's terms requiring a court in a patent infringement action to
award a reasonable royalty as the alternative remedy to unavailable damages (lost profits).
B. LACK OF AUTHORITY FOR CURRENT PATENT LAW PRACTICE

The award of a reasonable royalty within the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (hereinafter "Federal
Circuit" or "CAFC") goes back to the beginning of the Federal
Circuit. The CAFC adopted the exclusive lost profits/reasonable
royalty two-method approach in the 1983 case Hanson v. Alpine
Valley Ski Area.26 The Hanson court adopted this two-method
approach from the 1978 Sixth Circuit case of Panduit Corp. v.
Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works 27 without analyzing the statutory terms
in 35 U.S.C. § 284.28 Although the Sixth Circuit court in Panduit
cited § 284 and three prior Sixth Circuit cases for the proposition
that "where lost profits cannot be proved, the claimant is entitled
to a reasonable royalty," 29 the Panduit court made this § 284
reasonable royalty recovery rule without analyzing the statutory
terms in 35 U.S.C. § 284.

2
2
27

2

See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1994) (reproduced in Appendix II).
718 F.2d 1075 (Fed. Cir. 1983).

575 F.2d 1152, 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 726 (6th Cir. 1978).
Hanson, 718 F.2d at 1078.
PanduitCorp., 575 F.2d at 1157.
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As for the three prior Sixth Circuit cases cited by Panduit,none
adequately or authoritatively addressed the analysis of the
statutory terms in § 284.30 Of course, the 1928 Egry Register
court and the 1944 Enterprise Manufacturing court cited by
Panduit could not have analyzed R.S. 4921 (1946) since R.S. 4921
(1946) had yet to be enacted by the 1946 Congress. This raises the
rhetorical question that if the Patent Act of 1946 substantively
changed the law of patent infringement compensation, why would
the Sixth Circuit court in Panduitcite to two pre-1946 Sixth Circuit
cases for the same legal proposition as in the Sixth Circuit case of
Win. Brothers Boiler, a post-1946 case. This is another clue that
something is wrong with current patent legal theory.
While other circuits have addressed this issue, 1 those circuit
decisions are inadequate and not binding precedent on the Federal
Circuit. Only the United States Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals decisions and United States Court of Claims, Appellate
Division decisions entered before October 1, 1982 are binding

so See Egry Register Co. v. Standard Register Co., 23 F.2d 438, 442 (6th Cir. 1928);
Enterprise Mfg. v. Shakespeare Co., 141 F.2d 916, 920, 61 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 201,204 (6th Cir.
1944); and Wm. Bros. Boiler & Mfg. v. Gibson-Stewart Co., 312 F.2d 385, 386, 136 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 239, 240 (6th Cir. 1963).
" See, e.g., Ric-Wil Co. v. E. B. Kaiser Co., 179 F.2d 401,407,84 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 121, 127
(7th Cir. 1950) (concluding without statutory term analysis: T'he language appears to make
it plain that profits realized by an infringer are not recoverable as such.*); Laskowitz v.
Marie Designer, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 541,554-55, 100 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 367,376 (S.D. Cal. 1954)
(dicta regarding ornamental design patents [§ 171]: "[The general damages now recoverable
are the detriment suffered by the plaintiffs through the infringement. The profits of the
infringer may be the measure, when no other is adequate.... And when the profits or a
reasonable royalty are chosen as a basis, there is no room for the award of other damages.");
Livesay Window Co. v. Livesay Indus., 251 F.2d 469, 472, 116 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 167, 169 (5th
Cir. 1958) (concluding without statutory term analysis that "[pirofits, as such, are not
recovered as the [1952] broadening [codification] amendment to the statute, 35 U.S.C.A.
§ 284, makes so clear."); Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp., 243 F. Supp.
500, 146 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 228 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (concluding with improper statutory term
analysis that profits are not recoverable); Zegers v. Zegers, Inc., 458 F.2d 726, 728, 173
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 385,386 (7th Cir. 1972) (failing to analyze the terms in § 284, citing part IV
of Are H (plurality dicta view): "Justice Brennan plainly stated that the Act of August 1,
1946, 60 Stat. 778, changed the preexisting law which had allowed a patentee to recover the
infringer's profits as well as his own damages."). In note 4 of Zegers, then-Circuit Judge
John Paul Stevens sidestepped the nuisance, binding/non-binding precedent issue by stating:
"However, the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Black, with whom the Chief Justice, Mr.
Justice Douglas, and Mr. Justice Clark joined, would appear to accept the reasoning of Part
IV of Mr. Justice Brennan's opinion." Id. at 728 n.4.

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol5/iss1/3

14

Tassinari: Patent Compensation Under 35 U.S.C. § 284

1997]

PATENT COMPENSATION

precedent on the Federal Circuit, unless and until overruled by the
Federal Circuit sitting in banc.3 2 Further, the Supreme Court has
not adequately or authoritatively addressed the statutory term
analysis of § 284. In General Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp.," the
Supreme Court stated in dicta:
In 1946 Congress excluded consideration of the infringer's
gain by eliminating the recovery of his profits, Aro [Mfg.],
supra, at 505, 84 S. Ct., at 1542, the determination of which
has often required protracted litigation. H.R. Rep. No. 1587,
79th Cong., 2d Sess., 1-2 (1946); S. Rep. No. 1503, 79th
Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1946), ... ; 92 Cong. Rec. 9188 (1946)

(remarks of Senator Pepper).34

However, as will be shown next, not stated in the Devex Court's
dicta was that Aro IFs view itself was mere dicta, and that Senator
Pepper's Senate floor remark does not support the Devex Court's
dicta proposition. In Aro II," only four of the nine Justices'"
expressed their plurality view in dicta (hereinafter "plurality dicta
view") that "[t]he purpose of the change was precisely to eliminate
the recovery of profits as such and allow recovery of damages
only."3 7
Further, Senator Pepper's 1946 Senate floor remark-"[c]onsequently, the basis laid down by this bill is general
compensatory damages which the plaintiff in the suit sustains. Of
course, that may include profits, but is not limited to profits"3 -- does not support the Devex Court's dicta proposition that
"[the 1946] Congress excluded consideration of the infringer's gain
by eliminating the recovery of his profits."3 9 Since Aro Ii's
plurality view was mere dicta and Senator Pepper's Senate floor

3See
South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1370, 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 657, 658
(Fed. Cir. 1982) (in banc).
461 U.S. 648, 654, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1185, 1188 (1983).

4Id.

377 U.S. 476, 141 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 681 (1964) ("Aro II").
As of February 5, 1998, Westlaw's electronic copy of Aro II omits from Westlaw's
electronic case text participating Justice B. White, thereby improperly giving more weight-4
of the 8 Justices-to the Aro II plurality in section IV of Aro I.
' Aro II, 377 U.S. at 505 (1964).
92 CONG. REc. 918 (1946).
Devex Corp., 461 U.S. at 654 (dicta).
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remarks do not support the Devex Court's dicta proposition, the
dicta statement in Devex is neither adequate nor authoritative
judicial analysis of § 284's terms that require a court in a patent
infringement action to award a reasonable royalty as the alternative remedy to unavailable lost profits.
In summary, the text of 35 U.S.C. § 284 is ambiguous as to
whether a court must award a reasonable royalty as the alternative
remedy to unavailable damages or lost profits. Further, there is no
adequate or authoritative judicial analysis of 35 U.S.C. § 284's
terms requiring a court in a patent infringement action to award
a reasonable royalty as the alternative remedy to unavailable lost
profits (damages). Thus, the fifty-one year old question remains
open: through the Patent Act of 1946, did Congress intend 35
U.S.C. § 284 as statutory authority for the courts to award
compensation in the form of the infringer's profits?
In order to understand this question, it may be helpful to state
the question several different ways: did Congress intend 35 U.S.C.
§ 284 as statutory authority for entitling a claimant who lacks
exploitation capacity to recover compensation in the form of the
infringer's profits? Is a poor claimant who lacks the capacity to
mine that claimant's gold claim actually injured (or does that
claimant actually lose profits) when a rich infringer enters the
claimant's land without permission, mines the claimant's gold, and
keeps the gold all to the infringer's self? In essence, this open
question is whether § 284 permits a claimant who lacks exploitation capacity to recover compensation in the form of the infringer's
gross income less fixed costs.
As will be shown, Congress intended 35 U.S.C. § 284 as the
statutory authority for awarding the patent infringement claimant
"compensation"-not damages (lost profits) or a reasonable royalty
as is the current practice. Moreover, it will be shown that, among
other things, Congress intended for this compensation to be based
on the amount of the infringer's gross income that is proven as the
economic value of the infringer's enrichment to the extent that the
infringer's enrichment is causally connected to the infringement
conduct.
Analyzing the above open question requires applying a statutory
term analysis tool to 35 U.S.C § 284 (1994). While preparing a
brief on behalf of himself to the Supreme Court on equitable tolling
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of the income tax refund statute 26 U.S.C. § 6 5 11,' ° this author
discovered that there is no overall analytical theory of legislation.
Since no one has developed appropriate statutory term analysis
tools in the 210 years since the 1787 Convention, this Article will
next devise a new, useful, and nonobvious statutory term analysis
tool through analogy to the arcane area of patent claim construction and will set out similar rules for constitutional term analysis.
II. STATUTORY TERM ANALYSIS & CONSTITUTIONAL
TERM ANALYSIS

Our Constitution was not written in the sands to be washed
away by each wave of new judges blown in by each successive
politicalwind that brings new political administrationsinto
temporarypower.
-Justice Black, 197041
Determining whether Congress as a whole intended for a
statutory term to have a different and particular meaning from
that term's ordinary and reasonable meaning requires structured
analysis. By loose analogy to the arcane area of patent claim
construction, this Article devises a new, useful, and nonobvious
method of statutory term analysis (STA) and a new, useful, and
nonobvious method of constitutional term analysis (CTA), both of
which may be used in all bodies of law.4 2
A. PATENT CLAIM CONSTRUCTION

A patent claim is a group of written terms tangibly fixed as a
unit in a government issued document specifying the scope and the

' Vincent Tassinari, Amicus Curiae Brief, U.S. v. Brockamp, 116 S. Ct. 1875 (1996) (No.
95-1225).
"' Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 426 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting).
42 The two writings that were central to this author in developing Parts II, III, and IV of
this Article were: Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576,39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1573 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (Mechel, J.) (Circuit Judge Paul R. Michel's writings on The Use of
Intrinsic and Extrinsic Evidence in Claim Construction); and Felix Frankfurter, Some
Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REv. 527 (1947). The author of this
Article strongly recommends reading these two items.
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matter that the inventor regards as the claimed invention. Patent
law revolves around patent claim term analysis (in patent law
nomenclature, "claim construction"). Every patent claim term
within each issued patent must be construed in all cases because
it is only possible to determine whether the accused matter
reasonably falls within the claim's scope by construing the claim's
terms. Similar to the legislative representative's meaning of a
statutory term or a Constitutional term, a patent claim term at
issue must be construed by considering the inventor's meaning of
that claim term as expressed through the undisputed, timely, and
relevant public record.' In the case of a patent claim term, the
undisputed public records that may properly be used for term
analysis are (I) the patent specification with (a) its claims and (b)
its written description and (II) the in-evidence patent file history
which contains "the complete record of all the proceedings before
the Patent and Trademark Office"' by the inventor or the inventor's agent. Since the patent specification and in-evidence patent
file history is evidence that is intrinsic to the meaning of a term in
a patent claim, this evidence is "always necessary to review to
determine whether the inventor has used any terms in a manner
inconsistent with their ordinary [and reasonable] meaning."'
Patent claim construction is a critical and recurring problem for
every patent system participant. In the same way Congress drafts
a law, patent attorneys draft patent claims to cover future issues
which they have no way of conceiving at the present time. In the
same way lawyers attempt to show that their client's behavior falls
outside the scope or matter of a law drafted by Congress, lawyers
attempt to show that their client's product or process falls outside
the scope or matter of a patent claim drafted by a patent attorney.
With the future unknown and the imagination of the inventors of
products and processes unlimited, the need for theoretical legitimacy in patent claim construction is paramount.

" Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 397, 155 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 697, 702
(Ct. Cl. 1967) (stating that "[Inderiving the [inventor's] meaning of a [term in a] claim, we
inspect all useful documents.
").
" Vitronics Corp., 90 F.3d at 1582.
'Id. See also Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967,979,34 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1321, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (in banc) (stating that "[c]laims must be read in view of
the specification, of which they are a part"), affd, 515 U.S. 1192,38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1461

(1996).
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Taking this need for theoretical legitimacy seriously, the Federal
Circuit responded by developing the most comprehensive set of
structured term analysis rules for any body of law. As such, the
following discussion develops new, useful, and nonobvious statutory
term analysis rules and constitutional term analysis rules by loose
analogy to the Federal Circuit's claim construction rules. Since
"the answers to the problems of an art are in its exercise,"" and
not in some abstract proposal, Part III of this Article uses these
statutory term analysis rules to flush out Congress' meaning of the
terms in 35 U.S.C. § 284.
B.

STATUTORY TERM ANALYSIS (THE STA METHOD)

The Statutory Term Analysis Method (hereinafter "The STA
Method") is the analytical method of determining Congress', as a
whole body (hereinafter "the body Congress"), meaning of a
statutory term at issue. Central to the rules of the STA Method is
Article I, Section 5, Clause 3 of the Constitution which states that
"[e]ach House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from
time to time publish the same."4 7 This Congressional Journal has
had a total of four titles - Annals of Congress (1789-1824); Register
of Debates in Congress (1824-1837); Congressional Globe (18331873); and Congressional Record (1873 to present) - and is generally referred to as the Congressional Record.
Under the STA Method, the entire realm of evidence regarding
a term at issue is first divided into two categories concerning the
Congressional Record. Rules of analysis are then set out regarding
these two categories. Each category is then divided into subcategories with rules of analysis set out for each subcategory. Below are
the rules of the STA Method.
In determining the body Congress' meaning of a statutory term
at issue under the rules of the STA Method, there are only two
sources of guidance: intrinsic evidence and extrinsic evidence.
Intrinsic evidence is that evidence from the Congressional Record
that is internal to the body Congress' meaning of a statutory term.
This intrinsic evidence is comprised exclusively of the relevant

Frankfurter, supra note 42, at 530.
§ 5, c. 3.

47 U.S. CONST. art. I,
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Congressional Record entries that were both presented on the floor
of Congress and in existence at any time before the enactment date
of the statute as evidenced by the Congressional Record. The
intrinsic evidence comprises the entire realm of established
legislative facts and the trier of law is to expressly address and
analyze each intrinsic fact; colloquially, to take friendship with all
the intrinsic evidence. This relevant intrinsic evidence is not
restricted to any timely session of Congress, although the date of
the timely session may affect the evidentiary weight of the intrinsic
item.
Extrinsic evidence is that evidence outside of the Congressional
Record and thus is external to the body Congress' meaning of a
statutory term. This extrinsic evidence is comprised of the relevant
document evidence that was not applicably set out in the Congressional Record, but was in existence at any time before the enactment date of the statute. This relevant extrinsic evidence is not
restricted to any timely source, although the relevant and timely
source may affect the evidentiary weight of the extrinsic item.
In determining the body Congress' meaning of a term at issue in
a statute, the intrinsic evidence is always analyzed first. The
rationale for this is that the intrinsic evidence was presented on
the floor of Congress and thus represents the most significant
source for the body Congress' meaning of a term at issue. In other
words, intrinsic evidence is always analyzed before extrinsic
evidence under the rules of the STA Method.
1. The Relevant Statute for Analysis. To begin the four part
statutory term analysis, it is critical that the relevant statute is
selected for the analysis. A statute is the relevant statute if the
term at issue first appeared in that statute, regardless of the form
Congress used to express the term at issue.
2. Law Text Change from Old Law to New Law. In analyzing
the intrinsic evidence under the STA Method, the relevant
statutory text change from the old law to the new law is set out as
the second part of the STA Method. This intrinsic evidence is then
analyzed to draw proper conclusions from the facial change in the
text and to dispel any improperly drawn conclusions. Where there
is no old statutory law, this STA Method step does not apply to the
analysis.

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol5/iss1/3

20

Tassinari: Patent Compensation Under 35 U.S.C. § 284

1997]

PATENT COMPENSATION

3. The Statute at Issue. With the relevant statute for analysis
selected and the change from the old law to the new law analyzed,
the third part of the STA Method is to identify the terms in the
statute that the litigants have taken issue with before the court
and then to analyze those terms.
The main analytical construct of the rules of the STA Method is
set out in the following two sentences:
The Different & ParticularMeaning Rule
With the terms at issue identified, each such term is given
that term's expressed statutory definition. However, where
Congress does not provide an expressed statutory definition
for a term at issue, the body Congress is presumed to have
given that term its ordinary and reasonable meaning unless
the body Congress reasonably intended for that term in the
statute to have a different and particular meaning from that
term's presumed ordinary and reasonable meaning.
Analyzing a term at issue under the rules of the STA Method is
a six step process; however, the inconsistent language used by
Congress in statutes to reference the same term creates a minor
issue that nonetheless must be analytically addressed at the outset.
Thus, each possible manifestation of the term at issue within the
statute is to be set out and analyzed to determine whether that
manifestation analytically subsumes the other manifestations, is
analytically merged into the other manifestations, or is found not
relevant concerning the term at issue so that only one term at issue
remains. The body Congress' meaning of this one remaining term
at issue is then derived through the six steps of analyzing Congress' specification of the law. The six steps are titled in this
Article as: i. The statute's text body; ii. The statute's preamble &
title; iii. Floor discussions, bills, reports; iv. The statute's progression history estoppel; v. Extrinsic evidence; vi. Conclusion: The
term at issue.
a. The Statute's Text Body. Where a term at issue is defined
expressly in the statute, it is improper to give any weight to further
evidence, either intrinsic or extrinsic, to alter the body Congress'
definition of that term. The reason for this is that the text of a
statute is clear when a term at issue is defined expressly in the
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statute. In just about all cases, however, the body Congress'
meaning of a statutory term cannot be determined without going
beyond the statute itself and into the Congressional Record. Thus,
where a term at issue is not expressly defined in the statute itself,
the term at issue is deemed a disputed term. In other words, in all
circumstances other than where Congress provides an express
statutory definition for a term at issue, the term at issue is deemed
a disputed term.
Where the term at issue is a disputed term, the body Congress
is presumed to have given that term its ordinary and reasonable
meaning as of the enactment date of the statute. If the body
Congress reasonably intended for the disputed term to have a
different and particular meaning from the disputed term's presumed ordinary and reasonable meaning, then the different and
particular meaning rebuts this presumption and thus controls. In
other words, for the disputed term, the key issue is whether the
body Congress reasonably intended for the disputed term to have
a different and particular meaning from the disputed term's
presumed ordinary and reasonable meaning.
As one heuristic technique for beginning the analysis under the
STA Method, the relevant and timely extrinsic evidence may be
consulted to arrive at the assumed, initial "body Congress' presumed ordinary and reasonable meaning" of the disputed term.
Although relevant and timely extrinsic evidence may be consulted
to arrive at this initial meaning, the body Congress' meaning for
the disputed term as determined under the STA Method commutes
for the assumed meaning initially taken from the intrinsic or
extrinsic evidence.
b. The Statute's Preamble & Title. The relevant parts of the
preamble and title to the Act are next analyzed as the second step
of part three of the STA Method. In most circumstances, the
preamble and title to an Act are outside the statute's enacting
clause. In those circumstances where either the preamble or title
to an Act is outside the statute's enacting clause, the preamble or
title is not enacted into law and thus is not law. Since the statute's
preamble and title require brevity, this brevity is to be considered
when giving weight to the jejune preamble and title language. In
other words, the statute's preamble and title are far from conclusive evidence of the body Congress' meaning of the disputed term.
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c. FloorDiscussions,Bills, Reports. The third step in analyzing a term at issue for the body Congress' meaning of that term is
to organize the relevant and timely (A) floor discussions, (B) bills,
and (C) reports into groups. Next, each Congressional Record entry
within each group is set out expressly and analyzed in reverse
chronological order.
Under "The STA Rule of Omniscience," the relevant upstream-intime floor discussion, bill, and report evidence is irrebuttably
presumed known by each member of the body Congress, the
President, and the public, prior to the current floor discussion, bill,
or report being analyzed. The reason for this is that these intrinsic
entries were presented on the congressional floor to the body
Congress as evidenced by their applicable entry in the Congressional Record. Since the relevant upstream floor discussion, bill, and
report evidence is irrebuttably presumed known by each member
of the body Congress prior to the current floor discussion, bill, or
report being analyzed, the weight of relevancy dictates that the
downstream relevant floor discussions, bills, and reports-those
later in time-are more relevant to the body Congress' intent for a
disputed term to have a different and particular meaning than the
earlier, upstream floor discussion, bill, and report evidence. Since
more weight is given to the relevant floor discussions, bills, and
reports that are later in time than are earlier in time, the grouped
Congressional Record entries are set out and analyzed in reverse
chronological order, i.e., the later entries are analyzed first to give
effect to this difference in weight.
i. FloorDiscussions. The order that each group is analyzed
gives the judiciary further guidance to the body Congress' meaning
of a disputed term. Since all legislative meanings of a disputed
term are presented, challenged, amended, or voted upon during
floor discussions, floor discussion evidence is analyzed before bill
and report intrinsic evidence. Congressional Record entries of floor
statements from one member are accorded equal weight with those
of another member subject to the other rules of the STA Method.
Moreover, statements applicably set out in the Congressional
Record are irrebuttably presumed to be statements of a member on
the floor. Further, a legislator's skill at being a legislator has no
legal weight under The STA Rule of Omniscience. In other words,
under The STA Rule of Omniscience, parliamentary tactics such as
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whether a certain member actually hears, reads, or otherwise has
genuine knowledge of these presentations on the congressional floor
to the body Congress as evidenced by their applicable entry in the
Congressional Record has no legal weight.
ii. Bills. Bill evidence is analyzed second, because a bill
embodies the potential law that is voted upon during the floor
discussion.
iii. Reports. Report evidence is analyzed after floor discussion and bill evidence, since report evidence at best gives insight
into the context of the floor discussions and bills.
d. The Statute's ProgressionHistory Estoppel. For the fourth
of six steps in analyzing a term at issue in the statute itself, each
relevant and timely floor discussion, bill, and report entry is
analyzed sequentially by Record entry date to determine whether
any Congressional meaning of a disputed term found in analyzing
the grouped floor discussions, bills, and reports was effectively
disclaimed in subsequent congressional entries. Although floor
discussions, bills, and reports are analyzed as groups, the entries
within each group influence and may supersede one another as
each entry of each group individually makes its appearance on the
congressional floor. Thus, this forward entry progression history
limits the body Congress' meaning of a disputed term or estops
assertion of the body Congress' meaning of a disputed term by
excluding any meaning of a term at issue in a statute that was
effectively disclaimed during downstream progression of that term
through Congress. To coin a phrase, this is the "Progression
History Estoppel."
e. ExtrinsicEvidence. Where analysis of the intrinsic evidence
alone will reasonably determine the body Congress' meaning of a
disputed term, it is improper to give any weight to extrinsic
evidence to alter the disputed term's reasonably determined
meaning. The rationale for this is that intrinsic evidence-the law
text change, the Act, floor discussions, bills, and reports-rather
than extrinsic evidence constitutes the Article I, Section 5, Clause
3 record of the elected members that make up the body Congress.
Where the body Congress' meaning of the disputed term cannot
reasonably be determined from the intrinsic evidence alone,
extrinsic evidence may be considered. In these very narrow
circumstances, extrinsic evidence such as legislation, judicial cases,
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learned treatises, and dictionary definitions may be used as
extrinsic evidence of the body Congress' meaning of a term in a
floor discussion or report. While an argument can be made that
the body Congress has all knowledge prior to passing the Act, there
is no logical (and therefore legal) way to conclude that such
knowledge had any influence on whether the body Congress
intended for a disputed term to have a different and particular
meaning from that disputed term's presumed ordinary and
reasonable meaning, unless an elected member of Congress
applicably set out this knowledge evidence in the Congressional
Record. Thus, although timely legislation, judicial cases, learned
treatises, and dictionary definitions may be relevant as extrinsic
evidence where not applicably set out in the Congressional Record,
under "The STA Corollary" to The STA Rule of Omniscience, timely
extrinsic evidence is not conclusive and may be superseded by
intrinsic evidence. When relevant as extrinsic evidence, such
evidence may be used only to help explain the body Congress'
meaning of a vague or ambiguous term used in a floor discussion
or report. Extrinsic evidence may not be used to help explain the
meaning of any term in a bill, whether that bill is enacted or
unenacted.
f Conclusion: The Term at Issue. With the appropriate
evidence set out and analyzed, a proper conclusion can be determined about the body Congress' meaning of a term at issue in a
statute.
4. Conclusion:The Statute at Issue. As the fourth and final part
of the STA Method, the trier of law draws a conclusion as to the
statute at issue and applies that conclusion to the issues of the
litigants before the court. In other words, with the body Congress'
meaning of each term at issue properly defined, the statute at issue
may be applied to the issues at hand.
5. Comments on the STA Method. As a general comment, it is
ironic to think about patenting this method of statutory term
analysis. Patent attorneys implore university professors and
doctors to patent their invention methods, contrary to their natural
inclination to contribute freely to the profession they love.
Thinking about patenting this method of statutory term analysis
will help the reader understand the controversies surrounding the
patenting of medical procedures and other similar inventions.
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In particular, the author of this Article has intentionally not
discussed the patent law term analysis techniques of means-plusfunction limitation, equivalency, and the Doctrine of Equivalents as
they apply to the STA Method. The discussion of other patent law
term analysis techniques as they apply to the STA Method must
wait until a real life situation from the past or the future is
properly analyzed. For this same reason, the discussion of the
effect a series of enacted statutes has on one statute in that series,
will have to wait for another day.
C. CONSTITUTIONAL TERM ANALYSIS (THE CTA METHOD)

The trenchant analytical structure set out in Part II.B of this
Article will be shown in Part III to provide a fair and comprehensive statutory term analysis method that allows one to cut to the
heart of the matter. By enlarging the scope of the intrinsic
evidence to include the several state Legislature Record entries and
the Constitutional Convention Record entries, this trenchant
analytical structure also will provide a fair and comprehensive
method of constitutional term analysis that allows one to cut to the
heart of the matter concerning the Constitution. Similar to the
STA Method, this new method of constitutional term analysis can
be used to flush out the representatives' meaning of the terms in
the United States Constitution.
III. ANALYSIS OF 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1994) BY WAY OF
R.S. 4921 (1946)
The necessity for a sensible and systematic approachto claim
interpretation is axiomatic. The Alice-in-Wonderland view
that something means whatever one chooses it to mean makes
for enjoyable reading, but bad law.
-- Judge James R. Durfee, 19674
Congress' right to implement its patent power is a constitutional
right to make statutory law under Article I, Section 8, clause 8:
"The Congress shall have the Power To promote the Progress of
" Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 397 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
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Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries." Since a patent claimant's right to a monetary
compensation remedy under federal law only flows from patent law
statutes enacted by Congress and the President, the analysis of
whether Congress reasonably intended 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1994) as
statutory authority for the courts to award compensation in the
form of the infringer's profits necessarily begins with the relevant
patent statute. This, in turn, requires examining the patent
statute's Congressional Record entries and extrinsic evidence under
the STA Method to determine the body Congress' meaning of the
relevant terms in that patent statute. As stated earlier, a judge
must take friendship with all the intrinsic evidence. One of the key
tests to determine if a judge is implementing that judge's own
meaning of a statutory term is whether that judge expressly cites
to all the available intrinsic evidence or only some of the available
intrinsic evidence. By compelling that judge to expressly tabulate
each intrinsic entry in his published opinion, Congress and others
will be able to check the work of the trier of law.49
A. THE RELEVANT STATUTE FOR ANALYSIS IS R.S.

4921 (1946)

To begin the four part statutory term analysis, it is critical that
the relevant statute is selected for the analysis. A statute is the

* In this Article, the timely and relevant Congressional Record Entry Page Citation's to
H.R. 5311, 79th Cong. (1946) are: VOL 91, 1ST SESSION: H.R. 4143, 79th Cong. (1945)
introduced to House, to Committee on Patents, (p.8879); VOL 92,2ND SESSION: H.R. 5231,
79th Cong. (1946) introduced to House, to Committee on Patents, (p.373); Recovery in Patent
Infringement Suits: Hearing on H.R. 5231, 79th Cong. (1946); H.R. 5311, 79th Cong. (1946)
introduced to House, to Committee on Patents, (p.691); Reported back, to House Calendar
(H.R. REP. No. 1587, pt. 1), (p.1482); House permission to file supplemental report on H.R.
5311, 79th Cong. (1946), (p.1789); Supplemental report (H.R. Rept. 1587, pt. 2), (p.1791);
H.R. 5311, 79th Cong. (1946) Passed House, with discussion, (p.1857); H.R. 5311, 79th Cong.
(1946) referred to Senate Committee on Patents, (p.1905); Reported back to Senate with
amendments (S. REP. No. 79-1503), (p.6886); H.R. 5311, 79th Cong. (1946) temporarily
passed over in Senate, (p.9174); Amended and passed Senate with discussion, (pp.9187-88);
House concurs in Senate amendments, with discussion, (p.9881); H.R. 5311, 79th Cong.
(1946) signed by House Speaker & Senate President pro tempore, (p.10,139); H.R. 5311, 79th
Cong. (1946) examined by House Committee on Enrolled Bills, (p.10,230); H.R. 5311, 79th
Cong. (1946) presented to the President, (p.10,230, 31); Approved as Public Law No. 587,
Chapter 726, (p.10,649).
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relevant statute if the term at issue first appeared in that statute,
regardless of the form Congress used to express the term at issue.
Under current patent infringement practice, courts apply 35
U.S.C. § 284 (1994) in patent infringement cases, the substantive
law of which has remained unchanged since at least the Patent Act
of 1946 as shown above. As of August 1, 1946, R.S. 4921 provided,
"the complainant shall be entitled to recover general damages
which shall be due compensation for making, using, or selling the
invention, not less than a reasonable royalty therefor.""
However, from July 8, 1870 to July 31, 1946, R.S. 4921 provided,
"the complainant shall be entitled to recover, in addition to the
profits to be accounted for by the defendant, the damages the
complainant has sustained thereby."51 The question this brings
up is whether R.S. 4921 (1946) (and thereby 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1994))
permits a claimant who lacks exploitation capacity to recover
52
compensation in the form of "the profits . . . [of] the defendant."
Since Congress' term "general damages" first appeared in 1946 as
part of the replacement of Congress' 1922 statutory phrase "in
addition to the profits to be accounted for by the defendant, the
damages the complainant has sustained thereby,"' the patent
statute that must necessarily be analyzed is R.S. 4921 (1946), not
35 U.S.C. § 284 (1994), § 284 (1964), or even § 284 (1952).
It seems logical that the analysis of whether the infringer's gross
income is recoverable under R.S. 4921 (1946) should be the same
under R.S. 4921 (1946) or 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1952, 1964, 1994) since
35 U.S.C. § 284 (1952) has not been changed as of the writing of
this Article and § 284 (1952) merely codified R.S. 4921 (1946) with
some subtle differences in the text. However, analytical reliance
upon these subtle text differences is sufficient for the judicial
activist to improperly draw a § 284 conclusion as to 1946 congres-

50 Patent Act of 1946, ch. 726, 60 Stat. 778, 778 (1946) (codified as revised in 1952 at 35
U.S.C. § 284 (1994)).
5'The Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 55, 16 Stat. 198, 206 (1870) (was amended on August
1, 1946 by the Patent Act of 1946, 60 Stat. at 778).
5Patent
Act of 1922, ch. 58, sec. 8, § 4921, 42 Stat. 382, 392 (1922) (amended 1946,
codified as revised in 1952 at 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1994)).
wId.
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sional meaning of the terms in the statute." This point will be
brought out below during the analysis of R.S. 4921 (1946).
B. LAW TEXT CHANGE FROM R.S.

4921 (1922) TO R.S. 4921 (1946)

In analyzing the intrinsic evidence under the STA Method, the
relevant statutory text change from R.S. 4921 (1922) to R.S. 4921
(1946) is set out as the second part of the STA Method. This
intrinsic evidence is then analyzed to draw proper conclusions from
the facial change in the text and to dispel any improperly drawn
conclusions.
1. Relevant Change in Statutory Text. As discussed above, R.S.
4921 (1922) provided, "[t]he complainant shall be entitled to
recover, in addition to the PROFITS to be accounted for by the
defendant, the DAMAGES the complainant has sustained thereby."55 After July 31, 1946, R.S. 4921 (1946) provided, "[t]he
complainant shall be entitled to recover GENERAL DAMAGES
which shall be due compensation for making, using, or selling the
invention, not less than a reasonable royalty therefor.'
2. Four Conclusionsfrom Facial Change. From the text change
between R.S. 4921 (1922) and R.S. 4921 (1946), four proper
conclusions are drawn:
(i) Before 1946, R.S. 4921 (1922)'s recovery category of damages and R.S. 4921 (1922)'s recovery category of profits
entitled the claimant to recover both damages and profits,57 or damages individually, or profits individually;
See, e.g., Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 505 (1964)
(plurality dicta view) (stating: The purpose of the change was precisely to eliminate the
recovery of profits as such and allow recovery of damages only."); Georgia-Pacific Corp. v.
United States Plywood Corp., 243 F. Supp. 500, 146 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 228 (S.D.N.Y. 1965)
(concluding that profits are not recoverable because § 284 says "damages").
' Patent Act of 1922, 42 Stat. at 392 (emphasis added).
Patent Act of 1946, 60 Stat. at 778 (emphasis added).
5 General Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648, 654 (1983) ("Under the pre-1946
statute, the [claimant] could recover both [the claimant's] own damages and the infringers
profits."); Tilghman v. Proctor, 125 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1888) ('[Tihe provision of the patent act
of 1870, embodied in the Revised Statutes ... expressly affirms the defendant's liability to
account for profits, as well as authorizes the court sitting in equity to award and to treble
any damages that the plaintiff has sustained in excess of the defendant's profits.*); HamiltonBrown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Bros. & Co., 240 U.S. 251, 259 (1916) (citing Tilghman u. Proctor)
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(ii) The 1946 Congress biunially eliminated the R.S. 4921 (1922)
recovery category of damages and the R.S. 4921 (1922)
recovery category of profits and replaced these two recovery
categories with a new, single R.S. 4921 (1946) statutory
recovery category labeled general damages, thus entitling
the claimant to recover general damages;"
(iii) R.S. 4921 (1922) did not require that the court's compensation award be in excess of or equal to a royalty reasonable
for the practice made of the invention by the infringer; 9
and
(iv) R.S. 4921 (1946) requires that the claimant's compensation
award be in excess of or equal to a royalty reasonable for
the practice made of the invention by the infringer.'c
3. DispellingImproper Conclusions. From the text differences
between R.S. 4921 (1946) and R.S. 4921 (1922), it can be concluded,
for argument's sake, that the 1946 body Congress reasonably

("In the courts of England, the rule seems to be that a party aggrieved must elect between
damages and profits, and cannot have both. In this country, it is generally held that in a
proper case both damages and profits may be awarded.").
" See Patent Act of 1946, 60 Stat. at 778 (allowing complainant to recover general
damages). See also H.R. REP. No. 79-1587, pt. 1, at 1 (1946) (to accompany H.R. 5311) ("The
object of the bill is to make the basis of recovery in patent-infringement suits general
damages... rather than profits and damages."); S. REP. No. 79-1503, at 2 (1946) (adopting
H.R. REP. No. 1587, pt. 1 (1946) and to accompany H.R. 5311). Pre-1946 patent law
"damages' were defined in Duplate Corp. v. Triplex Safety Glass Co., 298 U.S. 448, 451
(1936) (the Duplate definitions) as "what the owner of the patent loses by such infringement."
Pre-1946 patent law definitions for "damages" and "profits" are discussed in text accompanying note 17. But see Kori Corp. v. Wilco Marsh Buggies & Draglines, Inc., 761 F.2d 649, 654
n.2, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 985, 988 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (Rich, J.) (" '[1946 g]eneral damages'
may be distinguished from 'damages' in the traditional [Duplate] sense. [In Duplate, t]he
term 'damages' was formerly defined by the Supreme Court as 'what the owner of the patent
loses by such infringement. . .' In Duplate,] the Court also said, 'what the infringer makes
is profits.' ").
'9See Patent Act of 1922, 42 Stat. at 392. It is important to note here that the pre-1946
courts awarded nominal damages to account for the omission of a necessary recovery
category from the statute. See 3 WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, LL.D., THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR
USEFUL INVENTIONS § 1068, at 363 (Clark Boardman Co. & Sage Hill Pubs., Inc. photo.
reprint 1971) (1890) ("Nominal Damages: when Recoverable.") (Robinson's treatises are
applicable post-1890 as inferred from Independent Wireless Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am.,
269 U.S. 459, 466 n.* (1926) (noting that the relevant portions of the Patent Act of 1870
remained unchanged by the Patent Act of 1897 and 1922)).
s0 See Patent Act of 1946, 60 Stat. at 778 (stating that "the complainant shall be entitled
to recover ... not less than a reasonable royalty therefor").
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intended to eliminate recovery of profits by eliminating the R.S.
4921 (1922) recovery category of "profits." Using the same logic, it
can be concluded that the 1946 body Congress reasonably intended
to eliminate recovery of damages by eliminating the R.S. 4921
(1922) recovery category of "damages." Following this line of logic,
the 1946 body Congress reasonably intended to eliminate all
recovery of compensation from R.S. 4921 (1946)-and by that any
infringement deterrent-while maintaining the § 271 prohibition
against the infringement conduct. Since it is so unlikely that the
body Congress intended to prohibit conduct without providing
deterrent measures, the body Congress could not have intended to
eliminate recovery of damages by eliminating the R.S. 4921 (1922)
recovery category of damages. In the same way, the body Congress
could not have intended to eliminate recovery of profits by eliminating the R.S. 4921 (1922) recovery category of profits.
Although the body Congress did not intend to eliminate recovery
of either profits or damages by textually eliminating their recovery
category, the body Congress' "intent" for the text change from R.S.
4921 (1922) to R.S. 4921 (1946) requires analysis of R.S. 4921
(1946) itself. As will be evident, determining the meaning of the
terms in R.S. 4921 (1946) makes the body Congress' "intent" a
foregone conclusion. In other words, the body Congress' intent has
importance in a court of law only as a heuristic technique of
determining the body Congress' meaning of a term in a statute.
C. R.S. 4921 (1946)
With the relevant statute for analysis selected and the change
from the old law to the new law analyzed, the third part in the STA
Method is to identify the terms in R.S. 4921 (1946) and then
analyze these terms. With the terms at issue identified, each such
term is given that term's expressed statutory definition. However,
where Congress does not provide an expressed statutory definition
for a term at issue, the body Congress is presumed to have given
that term its ordinary and reasonable meaning unless the body
Congress reasonably intended for that term in R.S. 4921 (1946) to
have a different and particular meaning from that term's presumed
ordinary and reasonable meaning.
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The terms at issue in R.S. 4921 (1946) are "general damages" and
"due compensation.""
The "general damages" term will be
analyzed first, then the "due compensation" term will be analyzed.
1. General Damages Term. Each possible manifestation of
"general damages" within R.S. 4921 (1946) is to be set out and
analyzed to determine whether that manifestation analytically
subsumes the other manifestations, is analytically merged into the
other manifestations, or is found not relevant concerning the term
at issue so that only one term at issue remains. The body Congress' meaning of this one remaining term at issue is then derived
through the six steps of analyzing Congress' specification of the
law.
In the text of R.S. 4921 (1946), the term "general damages"
manifests itself in four ways: (i) "general damages;" (ii) "said
damages;" (iii) "assessed damages;" and (iv) "damages found by
verdicts. " "2
The first of these four manifestations appears once as "general
damages.'
The second manifestation, "said damages," inferentially states that its antecedent basis has already appeared in R.S.
4921 (1946).64 Since "general damages" is the antecedent basis for
"said damages" in R.S. 4921 (1946), "said damages" is subsumed by
"general damages." Thus "said damages" means general damages
within the text of R.S. 4921 (1946).
R.S. 4921 (1946) then states that "said damages" (general
damages) are to be assessed as "assessed damages.'
Thus, the
third manifestation, "assessed damages," refers back to and is
subsumed by "said damages," where "said damages" itself refers
back to "general damages." Since "assessed damages" is subsumed
by "general damages," "assessed damages" means general damages
within the text of R.S. 4921 (1946).

" See id.; see also Recovery in PatentInfringement Suits: Hearingon H.R. 5231 Before the
House Comm. on Patents, 79th Cong. 11 (1946) ("MR. FOLK I was confused about general
damages and due compensation.").
Patent Act of 1946, 60 Stat. at 778.
a Id.

"As an aside observation, R.S. 4921 (1946) clearly is a patent law statute, for "said
damages" is written as it would be in a patent claim. Because the patent statutes 35 U.S.C.

§§

1-376 (1994) were last codified 46 years ago through the Patent Act of 1952, this author
recommends that Congress recodify the patent statutes 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1994) using
modern and consistent statutory language (not patent law nomenclature).
6Patent

Act of 1946, 60 Stat. at 778.
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The fourth manifestation, "damages found by verdicts," refers to
"damages found by verdicts in actions in the nature of actions of
trespass upon the case" in the context of "increas[ing] the assessed
damages." 6 However, since "damages found by verdicts" are a
punitive remedy,6 7 they are not relevant to the body Congress'
meaning of the non-punitive remedy of "general damages." Thus,
the only term at issue remaining is general damages.
a. R.S. 4921 (1946) Text Body. Where a term at issue is
defined expressly in the statute, it is improper to give any weight
to further evidence, either intrinsic or extrinsic, to alter the body
Congress' definition of that term. Where a term at issue is not
expressly defined in the statute itself, the term at issue is deemed
a disputed term.
In the case of the term "general damages," the Patent Act of 1946
is an Act where Congress has supplied its own dictionary."
Congress used the jussive term "shall" to express its command that
general damages shall be due compensation. Since "general
damages" is defined expressly in R.S. 4921 (1946) as "due compensation for making, using, or selling the invention,"6 9 it is improper
to give any weight to further evidence, intrinsic or extrinsic, to
alter R.S. 4921 (1946)'s definition of general damages.
b. Conclusion: General Damages. With the appropriate
evidence set out and analyzed, a proper conclusion can be determined about the body Congress' meaning of general damages in
R.S. 4921 (1946).
As discussed above, the three relevant manifestations of "general
damages" within R.S. 4921 (1946) refer to general damages. The
fourth manifestation was shown as not relevant to the body
Congress' meaning of general damages. Further, the body Congress
expressly defined general damages in the text of the statute as "due
compensation." Thus, the body Congress reasonably intended for
general damages in R.S. 4921 (1946) to mean due compensation.

"Id.
See Tilghman v. Proctor, 125 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1888) (referring to such patent language
as punitive).
68See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 191 n.47 (1961) (stating that "[t]his Act has been

described as an instance where 'Congress supplies its own dictionary' "(quoting Frankfurter,
supra note 42, at 536)).
69 Patent Act of 1946, 60 Stat. at 778.
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Note that the definition of general damages in the Patent Act of
1946 is both different and particular from the definition of general
damages in the Patent Act of 1922. In the Patent Act of 1946,
Congress defined "1946 general damages" as "due compensation for
making, using, or selling the invention. 70 In the Patent Act of
1922, Congress defined "1922 general damages" as an adjudged and
decreed sum, "not susceptible of calculation and determination with
reasonable certainty."7 1 Since Congress particularly defined 1946
general damages differently than 1922 general damages, the
general damages term referred to in the Patent Act of 1946 is not
be confused with "1922 general damages. 72 Moreover, since the
body Congress intended to entitle a successful patent infringement
claimant to R.S. 4921 (1946) general damages, and "general
damages" is defined expressly in R.S. 4921 (1946) as due compensation, the body Congress intended that the successful patent
infringement claimant be entitled to due compensation under R.S.
4921 (1946).
2. Due Compensation Term. The second disputed term is "due
compensation." Each possible manifestation of due compensation
within R.S. 4921 (1946) is to be set out and analyzed to determine
whether that manifestation analytically subsumes the other
manifestations, is analytically merged into the other manifestations, or is found not relevant concerning the term at issue so that
only one term at issue remains. The body Congress' meaning of
this one remaining term at issue is then derived through the six
steps of analyzing Congress' specification of the law. Here, in the
text of R.S. 4921 (1946), the term "due compensation" manifests
itself in two ways: (i) in the phrase "general damages which shall
be due compensation"; and (ii) the phrase "the court [may] receive
evidence upon which to determine due compensation." 3 Since
both manifestations of due compensation are referred to as "due
compensation," the second manifestation of "due compensation" is
subsumed by its antecedent basis. This leaves only the one term

70Id.

7' Patent Act of 1922, ch. 58, sec. 8, § 4921, 42 Stat. 382, 392 (1922).
See, e.g., Recovery in PatentInfringement Suits:Hearingon H.R. 5231, 8upra note 61,
at 6 (quoting Mr. C. Henry making the same distinction: "[The 1922] law as it now is

authorizes the court to assess [1922] general damages.").
73 Patent Act of 1946, 60 Stat. at 778.
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at issue. Demonstrated next are the six steps to analyzing the
term at issue under the STA Method, in this case, "due compensation."
a. R.S. 4921 (1946) Text Body. Where a term at issue is
defined expressly in the statute, it is improper to give any weight
to further evidence, either intrinsic or extrinsic, to alter the body
Congress' definition of that term. Where a term at issue is not
expressly defined in the statute itself, the term at issue is deemed
a disputed term.
Where the term at issue is a disputed term, the body Congress
is presumed to have given that term its ordinary and reasonable
meaning as of the enactment date of the statute. If the body
Congress reasonably intended for the disputed term to have a
different and particular meaning from the disputed term's presumed ordinary and reasonable meaning, then the different and
particular meaning rebuts this presumption and thus controls. For
the disputed term, the key issue is whether the body Congress
reasonably intended for the disputed term to have a different and
particular meaning from the disputed term's presumed ordinary
and reasonable meaning.
Since the term "due compensation" is not expressly defined in
R.S. 4921 (1946) itself,74 it is deemed a disputed term and the
body Congress is presumed to have given due compensation its
ordinary and reasonable meaning as of the August 1, 1946
enactment date of R.S. 4921 (1946). As one heuristic technique for
beginning the analysis under the STA Method, the relevant and
timely extrinsic evidence may be consulted to arrive at the
assumed, initial "body Congress' presumed ordinary and reasonable
meaning" of the disputed term. Although relevant and timely
extrinsic evidence may be consulted to arrive at this initial
meaning, the body Congress' meaning for the disputed term as
determined under the STA Method commutes for the assumed
meaning initially taken from the intrinsic or extrinsic evidence.
With such consultation performed, the body Congress presumably
intended for "due compensation" to mean "compensation" as an
ordinary and reasonable meaning. If the body Congress reasonably
intended for "due compensation" in R.S. 4921 (1946) to have a
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meaning that is different and particular from "compensation," then
the different and particular meaning rebuts this presumption and
thus controls.
The key issue then is whether the body Congress reasonably
intended for due compensation to have a different and particular
meaning from due compensation's presumed ordinary and reasonable meaning of compensation.
b. R.S. 4921 (1946) Preamble & Title. The relevant parts of
the preamble and title to the Patent Act of 1946 are next analyzed
as the second step of part three of the STA Method. Since the
statute's preamble and title require brevity, this brevity is to be
considered when giving weight to the jejune preamble and jejune
title language. In other words, the statute's preamble and title are
far from conclusive evidence of the body Congress' meaning of the
disputed term. Note here that while the Patent Act of 1946 may be
analytically referred to by various names-Public Law No. 587
(1946); House Bill 5311, 79th Congress (1946); Chapter 726 (1946);
Volume 60, Statutes at Large, Page 778 (1946)-the name used in
this Article is R.S. 4921 (1946) for consistency and to avoid
confusion with existing analyses on this same issue.
Here, the preamble to R.S. 4921 (1946) (e.g., the Patent Act of
1946) states, "[t]o amend Revised Statutes, 4921 (U.S.C.A., title 35,
Patents, sec. 70), providing that damages be ascertained on the
basis of compensation for infringement."75 Since the word "compensation" appears once in the preamble to the Patent Act of 1946,
the preamble to the Patent Act of 1946 is relevant to the analysis.
Here, the jejune preamble's use of "compensation" supports the
presumed ordinary and reasonable meaning of "due compensation."
c. FloorDiscussions,Bills, Reports. The third step in analyzing due compensation for the body Congress' meaning of due
compensation is to organize the relevant and timely (A) floor
discussions, (B) bills, (C) reports into groups. Next, each Congressional Record entry within each group is set out expressly and
analyzed in reverse chronological order. Under The STA Rule of
Omniscience, the relevant upstream-in-time floor discussion, bill,
and report evidence, is irrebuttably presumed known by each
member of the body Congress prior to the current floor discussion,
bill, or report being analyzed.
7

6Id.
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The R.S. 4921 (1946) floor discussion, bill, and report intrinsic
evidence includes: (A) FLOOR DISCUSSIONS-House floor
discussion No. 2,76 Senate floor discussion No. 1, 77 House floor
discussion No. 178; (B) BILLS-House Bill 5311, 79 House Bill
5231,' House Bill 414381; and (C) REPORTS-House Report
1503,82 House Report 1587 (Part 2), 8 House Report 1587 (Part

1)84.
i. FloorDiscussions. Although there were three substantive
floor discussions, the bills relevant to R.S. 4921 (1946) were
brought before Congress in fifteen separate floor discussions,
including the three substantive floor discussions." When each bill
relating to R.S. 4921 (1946) was introduced on the congressional
floor as part of a floor discussion, the due compensation term was
presented during floor discussions to the body Congress as in "an
act to amend Revised Statutes 4921 (U.S.C.A., title 35, Patents, sec.
70), providing that damages be ascertained on the basis of compensation for infringement."'m Since due compensation was consis-

tently presented as "compensation" during floor discussions to the

76 92 CONG. REc. 9881 (1946).
7

92 CONG. REC. 9187-88 (1946).

78 92 CONG. REc. 1857 (1946).
7
9

H.R. 5311, 79th Cong. (1946) (introduced to Congress at 92 CoNG. REc. 691 (1946)).
m H.R. 5231, 79th Cong. (1946) (introduced to Congress at 92 CONG. REC. 373 (1946)).
8'H.R. 4143,79th Cong. (1945) (introduced to Congress at 91 CONG. REC. 8879 (1945) and
reproduced in Appendix III, this Article).
82 H.R. REP. No. 79-1503 (1946) (introduced to Congress at 92 CoNG. REc. 6886 (1946)).
83 H.R. REP. No. 79-1587, pt. 2 (1946) (introduced to Congress at 92 CONG. REC. 1791
(1946)).
' H.R. REP. NO. 79-1587, pt. 1 (1946) (introduced to Congress at 92 CONG. REC. 1482
(1946)).
85 See 92 CoNG. REC. 10,649, 10,231, 10,230, 10,139, 9881, 9187, 9174, 6886, 1905, 1857,
1791, 1482, 691, 373 (1946); 91 CONG. REC. 8879 (1945). Concerning 91 CONG. REC. 8879
(1945), recall the rule under the STA Method that the relevant intrinsic evidence is not

restricted to any timely session of Congress, although the date of the timely session may
affect the evidentiary weight of the intrinsic item. If a member of Congress brought this
issue up in the 78th, 77th, 76th, etc., Congress, those Congressional Record entries would
be relevant here also.
86 To view this identical quote for each bill introduction, see 92 CONG. REC. 10,649,
10,231, 10,230, 10,139, 9881, 9187, 9174, 6886, 1905, 1857, 1791, 1482, 691, 373 (1946) and
91 CONG. REC. 8879 (1945). As an aside, because general damages was expressly defined
within R.S. 4921 (1946) as "due compensation," it is improper to rely on this floor
presentation of the word "damages' to alter Congress' express statutory definition of general
damages.
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body Congress, these fifteen floor discussion presentations support
the presumed ordinary and reasonable meaning of "due compensation."
(a). House FloorDiscussionNo. 2 (p. 9881). As mentioned
above, there were three substantive floor discussions. During the
substantive House floor discussion No. 2, House member Mr.
Lanham twice used the term "compensation" in his speech to the
entire House in a manner consistent with the term "due compensation," stating "that damages be ascertained on the basis of compensation for infringement." 7 With no other reference to the term
"due compensation" in this floor discussion, this floor discussion No.
2 supports the proposition that the body Congress reasonably
intended for due compensation to mean compensation in R.S. 4921
(1946).
(b). Senate Floor DiscussionNo. 1 (pp.9187-88). With the
House bill relevant to R.S. 4921 (1946) now in front of the Senate,
Senator Pepper used the phrase "general compensatory damages"
three times during this substantive Senate floor discussion.88 But
when R.S. 4921 (1946) came to a vote in the form of House Bill
5311, the presiding officer of the Senate stated, "[T]he Senate
proceeded to consider the bill [House Bill 5311]... providing that
damages be ascertained on the basis of compensation for infringement." 9 Since the Senate body voted on and approved the term
"compensation," this term controls over Senator Pepper's proposed
term "general compensatory damages" in this floor discussion. This
supports the proposition that Congress reasonably intended for due
compensation to mean compensation in R.S. 4921 (1946), not
general compensatory damages.
Note that even if the term Congress enacted was Senator
Pepper's term "general compensatory damages" as implied in
General Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp.,° Senator Pepper's "general
compensatory damages" recovery category includes both the
87

92 CONG. REc. 9881 (1946).

8 92 CONG. REC. 9187-88 (1946).
'9 92 CONG. REC. 9188 (1946). Again as an aside, because general damages was expressly
defined within R.S. 4921 (1946) as "due compensation,* it is improper to rely on the
"damages" remark by the presiding officer to alter Congress' express statutory definition of

general damages.
9o 461 U.S. 648, 654-55, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1185, 1188 (1983) (dicta). But see supra text
accompanying notes 33-39 (suggesting that Sen. Pepper's floor remark does not support the
dicta in Devex).
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infringer's profits and the claimant's damages as per Senator
Pepper's Senate floor discussion No. 1 remark: "[C]onsequently, the
basis laid down by this bill is general compensatory damages which
the plaintiff in the suit sustains. Of course, [general compensatory
damages] may include [the recovery of] profits, but is not limited to
[the recovery of] profits."9 1
(c). House Floor Discussion No. 1 (p. 1857). With the
House bill relevant to R.S. 4921 (1946) in the House for the first of
two House substantive discussions, the bill containing the language
"general damages which shall be due compensation" was passed by
the entire House at the conclusion of House floor discussion No.
1.92 Furthermore, in referring to this bill, Mr. Lanham stated that
"[tihe measure ... will be due compensation."93 Since the term
"due compensation" was consistently used in House floor discussion
No. 1, neither use of "due compensation" in House floor discussion
No. 1 is inconsistent with due compensation's presumed ordinary
and reasonable meaning of compensation. Thus, the uses of "due
compensation" in the three substantive floor discussions and twelve
essentially procedural floor presentations are consistent with the
finding that "compensation" is the ordinary and reasonable
meaning of "due compensation."
ii. Bills. Concerning due compensation as "compensation,"
the text of each relevant bill is the same as the text of the enacted
statute R.S. 4921 (1946) in that due compensation appears in the
phrase "general damages which shall be due compensation" and the
phrase "the court [may]... receive... evidence... upon which to
determine ... due compensation."94 Also, in each bill, the term
"compensation" appears once in each preamble, just as in the
enacted statute R.S. 4921 (1946). 95 Since the text and preamble
of each bill is identical with the text and preamble of R.S. 4921
(1946) 96 concerning the issue of "due compensation" as "compensation," analyzing the issue of due compensation as compensation for

91 92 CONG. REC. 9188 (1946).
292 CONG. REC. 1857 (1946).
" Id.
"Compare Patent Act of 1946, ch. 726, 60 Stat. 778, 778 (1946) to H.R. 5311, 79th Cong.
(1946), H.R. 5231, 79th Cong. (1946), and H.R. 4143, 79th Cong. (1945) (in Appendix III).
9Patent Act of 1946, 60 Stat. at 778.
9 Id.
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each bill will lead to the same conclusions as analyzing the issue of
due compensation as compensation for the enacted bill.
iii. Reports. Recall from above that the three reports
relating to R.S. 4921 (1946) were Senate Report 1503, House
Report 1587 (Part 2), and House Report 1587 (Part 1).17 The use
of the term "due compensation" in these three committee reports
supports a finding that the ordinary and reasonable meaning of due
compensation as used by the body Congress is compensation. First,
Senate Report 1503 recommended to the entire Senate, House Bill
5311 with the bill's text reading "general damages as due compensation" and the term "compensation" in the report's title.9"
Moreover, the Senate committee adopted the House Report 1587
(Part 1), where the House report itself used both the language
"general damages as due compensation" in the body of its text and
the term "compensation" in its title. 99 Further, like Senate Report
1503, the House Report 1587 (Part 2) recommended House Bill
5311 to the entire House with the bill's language reading "general
damages which shall be due compensation" and the term "compensation" in the report's title."° Thus, the use of "due compensation" in the three relevant committee reports supports a finding
that the ordinary and reasonable meaning of the term "due
compensation" is compensation as used by the body Congress.
d. R.S. 4921 (1946) Progression History Estoppel. For the
fourth of six steps in analyzing due compensation in R.S. 4921
(1946), each relevant and timely floor discussion, bill, and report
entry is analyzed sequentially by Record entry date under the STA
rule of progression history estoppel to determine whether any
Congressional meaning of due compensation found in analyzing the
grouped floor discussions, bills, and reports was effectively
disclaimed in subsequent Congressional entries.
After carefully reading over the relevant and timely floor
discussion, bill, and report entries, no upstream floor discussion,
bill, and report entry was found superseded by downstream entries

See supra notes 82, 83, and 84.

See S. REP. No. 79-1503, at 1 (1946) (to accompany H.R. 5311, 79th Cong. (1946)).
See H.R. REP. No. 79.1587, pt. 1, at 1 (1946) (to accompany H.R. 5311, 79th Cong.
(1946)).
' See H.R. REP. No. 79-1587, pt. 2, at 1 (1946) (to accompany H.R. 5311, 79th Cong.
(1946)).
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when sequentially analyzed for the proposition that due compensation means compensation.
Since earlier, downstream floor
discussion, bill, and report entries do not supersede upstream
entries when sequentially analyzed for the proposition that due
compensation means compensation, progression history estoppel
does not limit or estop assertion of due compensation's presumed
ordinary and reasonable meaning of compensation as used by the
body Congress.
e. ExtrinsicEvidence. Where analysis of the intrinsic evidence
alone will reasonably determine the body Congress' meaning of a
disputed term, it is improper to give any weight to extrinsic
evidence to alter the disputed term's reasonably determined
meaning. The rationale for this is that the intrinsic evidence-law
text change, the Act, floor discussions, bills, and reports-rather
than extrinsic evidence, constitutes the Article I, Section 5, Clause
3 record of the elected members that make up the body Congress.
Where the body Congress' meaning of the disputed term cannot
reasonably be determined from the intrinsic evidence alone,
extrinsic evidence may be considered. In these very narrow
circumstances, extrinsic evidence such as legislation, judicial cases,
learned treatises, and dictionary definitions may be used as
extrinsic evidence of the body Congress' meaning of a term in a
floor discussion or report. While an argument can be made that
the body Congress knows all knowledge prior to passing the Act,
there is no logical (and therefore legal) way to conclude that such
knowledge had any influence on whether the body Congress'
intended for a disputed term to have a different and particular
meaning from that disputed term's presumed ordinary and
reasonable meaning unless an elected member of Congress
applicably set out this knowledge evidence in the Congressional
Record. Thus, although timely legislation, judicial cases, learned
treatises, and dictionary definitions may be relevant as extrinsic
evidence where not applicably set out in the Congressional Record,
under "The STA Corollary" to The STA Rule of Omniscience, timely
extrinsic evidence is not conclusive and may be superseded by
intrinsic evidence. When relevant as extrinsic evidence, such
evidence may be used only to help explain the body Congress'
meaning of a vague or ambiguous term used in a floor discussion
or report. Extrinsic evidence may not be used to help explain the
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meaning of any term in a bill, whether that bill is enacted or
unenacted.
Here, the body Congress' meaning of due compensation is
reasonably determined from the intrinsic evidence alone to have its
ordinary and reasonable meaning of compensation. Thus, it is
improper to give any weight to extrinsic evidence to alter the
disputed term's reasonably determined meaning. However, a
discussion of extrinsic evidence here will allow this Article to
demonstrate the use of extrinsic evidence under the STA Method
in the unlikely event that extrinsic evidence will be needed for
another statute, as well as how the conditions of timeliness and
relevance limit the use of extrinsic evidence.
Extrinsic evidence includes the transcripts from the Hearing
before the House Committee on Patents. 1 During this House
committee hearing, invited witness Mr. Folk 11 2 brought into issue
the meaning of due compensation by stating, "I was confused about
general damages and due compensation. I have not given the bill
sufficient study to see exactly what that means.""° Confusing
the word "damages" with the term "general damages" without
actually explaining the meaning of the "due compensation" term in
the bill before the Committee, invited witness Mr. C. Henry
responded to Mr. Folk by stating:
Apropos of Mr. Folk's remark about compensation, I anticipated that that question would come up, and for that reason
I tried to read into the [committee hearing] record awhile ago
[at page 9] a statement of what damages really are [with the
first sentence of the reading beginning, "What are damages?"]. Damages, in a legal sense, means ... compensation
104

At the end of the hearing, invited witness John Stedman, who
worked for John Sonnett at the Department of Justice, proposed

" See Recovery in Patent Infringement Suits: Hearingon H.R. 5231 Before the House
Comm. on Patents, 79th Cong. (1946).
1"2Mr. George E. Folk was the 1946 patent advisor to the National Association of
Manufacturers and invited to the Hearing as a witness just two days before the Hearing.

Id. at 10.
'3Id. at 11.
104 id.
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modifying the bill: "[Sltrike the word 'general' and insert the words
'reasonable royalties as;' then strike the words 'which shall be due
compensation.' 0o However, the House committee supported the
use of the term due compensation by rejecting invited witness Mr.
Stedman's proposed modifications."°
Rhetorically, why would Mr. Stedman's principal, Mr. John
Sonnett, direct his agent, Mr. Stedman, to request that the bill R.S.
4921 (1946)'s "general damages" term be changed to read "reasonable royalties as damages" if the text of the bill already allowed the
awarding of reasonable royalties? Moreover, why would the entire
1946 House Patent Committee reject Mr. Stedman's proposal to
change the bill R.S. 4921 (1946)'s "general damages" term to read
"reasonable royalties as damages" if the bill R.S. 4921 (1946)
already allowed the awarding of reasonable royalties? These are
strong clues that R.S. 4921 (1946) does not allow the award of a
reasonable royalty, contrary to current patent law practice.
Turning to the above three quotes, since this extrinsic exchange
was embodied into the intrinsic Committee report only to the
extent that this exchange was consistent with the Committee
report's proposition of "general damages as due compensation," no
light is shed on the intrinsic evidence presumption of due compensation as compensation by this extrinsic evidence. This extrinsic
evidence statement is, after all, merely an isolated excerpt from a
statement made by an unelected witness to a single committee
meeting of a single House as ultimately embodied in a single
intrinsic committee report by unelected staff members, where the
single intrinsic committee report is analyzed along with all the
other intrinsic evidence for use in determining the body Congress'
meaning of a statutory term enacted by the body Congress. Under
the STA Method, transcripts from Committee meetings are not
bestowed encyclical weight. Moreover, the best use of an extrinsic
evidence Committee meeting transcript is to identify the legislative
proposals that lose during the legislative process but are impermissibly revived by judicial activists during the judicial process.
As for other extrinsic evidence before August 1, 1946, the
Hearing before the House Committee on Patents referenced five
'05 Id. at 20, 21.
106Id,
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legal cases for the proposition of protracted patent infringement
litigation,"°7 a quotation from Seventh Circuit Judge Evan A.
Evans given in a speech before the Patent Law Association in Pittsburgh,"~ and one New York Times article."
Since none of this
evidence was set out in the Congressional Record, this evidence is
at best extrinsic evidence, and in any case does not provide
information about the meaning of "due compensation" as compensation.
Extrinsic evidence that is even less relevant than the New York
Times article that was expressly cited in the committee transcripts
of the Hearing before the House Committee on Patents are timely
legal cases not cited during the committee hearing. The reason for
this is that the body Congress' meaning of a disputed term in a
statute is set out by the elected members of Congress in the
Congressional Record as authorized by the Constitution. Case
opinions-including U.S. Supreme Court opinions-not applicably
set out in the Congressional Record by a member of Congress or
other congressional material essentially carry no weight as to the
body Congress' meaning of a term in a statute. Congress, not the
judiciary, is the architect for the basic human or societal needs of
the People under our Government by Constitution. As Justice
Stevens admonished: "Justice Frankfurter's scholarly observation
concerning the [analysis] of a statutory [term] also applies to the
analysis of legislative history: 'One must ... listen attentively to
what it does not say.' ""o
f
Conclusion: Due Compensation. With the appropriate
evidence set out and analyzed, a proper conclusion can be determined about the body Congress' meaning of due compensation in
R.S. 4921 (1946).
Along with the jejune preamble to R.S. 4921 (1946) supporting
the presumed ordinary and reasonable meaning of due compensation as compensation, each floor discussion, bill, and report
consistently used the term "due compensation" in the ordinary and
reasonable sense of compensation. Although Senator Pepper
'17 Id. at 3, 4, 7, 8, 13.
le Id. at 7.
'09 Id. at 13, 14.
10 Connecticut Natl Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 255 n.2 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (quoting Frankfurter, supra note 42, at 536).
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referred to general compensatory damages during Senate floor
discussion No. 1, the entire Senate considered the term "compensation" in its vote and did not consider Senator Pepper's "general
compensatory damages" term."' Thus, through analysis of the
intrinsic evidence, the meaning of due compensation is reasonably
determined to mean compensation. In addition, because analysis
of the intrinsic evidence alone was sufficient to reasonably determine the body Congress' meaning of due compensation, it is
improper to give any weight to extrinsic evidence to alter due
compensation's reasonably determined meaning of compensation.
Since the body Congress did not intend for the term "due
compensation" in R.S. 4921 (1946) to have a different and particular meaning from due compensation's presumed ordinary and
reasonable meaning of compensation, the presumed ordinary and
reasonable meaning of due compensation as compensation is not
rebutted and thus the term "compensation" controls. Thus, due
compensation has its ordinary and reasonable, August 1, 1946
meaning, namely, compensation.
It took a lot of mental effort to get to this conclusion which
seemed obvious from the beginning of the due compensation
analysis. However, where a statutory term is deemed a disputed
term, the Judiciary must fully and completely analyze the undisputed Article I, Section 5, Clause 3 public record for the body
Congress' meaning of that disputed term, even where the body
Congress' meaning of the disputed term appears to be ordinary and
reasonable at the start of the analysis. "Nothing worthwhile is
easy."' 2 The Judiciary must completely
perform its Marbury v.
3
Madison duty to say what the law is."
As discussed above, the text of R.S. 4921 (1946) is clear in that
the recovery category of general damages means that due compensation shall be recovered. In other words, the term "general
damages" is defined as due compensation under R.S. 4921 (1946),
by which the successful claimant is entitled to due compensation.
Since as was just shown, due compensation under R.S. 4921 (1946)
...
92 CONG. REC. 9188 (1946).

...Alex Kozinski, My Pizza with Nino, 12 CARDOzO L. REV. 1583, 1587 (1991)
(paraphrasing a plaque that resides on Justice Scalia's office wall).
...
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is, emphatically, THE...
DUTY of the judicial department, to say what the law is.") (emphasis added).
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means compensation, the body Congress intended that the successful patent infringement claimant be entitled to compensation under
R.S. 4921 (1946). Thus, the successful claimant is entitled to
compensation under R.S. 4921 (1946), not "damages." As to why
this distinction in terms makes a difference, please be patient.
Before continuing, take contemplative solitude in the words of
Judge Bowen, who stated that "the wheels of justice grind slowly
with the dripping and cooling water of deliberate thought and
human understanding upon the contrariety of life."" 4
Since the use of the term "compensation" comports with Congress' meaning of the term due compensation, the term compensation will be used in the proposed amendments to 35 U.S.C. § 284
(1994) and 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1994) in Appendix I.
3. Compensation Term. As discussed above, the two terms at
issue were identified as general damages and due compensation.
Since the body Congress expressly defined the term "general
damages" as due compensation and intended the term "due
compensation" in R.S. 4921 (1946) to have the ordinary and
reasonable meaning of compensation, the previously latent term
"compensation" now becomes the third term at issue. Again, the
rule under the STA Method is that each possible manifestation of
compensation within R.S. 4921 (1946) is to be set out and analyzed
to determine whether that manifestation analytically subsumes the
other manifestations, is analytically merged into the other manifestations, or is found not relevant concerning the term at issue so
that only one term at issue remains. The body Congress' meaning
of this one remaining term at issue is then derived through the six
steps of analyzing Congress' specification of the law. Since due
compensation was shown to be the only "due compensation" term
remaining in R.S. 4921 (1946) and the meaning of due compensation was shown to be compensation, only the term "compensation"
remains as the term at issue.
a. R.S. 4921 (1946) Text Body. Where a term at issue is
defined expressly in the statute, it is improper to give any weight
to further evidence, either intrinsic or extrinsic, to alter the body
Congress' definition of that term. Where a term at issue is not

114

Sylvester v. Sylvester, 154 N.E.2d 747, 749 (Ind. App. 1958) (referring to the duties

of a judge of a court of appeals).
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expressly defined in the statute itself, the term at issue is deemed
a disputed term.
Where the term at issue is a disputed term, the body Congress
is presumed to have given that term its ordinary and reasonable
meaning as of the enactment date of the statute. If the body
Congress reasonably intended for the disputed term to have a
different and particular meaning from the disputed term's presumed ordinary and reasonable meaning, then the different and
particular meaning rebuts this presumption and thus controls. For
the disputed term, the key issue is whether the body Congress
reasonably intended for the disputed term to have a different and
particular meaning from the disputed term's presumed ordinary
and reasonable meaning.
Since compensation is not expressly defined in R.S. 4921 (1946)
itself,11 5 it will be presumed that the body Congress gave compensation its ordinary and reasonable meaning as of August 1, 1946,
whatever that may have been, absent some showing to the
contrary. If the body Congress reasonably intended for compensation in R.S. 4921 (1946) to have a different and particular meaning
from compensation's presumed ordinary and reasonable August 1,
1946 meaning, then the different and particular meaning rebuts
this presumption and thus controls.
The key issue is whether it can be shown that the body Congress
reasonably intended for compensation to have a different and
particular meaning from compensation's presumed ordinary and
reasonable August 1, 1946 meaning.
b. R.S. 4921 (1946) Preamble & Title. The relevant parts of
the preamble and title to the Patent Act of 1946 are next analyzed
as the second step of part three of the STA Method. Since the
statute's preamble and title require brevity, this brevity is to be
considered when giving weight to the jejune preamble and jejune
title language. In other words, the statute's preamble and title are
far from conclusive evidence of the body Congress' meaning of the
disputed term.
Since the term "compensation" appears once in the preamble to
the Patent Act of 1946,11' the preamble is relevant to the analy115See Patent Act of 1946, ch. 726, 60 Stat. 778 (1946).

neId,
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sis. Although the preamble to R.S. 4921 (1946) states "[t]o amend
Revised Statutes, 4921 (U.S.C.A., title 35, Patents, sec. 70),
providing that damages be ascertained on the basis of compensation for infringement,"'17 it does not provide information about
whether the body Congress reasonably intended for compensation
to have a different and particular meaning.
c. Floor Discussions,Bills, Reports. The third step in analyzing compensation for the body Congress' meaning of compensation
is to organize the relevant and timely (A) floor discussions, (B) bills,
(C) reports into groups. Next, each Congressional Record entry
within each group is set out expressly and analyzed in reverse
chronological order.
i. Floor Discussions. In the Congressional Record, floor
discussion intrinsic evidence includes three substantive discussions:
House floor discussion No. 2, Senate floor discussion No. 1, and
House floor discussion No. 1.118
(a). House Floor Discussion No. 2 (p. 9881). Under the
STA Rule of Omniscience, relevant upstream-in-time floor discussion, bill, and report evidence is irrebuttably presumed known by
each member of the body Congress prior to the current floor
discussion, bill, or report being analyzed. In House floor discussion
No. 2, the Speaker of the House stated, "[i]s there objection to the
request of the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Lanham]? There was no
objection. The Senate amendments were concurred in."119 Thus,
by concurring in the amendments of the Senate made during
Senate floor discussion No. 1 without challenge, the House also
adopted the conclusions of the Senate made during Senate floor
discussion No. 1 (see below). Under Article I, Section I of our
Constitution, there is but one Journal and one Congress with all
legislative power vested therein.
(b). Senate FloorDiscussionNo. 1 (pp.9187-88). In Senate
floor discussion No. 1, Senator Pepper distinguished the term
"general [compensatory] damages" (which includes both profits and
damages) from the term "[compensatory] damages" (which only
includes damages) by stating, "[t]his House bill ...

117

only changes

Id.

li See supra notes 76, 77, and 78.
11992 CONG. REc. 9881 (1946).
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somewhat the basis of recovery in patent infringement suits...
The essential change proposed is that the court may award 'general
compensatory damages', whereas, under the present law [R.S. 4921
(1922)], the court has to determine [both] the profits which may
have been made by the infringer, as well as 'compensatory damages.' "120 Senator Pepper went on to reiterate that R.S. 4921
(1946) general damages may include the infringer's profits as well
as the claimant's damages by stating: "Consequently, the basis laid
down by this bill is general compensatory damages which the
plaintiff in the suit sustains. Of12course,
that may include profits,
1
but is not limited to profits...."
When the time came for the Senate to vote on House Bill 5311
during Senate floor discussion No. 1, two items remained open:
Senator Pepper's statement that "[t]he essential change proposed
is that the court may award general.., damages"1 22 and the bill
embodying R.S. 4921 (1946) with its own reasonable royalty floor
and its own general damages definition. Rather than conflict with
the bill, Senator Pepper's statement that the court may award
general damages merely reiterated the text of the bill embodying
R.S. 4921 (1946) in that the pending bill eliminated the recovery
category of profits and the recovery category of damages in favor of
the single recovery category general damages. Just after Senator
Pepper stated that general damages may include profits, but is not
limited to profits, the entire Senate passed the bill containing the
reasonable royalty floor and the general damages definition as
compensation for making, using, or selling the invention without
further discussion of the term "compensation."1'
Since House Bill 5311 passed without challenge to Senator
Pepper's last remarks that general damages may include the
infringer's profits and there were no other items that conflicted
with the proposition that general damages may include the
infringer's profits, the Senate intended that the infringer's profits
be recoverable as compensation in a patent infringement action by
entitling the claimant to compensation under R.S. 4921 (1946), just

92 CONG. REC. 9188 (1946) (punctuation added).
21Id.

"=Id.
13Id.
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as in R.S. 4921 (1922). Further, from the phrase "not limited to
profits,"lU the Senate intended for the claimant's damages to be
recoverable as compensation in a patent infringement action by
entitling the claimant to compensation under R.S. 4921 (1946), just
as in R.S. 4921 (1922).
The Senate based its collective intent on the adiaphorous belief
(one that is neither right nor wrong) that a pre-1946 claimant was
required to prove the infringer's profits under R.S. 4921 (1922) to
be entitled to R.S. 4921 (1922)'s injunction remedy" : "[Now,
under R.S. 4921 (1946),] it is not necessary to prove profits, if the
[claimant] does not find it appropriate to do so."1 2 It is important to note that because of the commensal relationship among
belief, meaning, and motive, the legal issue is not whether the body
Congress' belief about R.S. 4921 (1922)'s mandatory infringer's
profits requirement was legally or politically right or wrong, but
whether the body Congress held such a belief, as the Senate did in
this case. The courts are to implement the body Congress' meaning
27
of a statutory term, not inquire into their beliefs or motives.
Thus, showing its collective concern for the plight of a claimant
required by the law to prove the infringer's profits, the Senate
voted to make proving the infringer's profits permissive under R.S.
4921 (1946), rather than mandatory as in R.S. 4921 (1922),
reasoning that "[e]xperience has proven that it is such a difficult
accounting matter to determine what the profit of the alleged
infringer has been that there is almost always an interminable
delay [for the claimant] in connection with the recovery sought [by
the claimant]." 1" Thus, by permissively allowing a claimant to
luId.
m See 42 Stat. 389, 392 (1922) (reading: "The several courts vested with jurisdiction of
cases arising under the patent laws shall have power to grant injunctions according to the
course and principles of courts of equity, to prevent the violation of any right secured by
patent, on such terms as the court may deem reasonable; and upon a decree being rendered
in any such case for an infringement the complainant shall be entitled to recover, in addition

to the profits TO BE ACCOUNTED FOR by the defendant, the damages the complainant has
sustained thereby; and the court SHALL assess the same or cause the same to be assessed
under its direction.' (emphasis added to demonstrate that it was necessary for the R.S. 4921
(1922) claimant to prove the infringer's profits, regardless of whether the claimant found it
appropriate to do so).
'
92 CONG. REC. 9188 (1946) (remarks by Sen. Pepper) (emphasis added).
United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 298-99 (1935) (Cardozo, J., dissenting).
92 CONG. REc. 9188 (1946) (remarks by Sen. Pepper).
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seek an infringer's profits under R.S. 4921 (1946), the patent
infringement claimant could avoid, but need not avoid, the
"interminable
delay in connection with the recovery sought" by the
12 9

claimant.

The important point to take away from Senate floor discussion
No. 1 is that the Senate intended for the infringer's profits and the
claimant's damages to be recoverable within the R.S. 4921 (1946)
recovery category of compensation. Thus, in answering the key
issue of whether the body Congress reasonably intended for
compensation to have a different and particular meaning from
compensation's presumed ordinary and reasonable meaning, the
Senate intended the different and particular meaning of compensation, by which an infringer's profits and a claimant's damages are
recoverable within the R.S. 4921 (1946) recovery category of
compensation.
(c). House FloorDiscussionNo. 1 (p. 1857). In House floor
discussion No. 1, Mr. Lanham asserted that under "non-willful"
infringement circumstances, the claimant would be entitled to no
more than a reasonable royalty: "This [House Bill 5311] simply
provides ... in case the infringement of the patent is innocent,
merely to assess royalties... [tihe measure of [which]. . is clearly
set out."'
House member Mr. Cravens agreed with Mr.
Lanham. 3 ' But when House member Mr. Cole challenged Mr.
Lanham's remark concerning recovery of no more than a reasonable
royalty, Mr. Lanham indicated that the House committee's
definition of a reasonable royalty was contrary to Mr. Lanham's
reasonable royalty ceiling assertion and further indicated that the
House committee intended to make a reasonable royalty the
measure of minimum damages: "MR. COLE of New York. I would
like to be sure. Do I understand correctly that the effect of this bill
is to make a reasonable royalty for an infringement the measure of
minimum damages to any holder of a patent whose patent has been
infringed?" where Mr. Lanham responded: 'That is the purpose of
the bill as brought out before the committee. " 1 32 Mr. Lanham

'" Id.
180 92 CONG. REc. 1857 (1946).

"1 ld.
11Id,
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emphasized the House committee's commitment to their reasonable
royalty floor definition by stating: "The committee, I may say,
reported this bill unanimously after rather adequate hearings."'33
By distinguishing Mr. Lanham's remarks from the House committee's remarks, Mr. Lanham made it clear that his remarks were his
individual remarks, and not those of the committee or the House as
a whole body. Since Mr. Lanham's remarks concerning the
reasonable royalty as a ceiling conflicted with the House committee
report and the expressed reasonable royalty floor provisions in the
text of House Bill 5311,'34 only that proposed reasonably royalty
provision expressly adopted by the House could eventually be that
of Congress as a whole body.
Another conflict existed at the time of the House vote on House
Bill 5311. Mr. Lanham and the House committee report requested
that general damages be defined as "any damages a complainant
can prove, not less than a reasonable royalty, together with interest
from the time the infringement occurred, rather than damages
based upon profits.""s However, the text of House Bill 5311
defined general damages as "due compensation for making, using,
or selling the invention."" 6 Since Mr. Lanham and the House
committee's definition of general damages conflicted with the
express definition of general damages in the text of House Bill
5311, only that proposed definition of general damages expressly
adopted by the House could eventually be that of Congress as a
whole body.
When the time came for the House to vote on House Bill 5311
during House floor discussion No. 1, two items remained open: (i)
whether the reasonable royalty was to be a ceiling or a floor; and
(ii) whether general damages was to be defined as "any damages a
complainant can prove, not less than a reasonable royalty, together
with interest from the time the infringement occurred, rather than
damages based upon profits" or defined as "due compensation for
making, using, or selling the invention." 3 7

Not only did the

entire House pass the bill containing the reasonable royalty floor
3

1

Id.

H.R. 5311, 79th Cong. (1946).
CONG. REc. 1857 (1946).
13 Id.
'3

135 92

uf Id.
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and the general damages definition of "compensation for making,
using, or selling the invention," but Mr. Lanham's proffered ceiling
definition as well as Mr. Lanham's and the House committee's
proffered definition of general damages that eliminated recovery of
the infringer's profits were never even brought to a vote."s
The important point to take away from House floor discussion
No. 1 is that because the attempt by a House member and House
committee to eliminate recovery of an infringer's profits was
presented to the entire House but was not brought to a vote, the
definition of general damages as "any damages a complainant can
prove, not less than a reasonable royalty, together with interest
from the time the infringement occurred, rather than damages
based upon profits"13 9 was not enacted into law. 1"
Further,
because the entire House both (i) rejected Mr. Lanham and the
House committee's definition of general damages that eliminated
recovery of an infringer's profits and (ii) passed the bill containing
the reasonable royalty floor and the general damages definition of
"compensation for making, using, or selling the invention," the
House body in floor discussion No. 1 intended that an infringer's
profits be recoverable within the meaning of compensation under
R.S. 4921 (1946)-just as in R.S. 4921 (1922). Thus, in answering
the key issue of whether the body Congress reasonably intended for
compensation to have a different and particular meaning from
compensation's presumed ordinary and reasonable meaning, the
House intended the different and particular meaning of compensation, by which an infringer's profits are recoverable within the R.S.
4921 (1946) recovery category of compensation. Bill evidence is
analyzed next.
ii. Bills. The three intrinsic evidence bills that went into
R.S. 4921 (1946) were House Bill 5311, House Bill 5231, and House
Bill 4143.141 The text of these bills remained unchanged over
time concerning the issue of whether the body Congress reasonably
138 92 CONG. REC. 1857 (1946).
'Id.

140 Cf Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp., 243 F. Supp. 500, 526

(S.D.N.Y. 1965) (adopting Mr. Lanham's and the House Committee's definition of general
damages definition over Congress' Article I, Section 8, Clause 18 enacted R.S. 4921 (1946)'s

definition of general damages).
141

See supra text accompanying notes 79, 80, and 81.
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intended for compensation to have a different and particular
meaning from compensation's presumed ordinary and reasonable
meaning. Thus, each bill reemphasizes the meaning of compensation that is found in the other intrinsic evidence.
iii. Reports. The three intrinsic evidence reports which went
into R.S. 4921 (1946) were Senate Report 1503, House Report 1587
(Part 2), and House Report 1587 (Part 1).142
Through Senate Report 1503, the Senate Committee on Patents
adopted House Report 1587 (Part 1) in full.'4 House Report 1587
(Part 2) was written to comply with the Ramseyer rule relating to
procedural approval by the House's legislative counsel and thus
added nothing substantive to House Report 1587 (Part 1).1"
Each report proffered the definition of general damages as: "any
damages the complainant can prove, not less than a reasonable
royalty, together with interest from the time the infringement
occurred, rather than profits and damages." 145 However, as
discussed in Part III.C.3.c.i. (compensation term: floor discussion)
of this Article, the definition of general damages as "compensation"
was approved by the full House in House floor discussion No. 2 and
No. 1 and the full Senate in Senate floor discussion No. 1 without
bringing to a vote the definition of general damages as proffered in
the three reports-a definition which appeared to seek elimination
of the recovery of an infringer's profits. Thus, recovery of the
infringer's profits was not eliminated from R.S. 4921 (1946)'s
compensation recovery category merely because the three intrinsic
reports appeared to seek elimination of the recovery of the infringer's profits.
As demonstrated under the STA Method, until the House and
Senate vote into law a committee report proposal, this committee
report proposal, like other intrinsic proposals not voted upon or
passed, lacks legislative authority and, therefore, is discarded along
side the political road in favor of those proposals that are voted
upon and passed. This supports the rule under The STA Rule of
Omniscience that it is not legally relevant whether a particular
142

See supra text accompanying notes 82, 83, and 84.

43 S. REP. NO. 79-1503, at 2 (1946).
144

92 CONG. REc. 1789 (1946). See also United States v. Casson, 434 F.2d 415, 420-21

n.22 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (defining the Ramseyer rule).
145See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 79-1587, pt. 1, at 1 (1946).
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member actually hears, reads, or otherwise has genuine knowledge
of these presentations on the congressional floor to the body
Congress as evidenced by their entry in the Congressional Record.
d. R.S. 4921 (1946) ProgressionHistory Estoppel. For the
fourth of six steps in analyzing compensation in R.S. 4921 (1946),
each relevant and timely floor discussion, bill, and report entry is
analyzed sequentially by Record entry date. The STA rule of
progression history estoppel determines whether any Congressional
meaning of compensation found in analyzing the grouped floor
discussions, bills, and reports was effectively disclaimed in
subsequent congressional entries. Although floor discussions, bills,
and reports are analyzed as groups, the entries within each group
influence and may supersede one another as each entry of each
group individually makes its appearance on the congressional floor.
Thus, this forward entry progression history limits the body
Congress' meaning of compensation or estops assertion of the body
Congress' meaning of compensation to exclude any meaning of
compensation in R.S. 4921 that was effectively disclaimed during
downstream progression of that term through Congress. To coin a
phrase, this is the "Progression History Estoppel."
147
1
Here, R.S. 4921 went from the House, " to the Senate,
back to the House, 14" to the President, 149 and into law1". An
analysis of the progression history reveals that in the July 24,
1946, House floor discussion No. 2,51 Mr. Lanham asked for the
House's "unanimous consent ... in concurr[ing] in the Senate
amendments" made in the July 17, 1946 Senate discussion No.
1152 without challenging anything set out in the Congressional
Record by the Senate on July 17, 1946.153 Since, as discussed
above, the entire Senate intended the different and particular
meaning of compensation by which an infringer's profits and a
claimant's damages are recoverable within the R.S. 4921 recovery

14091 CONG. REC. 8879 (Sept. 20, 1945).

14192
14892
149 92
150 92
"5
152

153

CONG.
CONG.
CONG.
CONG.

REC.
REC.
REC.
REC.

1905 (Mar. 5, 1946).
9881 (July 24, 1946).
10,230-31 (July 26, 1946).
10,649 (Aug. 1, 1946).

92 CONG. REC. 9881 (1946).
92 CONG. REC. 9187-88 (July 17, 1946).
See 92 CONG. REC. 9881 (1946).
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category of compensation, Mr. Lanham's July 24, 1946 request for
the House's "unanimous consent ... [to] in concur in the Senate
amendments" demonstrates Mr. Lanham's change of mind concerning his March 4, 1946, House floor discussion No. 1 proposal to
eliminate an infringer's profits from patent infringement recovery.'
Thus, Mr. Lanham effectively disclaimed his House floor
discussion No. 1 proposal to eliminate an infringer's profits from
patent infringement recovery.
As demonstrated by the above analysis, it is illogical and
mutually inconsistent to think that Mr. Lanham, the author of the
1946 Lanham (Trademark) Act that revolutionized United States
trademark law, would want to deny recovery of the patent infringer's profits to a patent claimant under the Patent Act of 1946 but
allow recovery of the trademark infringer's profits to a trademark
claimant under the Trademark Act of 1946. This provides evidence
of erroneous reasoning within current patent legal theory.
Of course, more importantly, through House floor discussions No.
2, No. 1, and the progression history estoppel, the entire House
expressed its collective intent that an infringer's profits and a
claimant's damages were to be recoverable within the R.S. 4921
recovery category of compensation. This conclusion is supported by
the House's actions of subsequently adopting the Senate's amendments to R.S. 4921 in House floor discussion No. 2 without
challenging the Senate's intent as expressed in the Congressional
Record that an infringer's profits and a claimant's damages were to
be recoverable within the R.S. 4921 recovery category of compensation as brought out in Senate floor discussion No. 1. With no one
in either the House or the Senate left advocating that the body
Congress define compensation within the R.S. 4921 (1946) to
eliminate the recovery of an infringer's profits, any assertion under
any circumstances that the body Congress intended to eliminate
the recovery of the infringer's profits by enacting R.S. 4921 (1946)
is unconditionally estopped through progression history estoppel.
e. Extrinsic Evidence. Where an analysis of the intrinsic
evidence alone will reasonably determine the body Congress'
meaning of a disputed term, it is improper to give any weight to
extrinsic evidence to alter the disputed term's reasonably deter-

I" See 92 CONG. REc. 1857 (Mar. 4, 1946).
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mined meaning. The rationale for this is that the intrinsic
evidence-the Act, floor discussions, bills, and reports-rather than
extrinsic evidence, constitutes the Article I, Section 5, Clause 3
record of the elected members that make up the body Congress.
Since analysis of the intrinsic evidence alone reasonably determined the body Congress' meaning of compensation, it is improper
to give any weight to extrinsic evidence that may alter compensation's reasonably determined meaning.
f Conclusion: Compensation. With the appropriate evidence
set out and analyzed, a proper conclusion can be determined about
the body Congress' meaning of compensation in R.S. 4921 (1946).
Both the House and Senate intended the different and particular
meaning of compensation under R.S. 4921 (1946) to include
recovery of both an infringer's profits and a claimant's damages,
rather than the presumed ordinary and reasonable meaning of
compensation, whatever it may have been.'55 The body Congress
intended that the claimant have a choice on whether or not to
prove an infringer's profits under R.S. 4921 (1946). The policy
underlying the "claimant's election" was the body Congress' concern
for the plight of the claimant where "[e]xperience has proven that
it is such a difficult accounting matter to determine what the profit
of the alleged infringer has been that there is almost always an
interminable delay [for the claimant] in connection with the
recovery sought [by the claimant].""5
This "Claimant's Election" rule makes sense since elimination of
the recovery of an infringer's profits would show concern for the
plight of the intellectual property infringer, something in which
Congress has never shown much interest. Further, eliminating the
recovery of the patent infringer's profits inconsistently gives patent
law the weakest intellectual property remedy between patent law,
trademark law, and copyright law, even though patent law's
liability law offers much stronger protection than the liability laws
for trademark law or copyright law. This is another clue that
something is wrong with current patent legal theory.
'5 See also Binger v. Unger, 7 F.R.D. 121, 122, 72 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 166, 167 (S.D.N.Y.
1946) (stating: "It would thus appear that profits can now, under [R.S. 4921 (1946)], be
included in general damages and recovered."). Binger, filed July 2, 1946, is the only
published case that was impacted by the August 1, 1946 enactment of R.S. 4921 (1946).
I 92 CONG. REc. 9188 (1946) (remarks of Sen. Pepper).
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D. CONCLUSION: 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1994)
As the fourth and final part of the STA Method, the trier of law
draws a conclusion as to the statute at issue and applies that
conclusion to the issues of the litigants before the court. Here, with
the body Congress' meaning of general damages, due compensation,
and compensation properly defined, R.S. 4921 (1946) may be
applied to the issues at hand. As will be obvious below, the body
Congress' "intent" becomes a foregone conclusion with the body
Congress' meaning of each term in a statute determined under the
STA Method. In other words, any conclusion by the tier of law as
to the body Congress' intent has importance only as a heuristic
technique of determining the body Congress' meaning of a term in
a statute.
As of this writing, there is no adequate or authoritative judicial
analysis of 35 U.S.C. § 284's terms requiring a court in a patent
infringement action to award a "reasonable royalty" as the
alternative remedy to unavailable "damages" or "lost profits."
Further, because the substantive law of patent infringement
compensation under 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1994) has remained unchanged since at least 1946, what is proven as the law under R.S.
4921 (1946) is proven as the law under 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1994).
The R.S. 4921 (1946) "general damages" term was proven to
mean due compensation. The "due compensation" term was proven
to mean compensation. Compensation under R.S. 4921 (1946)-and
therefore under 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1994)-was proven to include the
award of the infringer's profits and the claimant's damages, just as
before the Patent Act of 1946. This makes sense because the body
Congress' fundamental purpose behind patent infringement
compensation is to award the claimant full compensation for the
infringement conduct proven during the trial's liability phase,'5 7
despite any showing during the trial's remedy phase of the
claimant's ability to exploit that claimant's patent. As CAFC Chief

" See Monessen S.W. Ry. Co. v. Morgan, 486 U.S. 330, 339 n.9 (1988) (leaving intact
dissent's reiteration of the fundamental purpose of full compensation in a patent infringement suit); General Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648, 654 (1983) (noting that

Congress intended that the harm suffered by a patent infringement claimant be compensated
by full compensation); Birdsell v. Shaliol, 112 U.S. 485, 489 (1884) (analogizing full
compensation of a patent owner with the taking of personal property).
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Judge Markey concluded back in 1988: Distinguishing a claimant's
statutory right to full compensation on whether that claimant lacks
money and manufacturing capacity disserves the public's Article I,
Section 8, Clause 8 interest in technological advancement by
favoring corporations over individuals, and creates a "survival of
the fittest" jungle mentality that was to be replaced, not served, by
the law.'"
The difference in patent infringement compensation awarded
after 1946 from that awarded before 1946 is that the body Congress
effectively eliminated any possibility of double recovery'59 and
interminable delay that afflicted pre-1946 compensation
awards."8 Congress accomplished this by using two techniques:
the biunial act of embodying the infringer's profits and
claimant's damages within the single, 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1994)
recovery category of compensation; and
(ii) the act of removing R.S. 4921 (1922)'s mandatory requirement in favor of allowing the 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1994) claimant to decide whether to seek the infringer's profits.
(i)

Thus, rather than two explicitly separate recovery categories, the
body Congress intended that the infringer's profits and the
claimant's damages be the two elements that make up the single
recovery category of compensation,""' thereby foreshadowing a
Federal Circuit "compensation split" holding such as State Indus-

Fromson v. Western Litho Plate & Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568, 1575, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1606, 1613 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
1
" Kori Corp. v. Wilco Marsh Buggies & Dragjines, Inc., 761 F.2d 649,654,225 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 985, 987 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (Judge Rich stating that "[t]he 1946 amendment to the
damages provision [of the Patent Statutes] effectively eliminated this double recovery" to
prevent a successful claimant from being "placed in a better position than he would have
been if the infringer had not infringed.").
160 See 92 CoNG. REc. 9188 (1946) (Senate floor discussion No. 1) (remarks by Sen.
Pepper: "[There is almost always an interminable delay in connection with the recovery
sought..).
'a' Unlike the separate recovery categories of copyright and trademark infringements,
patent infringement placed its infringer's profits and claimant's damages recovery definitions
under the single recovery category labeled compensation. To achieve consistent intellectual
property law, this author recommends that Congress recodify the copyright and trademark
compensation statutes to a form similar to the proposed amendments to 35 U.S.C. § 284
(1994) and 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1994) in Appendix I.
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tries v. Mor-Flo Industries. 2
Since the 1952 Act merely codified R.S. 4921 (1946) into 35
U.S.C. § 284 (1952) and the monetary recovery remedy under § 284
has remained unchanged since 1952, Congress intended 35 U.S.C.
§ 284 (1994) as statutory authority for the courts to award the
infringer's profits as compensation under § 284, contrary to our
court's practice for the last 33 years. Recovery of the infringer's
profits and the claimant's damages within the recovery category of
compensation has been embodied within this Article's proposed
amendments to 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1994) and 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1994)
in Appendix I.
That R.S. 4921 (1946) provides for general damages and that the
term "general damages" means compensation is not some mere
abstract proposal with which the judiciary may do as it pleases ex
post facto, but a decisive rule of law by all concerned. The law
decisively states: "General damages ... shall be ... compensation.""
Further, by passing R.S. 4921 (1946), the House of
Representatives intended that general damages shall be compensation and that the claimant shall be entitled to compensation. By
passing R.S. 4921 (1946), the Senate intended that general
damages shall be compensation and that the claimant shall be
entitled to compensation. Finally, by signing R.S. 4921 (1946) into
law, the President of the United States intended that the enacted
term general damages shall be compensation, and that the claimant
shall be entitled to compensation. In short, the two relevant
branches of our tripartite system of government have decided
legislatively that general damages shall be compensation and that
the successful patent infringement claimant shall be entitled to
compensation.
Compensation under 35 U.S.C. § 284 includes both the infringer's
profits and the claimant's damages. To reach further into intrinsic
or extrinsic evidence using techniques of judicial advocacy for the
tribunal purpose of giving compensation a meaning that excludes
from recovery the infringer's profits usurps Congress' Constitution-

162883 F.2d 1573, 1577, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1026, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (compensation
award split between the two available forms of compensation), approved in Rite-Hite Corp.
v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1545,35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065, 1069 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (in banc).
163 Patent Act of 1946, ch. 726, 60 Stat. 778 (1946).
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al power to make all laws granted to the Legislative Branch by We
the People of the United States. This usurpation may seem trivial
to some in the Judicial Branch because, in this case, it is just
patent law. However, the tribunal's philosophy behind the "it'sjust
.
thinking incrementally and imperceptibly degrades into
personal fiefdoms everything our ancestors fought and died for in
support of our Constitution and the power that flows from our
Constitution. The next part of this Article, Part IV, bears this out.
IV. THE ARO II PLURALITY DICTA VIEW

If one man can be allowed to determine for himself what is
law, every man can. That means first chaos, then tyranny.
Legal process is an essentialpart of the democratic process.
-Justice Frankfurter, 194716
The following analysis exposes the judicial activist method that
four Supreme Court Justices used in the obscure, 1964 patent
infringement case of Aro Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible Top
Replacement Co.,"' to usurp Congress' vested power to make all
laws, thereby causing devastating effects on court opinions and the
rule of law, on litigants who seek justice, and on Congress and the
entire judicial system.
A. ARO I & ARO II

In the case of Aro ManufacturingCo. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co. ("Aro II")1' and its predecessor case, Aro I,167 the defendant (Aro Manufacturing Co.) was accused under 35 U.S.C.
§ 271 of infringing the claimant's (Convertible Top Replacement
Co., a.k.a. "CTR" Co.) patent claims through the defendant's action
of§ 271(c) contributory infringement. The claimant's patent claims
covered the structure used to create the convertible tops for
automobiles made by carmakers in the 1960s. The claimant's

United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 312 (1947).
'" 377 U.S. 476 (1964) ("Aro II).
INId.
'67 365 U.S. 336, 128 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 354 (1961) ("Aro 1").
'64
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patented structure consisted of two elements: mechanical parts and
a fabric top that normally wore out after three years of use."6
The two Aro cases have very similar facts. In both Aro cases, the
defendant sold component replacement fabric tops to the owners of
convertibles made by both General Motors (Aro I) and Ford (Aro I)
without a license from the claimant to make or sell component
replacement fabric tops.'" By repairing their car's worn out
fabric tops, these owners/purchasers themselves made the structure
covered by the claimant's patent claims. 70 The key difference
between Aro I and Aro H was that General Motors (Aro 1) was
licensed by the claimant to make and sell General Motors convertibles using the claimant's patented structure whereas Ford (Aro H)
made and sold Ford convertibles without a license from the
claimant.' 7 ' In both Aro I and Aro II, the Supreme Court would
find the defendant liable for § 271(c) contributory infringement only
if one or more of the defendant's purchasers could be found liable
under § 271(a) direct infringement
for replacing their car's fabric
172
top as an element of § 271(C).
In Aro I, the Supreme Court found that the owners of General
Motor cars were entitled to repair their car's patented convertible
tops using the defendant's fabric top, reasoning that an implied
license to repair flowed from the claimant to the defendant's
purchasers through the defendant's purchasers' ownership of
convertibles made by the claimant's licensee, namely, General
Motors. 173 Since each fabric top purchaser in Aro I had an
implied license to repair, the Court concluded that the defendant's
purchasers could not be found liable under § 271(a) direct infringement for replacing their car's fabric tops with the defendant's
unlicensed fabric tops. Since the Aro I claimant could not prove the
§ 271(a) element of § 271(c) contributory infringement, the Court
held that the Aro I defendant did not commit § 271(c) contributory
infringement, reasoning that it "is no more than the lawful right of

1

Aro II, 377 U.S. at 478-79 (U.S. Patent No. 2,569,724, "Convertible Folding Top with
Automatic Seal at Rear Quarter).
'69 1d. at 479.
70

'7 Id. at 483.

' Id. at 478-79.
d. at 483.
7
l 3 Id. at 483-84 (Aro // bringing out this Aro I point).
172
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174
the owner to repair his property."
At the time the Aro II Court addressed the issues before them,
the lower courts had not addressed the compensation issues, and
the parties had not briefed the compensation issues. 175 Thus, in
Aro II, only the liability phase of the claimant's patent infringement trial was before the Court. In the Court opinion written by
Justice Brennan and joined by Justices Stewart, White, Goldberg,
and Harlan, the majority held that the owners of Ford cars were
not entitled to repair their car's convertible tops since Ford itself
did not have a license from the claimant through which an implied
license to repair could flow. 176 Since the persons who purchased
cars from Ford lacked the claimant's express or implied authority
to repair their car's convertible tops, these people could be found
liable under § 271(a) "making infringement" for replacing their car's
worn out fabric top with the defendant's unlicensed fabric top.
Since the Aro II claimant could prove the § 271(a) element of
§ 271(c) contributory infringement as well as each other element, 177 the majority went on to hold the Aro II defendant liable
for contributory infringement within the terms of § 271(c). 178
Since the Court completed its Aro II analysis concerning the
issues of liability, the Justices were required under the "cases and
controversies" requirement of Article III, Section 2, Clause 1 to end
their discussion there. But Brennan, Stewart, White and Goldberg
felt compelled to go beyond the liability issues that were before the
Court and issued their plurality dicta view in section IV of the Aro
II opinion. 179 Under the great, pestiferous influence of section IV
of Aro II, the lower courts have continued the pre-1946 tworecovery category scheme eliminated by the 1946 Congress through

174 Aro 1, 365 U.S. at 346.
175Aro II, 377 U.S. at 502 (plurality dicta view).
176
Id. at 485.
17

7 Id.
Id, at 492-93. For follow up, see Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 240

17

F. Supp. 805, 145 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 61 (D. Mass. 1965) ("Aro III*).
'79Aro 11, 377 U.S. at 502 n.18 (plurality dicta view) (In section IV of this case, a plurality
4 of 9 justices stated their views in dicta while Mr. Justice Harlan restrained himself from
participating in unripe matters dealt with in section IV). See supra text accompanying note
37 (discussing the plurality dicta view). Although it is likely Justice Brennan wrote section
IV of Aro H since he wrote the majority opinion for the Aro II Court, there is no express
indication as to which of these four wrote the plurality dicta view.
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the practice of awarding "damages" ("lost profits") under the pre1946 recovery category of damages or awarding a "reasonable
royalty" under the post-1964 recovery category of reasonable
royalty. This has persisted despite lacking the statutory authority
under
35 U.S.C. § 284 for either award.
As the
reader can imagine, pulling the wool over the
eyes of the
People, the members of Congress and the judiciary is no easy feat
of deception. This is especially true where the deception lasts
thirty-three years and is overlooked by hundreds of thousands of
attorneys. Such an abditive feat requires a great skill-a "Supreme
skill'-at manipulating words and their meaning. The plurality
dicta view masterfully achieved this deception through distortion
and then a tying arrangement. First, the plurality dicta view
distorted the body Congress' meaning of the terms in R.S. 4921
(1946) into something that the body Congress never intended. The
plurality dicta view then piggybacked this distortion onto Aro Irs
majority holding to tie the Supreme Court's ultimate authority as
the analyzer of the terms of statutes and our Constitution to the
plurality dicta view's distortion. This tying arrangement between
the Supreme Court's Constitutional authority and the plurality
dicta view's distortion was crafted to impart the misconception that
the plurality dicta view's distortion was statutory law enacted by
Congress and the President. The plurality dicta view achieved the
distortion part of their overall deception in five steps.
1. Step 1: Find the ConstitutionSuperseded. Since 1792, it has
been clear that the Supreme Court's jurisdiction over issues is
limited to those issues that satisfy the Article III, Section 2, Clause
1 "case or controversy" requirement. This constitutional requirement states that "[t]he judicial Power shall extend to all Cases and
to controversies." i' °
On this, the 1997 Court in Clinton v.
8
1
Jones' cited the 1792 case of Hayburn's Case"2 and stated:
[T]his Court early and wisely determined that it would not
give advisory opinions even when asked by the Chief Executive. More generally, we have broadly stated that executive

1'o U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, c.

1.

18' 117 S. Ct. 1636 (1997).
182 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408 (1792).
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or administrative duties of a nonjudicial nature may not be
imposed on judges holding office under Art. III of the
Constitution. These restrictions on judicial activities help
ensure the independence of the Judicial Branch and to
prevent the Judiciary from encroaching into areas reserved
for the other branches.1s3
This Constitutional mandate makes sense since Congress may
still "authorize [the Court] to enter orders necessary and appropriate to the final disposition of a suit that is before [the Court] for
review" concerning matters" 'reasonably ancillary to the primary,
dispute-deciding function' of the federal courts."1
Moreover,
abstract or hypothetical questions before the Court lack the longterm, lower-court analysis needed by the minimally staffed Justices
to make wise, final, non-political decisions. Justice Harlan knew
this and appropriately restrained himself in Aro II by expressly
stating that the patent infringement compensation matters were
not ripe for decision, leaving them for determination in the future
course of Aro I/'s litigation.' '
It is a sad commentary on Chief Justice Earl Warren's 1964
Court that only one Justice in the Aro II majority-Justice
Harlan-felt bound by that Justice's sworn oath of Office to uphold
our Constitution by restraining himself. Justice Frankfurter once
explained the difference between judging and judicial activism:
[The] courts are not at large ....

They are under the con-

straints imposed by the judicial function in our democratic
society. As a matter of verbal recognition certainly, no one
will gainsay that the function in construing a statute is to
ascertain the meaning of words used by the [body Congress].
To go beyond it is to usurp a power which our democracy has
lodged in its elected legislature. .. .

A judge must not

rewrite a statute, neither to enlarge nor to contract it.
Whatever temptations the statesmanship of judicial] policy-

183

Clinton, 117 S. Ct. at 1647 n.33 (internal quotations and citations omitted).

'" U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 513 U.S. 18, 22 (1994)

(internal citations omitted).
185Aro 11, 377 U.S. at n.18.
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making might wisely suggest, construction must eschew
interpolation and evisceration. He must not read in by way
of creation. He must not read out except to avoid patent
nonsense or internal contradiction. ...
[At present, the]
only sure safeguard against crossing the line between
adjudication and legislation is an alert recognition of the
necessity not to cross it and instinctive, as well as trained,
reluctance to do so.'"
Even with a clear understanding of the constraints they were
under as federal judges, Brennan, Stewart, White, and Goldberg
gave the Constitution's case or controversy mandate a 1960's wink
by deeming Article III, Section 2, Clause 1 of our Constitution-the
Supreme law of our land-superseded by so-called administration
concerns: "It is true that the lower courts have not yet expressly
addressed themselves to the damages issue, and that the parties
have not argued it here. ...
[Nonetheless], we deem it in the
interest of efficient judicial administration to express those views
at this time."8 7
The so-called administration conc6rns that Brennan, Stewart,
White, and Goldberg used to supersede constitutional imperatives
were the personal conclusion of these four Justices that "we are,
indeed, doubtful that CTR can properly be allowed recovery of
anything more than nominal damages from Aro.""' The plurality
dicta view developed its analysis to support this predetermined
conclusion because these Justices personally believed that "[a]
patent owner's ability to recover the infringer's profits reflect[s] the
notion that he should be able to force the infringer to disgorge the
89
fruits of the infringement even if it caused him no injury."
With their ad hominem pretense of jurisdiction, the four members
of this ipse dixit coterie could now proceed to the more pernicious
parts of their view: enacting statutory law from the Court's bench.
2. Step 2: DisguisePluralityDicta View DefinitionsAs Congress'
Definitions. To distort Congress' law, the illusion had to be created
'86Frankfurter, supra note 42, at 533-35, quoted in FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 633
(1982).
117Aro II, 377 U.S. at 502.
18
1d. at 504.
"General

Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648, 654, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1185,

1188 (1983).
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that the plurality dicta view was implementing the body Congress'
meaning of the terms in R.S. 4921 (1946) and not their own
meaning. To achieve this, the plurality dicta view first correctly
pointed out that the Patent Act of 1952 did not change the law
concerning R.S. 4921 (1946): "[t]he [1952] stated purpose [for
consolidating R.S. 4919 (1946) and R.S. 4921 (1946) into 35 U.S.C.
§ 2841 was merely ... 'to clarify the statement of the statutes.' "'9 Their disingenuous purpose for pointing this out was
to imply without analysis that § 284 (1964) was an acceptable
patent statute for use in analyzing the body Congress' 1946
meaning of the terms in R.S. 4921 (1946), even though the body
Congress' meaning of the terms in § 284 were set out 18 years
before the existence of § 284 (1964). This makes a mockery of the
requirement that the analysis of a patent law question necessarily
begins with the relevant patent statute' 91 and, as will be so clear,
is an affront on our Constitution.
Analyzing the body Congress' meaning of the terms in R.S. 4921
(1946) under § 284 (1964) allowed the plurality dicta view to avoid
Congress' 1946 action of removing the R.S. 4921 (1922) statutory
basis for awarding "damages" and "profits" as separate recovery
categories by enacting a new R.S. 4921 (1946) umbrella patent
infringement recovery category labeled "general damages"" 2 and
by defining general damages as "due compensation for making,
using, or selling the invention." Violating their sworn oath under
Article VI, Clause 3 to support the terms of the United States
Constitution by avoiding Congress' 1946 removal of both the R.S.
4921 (1922) profits recovery category and the R.S. 4921 (1922)
damages recovery category, the plurality dicta view could now put
into effect their hidden agenda. The plurality dicta view declared
that the 1946 Congress eliminate the recovery of profits by
eliminating only the R.S. 4921 (1922) recovery category of profits,
while keeping the recovery of damages by not eliminating the R.S.
4921 (1922) recovery category of damages. As they put it, "[the
Aro II, 377 U.S. at 505 n.20.
101Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (in banc) (citing
1

General Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. at 653-54).
2
'9 See, eg., Ric-Wil Co. v. E. B. Kaiser Co., 179 F.2d 401, 407, 84 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 121,
127 (7th Cir. 1950) (stating R.S. 4921 (1946) "provides recovery for nothing other than
'general damages' ").
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statute was changed ... whereby only 'damages' are recoverable.' 9 3
In actuality, in making this statement, the plurality dicta view
was actually stating that the 1946 Congress eliminated recovery of
the infringer's profits by changing the text in 1952. This positive
misprision of retroactively attributing the recodification by the 1952
Congress to the 1946 Congress created the illusion that the
plurality dicta view was implementing 1946 Congress' meaning of
the terms in R.S. 4921 (1946) rather than the plurality dicta view's
meaning of the terms in R.S. 4921 (1946). The Federal Circuit's
observations are relevant here:
Distortion of the record, by deletion of critical language in
quoting from the record, reflects a lack of the candor required
by the MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 3.3
(1983), wastes the time of the court and of opposing counsel,
and imposes unnecessary costs on the parties and on fellow
citizens whose taxes support this court and its staff. A
quotation containing deletions that so clearly distort the
meaning and relevance of the quotation as to render it
misleading
will not in this court be encouraged by acquies1 94
cence.
3. Step 3: Circumvent Congress' Post-1946 General Damages
Recovery Category. Since the plurality dicta view had successfully
created the illusion that they were implementing the body Congress' meaning of the terms in R.S. 4921 (1946) and not their own
meaning, the plurality dicta view could take the third of their five
steps to distort the body Congress' meaning of the terms in R.S.
4921 (1946) into something that the body Congress never intended.
These four Justices knew that they had to circumvent Congress'
post-1946 general damages recovery category since, as discussed
above in Part III of this Article, Congress' meaning of post-1496
general damages included the infringer's profits and the claimant's
damages.
Aro H1, 377 U.S. at 505.
Amstar Corp. v. Envirotech Corp., 730 F.2d 1476, 1486, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 649, 656
(Fed. Cir. 1984).
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To circumvent Congressional law, the plurality dicta view of Aro
II relied on a textual change in R.S. 4921 (1946) from the 1946 law
to the 1952 law in order to assert that Congress made a substantive change in R.S. 4921 (1946) from the 1922 law to the 1946 law.
The Patent Act of 1952's codification of R.S. 4921 (1946) into § 284
(1952) changed the R.S. 4921 (1946) text, "the complainant shall be
entitled to recover GENERAL DAMAGES which shall be due
compensation for making, using, or selling the invention"19 5 to,
"the court shall award the claimant DAMAGES."'" While there
is no written record of why the text was changed from "general
damages" to "damages," the members of the plurality dicta view
admitted that this text change was not a substantive change in the
law: "the stated purpose [for consolidating R.S. 4919 (1946) and
R.S. 4921 (1946) into § 284 through the Patent Act of 1952's
codification] was merely . .. to clarify the statement of the
statutes."19 7 It is likely, however, that the drafters of the 1952
Act believed, without the benefit of analysis, that the term "general
damages" was a superfluous description of the word "damages"
since, as observed by the Supreme Court in 1980, "[t]he 1952 Act
was approved with virtually no floor debate.... Perhaps because
of the magnitude of the recodification effort, the Committee Reports
accompanying the 1952 Act also gave relatively cursory attention
to its features." 9 ' Given the 1952 drafters' enormous task of
recodifying all of patent law, their confusing mistake of eliminating
the modifier "general" from the term "general damages" is understandable. Justices Brennan, Stewart, White, and Goldberg's 1964
capitalization on this confusion, however, is inexcusable.

'9 Patent Act of 1946, 60 Stat. at 778 (codified as revised in 1952 at 35 U.S.C. § 284
(1994)) (emphasis added).
m6 Patent Act of 1952, ch. 29, sec. 3, § 284, 66 Stat. 792, 813 (1952) (codified at 35 U.S.C.
§ 284 (1994)) (emphasis added).
'7 Aro II, 377 U.S. at 505 n.20 (plurality dicta view).
'" Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 203, 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 385,
399 (1980). As an aside, luck was with the 1952 drafters when they removed the modifier
"due" from the term "due compensation" in codifying R.S. § 4921 (1946) into § 284 (1952)
since, as shown in Part II.C.2. of this Article, the 1946 Congress intended for "due
compensation" to mean "compensation." Nevertheless, rather than relying upon luck, the
courts must rely upon the rules of the STA Method or, in the future, on the Federal Rules
of Evidence to determine the body Congress' meaning of a statutory term.
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Through parisology (a deliberate ambiguity in the use of words),
the plurality dicta view linked a series of words mixed up in a
nonsensical fashion to create statements concerning the word
"damages" that circumvented Congress' post-1946 general damages
recovery category: "We are, indeed, doubtful that CTR can properly
be allowed recovery of anything more than nominal damages from
Aro."' 9
This is because "[R.S. 4921 (1946)] was [textually]
changed [by the 1952 Act] to approximately its present form,
whereby only 'damages' are [substantively] recoverable ....
0
This is so even though in the 1952 codification, "[t]he stated
purpose [of consolidating R.S. 4919 (1946) and R.S. 4921 (1946) into
§ 284] was merely reorganization in language to clarify the
statement of the statutes.""' Nevertheless, "[t]he purpose of the
[1952 codification] change was precisely to [substantively] eliminate
the [1946] recovery of profits as such and allow recovery of
damages only."2 "2 Thus, "there can be no doubt that the [1946]
amendment succeeded in effectuating this purpose; it is clear that
under [§ 284 (1964)] only damages are recoverable."2 3 As for the
claimant, "[the recovery of damages only] reduces substantially-quite possibly to a mere nominal sum-the amount of recovery
that CTR may be awarded."2 ° In conclusion then, we judicially
enact that CTR and all other claimants who lack exploitation
capacity are "not entitled ... to anything more than nominal
damages."2 °5
With the plurality dicta view's word-salad assertion that
Congress themselves intended that only damages (not general
damages) be recoverable in a patent infringement action, the
plurality dicta view could now define the term "damages" within
their damages recovery category in any way that the Aro H
plurality dicta view chose, simply because the 1964 Aro H plurality
dicta view substantively eliminated the 1946 Congress' recovery
category of "general damages."

'9 Aro II, 377 U.S. at 504.
"AId. at 505.
20
' Id, at 520 n.20.

2"
2

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

505.
506.
493.
510 (plurality dicta view).
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4. Step 4: Revive the DeadPre-1946DamagesRecovery Category.
The fourth step of the plurality dicta view's distortion required the
plurality dicta view to create at least one definition of "damages"
within their recovery category of damages to replace the removal
of Congress' general damages recovery category, which included
Congress' definition of general damages encompassing the infringer's profits and the claimant's damages. Since the plurality dicta
view's purpose was to prevent a patent infringement claimant from
recovering the infringer's profits (e.g. nothing "more than nominal
damages") without raising suspicion as to what they were up to, the
most likely source for their recovery category was something that
Congress had addressed in the past. Here, the pre-1946 recovery
category of damages that was eliminated by Congress in 1946 fit
their necrolexigraphic purpose. Justices Brennan, Stewart, White,
and Goldberg implicitly revived the dead pre-1946 recovery
category of damages by explicitly citing to three different sources:
an unenacted 1946 legislative proposal, a definition from a dead
recovery category, and an untimely and out of context lower court
opinion.
a. Unenacted 1946 Legislative Proposal. Along with Congress'
vested power to make all laws under Article I, Section 8, Clause 18,
Congress logically has the power to choose between two legislative
proposals to enact one of these two proposals into law. As discussed above, the definition of general damages as "compensation"
was approved by the full House'and the full Senate without
bringing to a vote the definition of general damages as "any
damages a complainant can prove," a definition proffered by Mr.
Lanham and the three reports relating to R.S. 4921 (1946) meaning
"actual damages."
The four justices of Aro IFs plurality dicta view never addressed
R.S. 4921 (1946)'s express definition of general damages by which
the full House, the full Senate, and the President intended to
include the recovery of both damages and profits, but not require
the recovery of either. Rather, the plurality dicta view usurped
Congress' Article I, Section 1 legislative power to make all laws
under Clause 18 relating to Congress' Clause 8 patent power to
impermissibly revive the 1946 legislative proposal defining general
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damages as "any damages the complainant can prove,"2o thereby
supporting these Justices' personal view that "[tihere can be no
doubt that the [1946] amendment succeeded in effectuating this
purpose; it is clear that under the present [1964] statute only
damages are recoverable. 2 °7
Now that these four unelected government employees enacted the
definition of general damages as "any damages the complainant can
prove," the plurality dicta view needed to define what they meant
by the term "any damages the complainant can prove." They
offered the bar three definitions of post-1946 "plurality dicta view
damages," two of which came from two pre-1946 (actually pre-1900)
cases. The two pre-1946 definitions will be addressed first.
b. Pre-1946 PatentProfits & Damages. In general, post- 1946
patent law opinions are given more weight than pre-1946 patent
law opinions because 1946 marked the beginning of clarity in
Patent Law.20 ' To understand the importance of the period from
when the plurality dicta view sourced two versions of their
"plurality dicta view damages" definition, it is necessary to look at
the relevant patent law history of the word "damages." Before
August 1, 1946, patent law had its own different and particular
definition of "damages" and its own different and particular
definition of "profits"--neither of which comported with the
ordinary and reasonable definitions for the same two words. Under
the Duplate definitions, pre-1946 patent law "damages" were
defined as "'what the owner of the patent loses by such infringement.' "209 Pre-1946 patent law "profits" were defined as "'what
the infringer makes.' "210 However, as discussed above, through
the Patent Act of 1946, Congress eliminated the pre-1946 recovery
category of "damages" and the pre-1946 recovery category of
"profits" without changing the pre-1946 substantive law by enacting
a new, single patent infringement recovery category labeled

2

w

d. at 505-06.

'0 7Id. at 506.

"
See, e.g., Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1548 n.7 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (in
banc) (finding as unpersuasive the dissenting opinion's use of pre-1946 case regarding
compensation).
2
Duplate Corp. v. Triplex Co., 298 U.S. 448, 451, 29 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 306, 308 (1936)
(quoting
Diamond Stone-Sawing Maching Co. v. Brown, 166 F.306 (2d Cir. 1908)).
210
Id. (quoting Diamond Stone-Sawing Maching Co. v. Brown, 166 F.306 (2d Cir. 1908)).
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"general damages," and by providing as law the different and
particular definition of the term general damages as due compensation for making, using, or selling the invention.
Despite Congress' action of killing the pre-1946 patent law
damages recovery category pursuant to Congress' Constitutional
authority, the plurality dicta view again invoked Congress' Article
I, Section 1 legislative powers to make law relating to Congress'
patent power. The plurality dicta view mandated that the definitions of damages set out in the 1895 case of Coupe v. Royer 211 and
the 1886 case of Yale Lock Manufacturing Co. v. Sargent212 were
to be the sole theory on which a claimant could recover more than
nominal damages within the "plurality dicta view damages"
recovery category. Further, by omitting the citation dates to these
pre-1900 case citations from the text of the Aro II plurality dicta
view, these four Justices made it less likely that other judges and
lawyers reading Aro ITs plurality dicta view would realize that
these two infringement recovery definitions were taken from before
the turn of the century.2 1 3
c. Untimely & Out-of-Context Lower Court Opinion. The
plurality dicta view also implicitly revived the pre-1946 recovery
category of damages by taking out of context a statement from a
lower court opinion issued twelve years after the Patent Act of
1946. The plurality dicta view cited to the Fifth Circuit's opinion
in Livesay Window Co. v. Livesay Industries (hereinafter "Livesay
II),214 where the Fifth Circuit stated that "the question to be
asked in determining damages is how much had the Patent Holder
and Licensee suffered by the infringement. And that question (is)
primarily: had the infringer not infringed, what would Patent
215
Holder-Licensee have made?"
In Livesay 11, the Fifth Circuit did not indicate why the above
statement was made or the basis for the statement. Further, this

211

155 U.S. 565 (1895).

117 U.S. 536 (1886).
Aro II, 377 U.S. at 507 (citing Yale Lock Mfg. Co. v. Sargent, 117 U.S. 536, 552 (1886)
and Coupe v. Royer, 155 U.S. 565, 582 (1895), but omitting the years of both opinions-here
1886 and 1895-from the published, Aro II plurality dicta view case citation).
214251 F.2d 469, 116 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 167 (5th Cir. 1958).
21
5 Aro II, 377 U.S. at 507 (quoting Livesay Window Co. v. Livesay Indus., 251 F.2d at
212
213
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case was one of accounting for profits and damages 216 where the
Fifth Circuit stated, "[t]he profit is but the true measure of that
which infringement has taken from the patent owner."2 17 Thus,
the context of the untimely Livesay H opinion recognized that both
the infringer's profits and the claimant's damages were the
economic sources from which the claimant could recover compensation.
Nonetheless, through their behavior of explicitly citing to three,
non-legislative sources that were inapplicable to R.S. 4921 (1946),
the plurality dicta view judicially enacted the dead pre-1946
recovery category of damages as the redivivus (once dead; now
living) pre-1946 recovery category of damages. Moreover, under the
Aro H "plurality dicta view damages" recovery category, only
"damages the complainant can prove" were recoverable. Proving
these "actual damages" under the Aro H "plurality dicta view
damages" first requires that the claimant prove that it had the
capacity to exploit that claimant's patent grant at the time of the
infringement. Thus, only those claimants who had the money and
resources to exploit that claimant's patent grant at the time of the
infringement could prove Aro II "plurality dicta view damages."
With all else being equal under this living constitution approach,
a claimant who was rich at the time of the infringement would
succeed in a court of law under the plurality dicta view's damages
recovery scheme where as a poor claimant would not. In short, the
plurality dicta view's actions of gutting Congress' statute like just
another 1960's fish to be fried, left a void in those circumstances
where the claimant did not or could not prove "actual damages."
To fill this void, these four citizens implemented their own
compulsory licensing scheme.
5. Step 5: Create the Post-1964 Reasonable Royalty Recovery
Category. The fifth and final step of the plurality dicta view's
distortion required the plurality dicta view to account for unconstitutionally removing Congress' laws relating to recovery of an
infringer's profits. This accounting was necessary since in those
216 This was brought out in Livesay Indus. v. Livesay Window Co., 202 F.2d 378, 379, 96

(BNA) 285, 286 (5th Cir. 1953) ("Livesay I*).
U.S.P.Q.
21 Livesay Window Co., 251 F.2d at 472. See also Kori Corp. v. Wilco Marsh Buggies &
Draglines, Inc., 761 F.2d 649, 655 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (Judge Rich making the same observation).
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circumstances where a claimant lacks the timely capacity to exploit
the claimant's patent claim, that claimant, by definition, could not
prove actual damages beyond mere speculation. Like the early
patent law case of Whittemore v. Cutter,21 the plurality dicta
view must have recognized that there needs to be some type of
statutory recovery award for infringement conduct if the statute
proscribes the conduct. This required the plurality dicta view to
create a new, post-1964 recovery category as the other half of their
two-recovery category scheme.
Again, since the plurality dicta view's purpose was to prevent a
patent infringement claimant from recovering the infringer's profits
without raising suspicion as to what they were up to, the most
likely source for their recovery category was a meaning of a term
and a term that Congress had addressed in the past. Here,
compulsory licensing fit their need for the meaning of a term in the
statute and "reasonable royalty" fit their need for a term in the
statute. As will be shown, through subintelligitur (a meaning
implied but not stated), the plurality dicta view created the post1964 reasonable royalty recovery category with compulsory license
as the implied meaning of their reasonable royalty term.
The concept of a patent reasonable royalty is an old one. The
Patent Act of 1793 provided as infringement remedy: "[The
infringer] shall forfeit and pay to the patentee, a sum, that shall be
at least equal to three times the price, for which the patentee has
usually sold or licensed to other persons, the use of the said
invention...."2 1 9 Thus, an infringer was liable for three times
the estimated monetary amount the claimant usually received for
the noninfringing use of the claimant's invention. The amount a
claimant received for noninfringing use falls under the ordinary
and reasonable definition of a royalty. The royalty amount a
claimant usually received from noninfringers falls under the
ordinary and reasonable definition of a "reasonable royalty."
Although this is the source for a patent reasonable royalty,
royalties for invention patents were not mentioned in case law until

21s 29 F. Cas. 1120, 1121 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600) ("Whittemore I) (concerning

patent law, Judge Story stated that "[e]very violation of a right imports some damage, and
if none other be proved, the law allows a nominal damage').
219 Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 5, 1 Stat. 318, 322 (1793) (repealed 1836).
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Goodyear v. Beverly Rubber Co. ,220 some sixty six years later.
However, as shown above, the 1946 Congress never meant for the
reasonable royalty to be a recovery category. The reasonable
royalty was meant to be a check and balance on the compensation
awarded. Nevertheless, the plurality dicta view threw the lower
courts a bone in the form of a reasonable royalty by incorrectly
stating that § 284 EXPRESSLY allowed the award of a reasonable
royalty under the circumstances where the claimant lacked
exploitation capacity: "[T]he statute [§ 284 (1964)] allows the award
of a reasonable royalty."221 The logic avoided by this negative
misprision of the plurality dicta view was that if § 284 does not
allow an award that is less than a reasonable royalty, § 284
INFERENTIALLY allows (or does not allow) for the award of a
reasonable royalty. Thus, the text of 35 U.S.C. § 284 is ambiguous
concerning the issue of awarding a reasonable royalty.
An ambiguous meaning of a statutory term requires an inference
of law by the trier of law. For an inference of law, a process of logic
and reason-an illation-must be made in writing by a judge before
concluding, as a matter of law, what the body Congress meant by
a statutory term. Since a dianoetic process must be made in this
regard, the terms of § 284 must first be analyzed before arriving at
a conclusion that, as a matter of law, § 284 allows or does not allow
for an award in the form of a reasonable royalty.
As this Article's analysis in Part III.C demonstrated, § 284 only
allows for an award in the form of compensation from the compensation recovery category under § 284 and not from a reasonable
royalty recovery category or any other recovery category. As
discussed above, the terms and legislative history of R.S. 4921
(1946), § 284 (1964), and § 284 (1994) clearly establish that a
reasonable royalty is but a measure, a floor, a nominal amount by
10 F. Cas. 638, 641 (C.C.D. Mass. 1859) (No. 5,557).
22Aro II, 377 U.S. at 505. Subsequent support for Justice Brennan's et al. judicial law
came from friends in the courts below. See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood
Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1127, 166 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 235, 244 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) modified,
Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood-Champion Papers, Inc., 446 F.2d 295, 170
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 369 (2d Cir. 1971) (concluding that "[i]t is clear, then, that under the statute
a reasonable royalty is an alternative way of recovering general compensatory damages");
Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp., 243 F. Supp. 500, 547 n.28 (S.D.N.Y.
1965) (observing that "Sen. Pepper stated, in the 1946 Senate Debate, that: 'the basis laid
down by this bill is general compensatory damages' ").
"'

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol5/iss1/3

76

Tassinari: Patent Compensation Under 35 U.S.C. § 284

1997]

PATENT COMPENSATION

which the compensation award must be in excess of or equal to.
This is in accord with the Federal Circuit which held in banc that
"[s]ection 284 further instructs that a [compensation] award shall
be 'in no event less than a reasonable royalty'; the purpose of this
alternative is not to direct the form of compensation, but to set a
floor below which damage awards may not fall."2" This has been
incorporated into the proposed amendments in Appendix I.
Awarding the claimant a true reasonable royalty under such
circumstances of infringement amounts to disgorging a license from
that claimant through an election to infringe. Under an economic
theory of breach of implied contract license, an election to infringe
is "a handy means for competitors to impose a compulsory license
policy upon every patent owner." 2' Moreover, the "imposition on
a patent owner who would not have licensed his invention for [a
certain] royalty is a form of compulsory license, against the will and
224
interest of the person wronged, in favor of the wrongdoer."
Even in the text of 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1994), the statute clearly
distinguishes "damages" from a "royalty" by listing the two terms
separately: "an aid to the determination of damages or of what
royalty."225 Where is the express statutory basis for a court to
award a "royalty" when § 284 (1994) precedes its qualitative phrase
"adequate to compensate" by expressly stating the "the court shall
award the claimant damages"? 226 If a reasonable royalty is
damages, then what does the statute indicate to award when not
awarding a reasonable royalty? Where in the statute is the term
"lost profits"? Is it not important to read the statute? Is everyone
afraid to say that "the King has no clothes on." 227 That being
said, the key to understanding how patent law ended up where it
is today is that no patent statute enacted by Congress and the

' Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (in banc).
ld. at 1555 (quoting TWM Mfg. v. Dura. Corp., 789 F.2d 895, 900, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
525, 528 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
2" Id. (quoting Del Mar Avionics, Inc. v. Quinton Instrument Co., 836 F.2d 1320, 1328,
5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1255, 1261 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (alteration in original)).

2 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1994).
Z% Id.

' Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733, 752 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
("Men may put on the habiliments of a partnership whenever it advantages them to be
treated as partners underneath, although in fact it may be a case of'The King has no clothes
on' to the sharp eyes of the law.").
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President allows the court to award a reasonable royalty-only the
unelected citizens of the Aro II plurality dicta view do.
6. Conclusion. In summary, before 1946, a patent infringement
claimant's recovery derived from two congressionally enacted
recovery categories: (i) from the recovery category of damages,
which included the definition of claimant's damages and (ii) from
the recovery category of profits, which included the definition of
infringer's profits. Through the Patent Act of 1946, Congress
eliminated this two-recovery category scheme without changing the
pre-1946 substantive law. Congress did this by enacting a new,
umbrella patent infringement recovery category labeled "general
damages" and by defining general damages as due compensation for
making, using, or selling the invention. Thus, a post-1946
claimant's recovery derived from the recovery category of general
damages, with Congress' definition of general damages including
the infringer's profits and the claimant's damages. After Congress'
1952 textual codification of the 1946 Act, a claimant still recovered
money from a single recovery category that still included the
infringer's profits and the claimant's damages. However, the 1952
textual codification confusingly renamed the 1946 "general damages
recovery category" as the "damages recovery category" without
substantively changing the law enacted 1946.
In section IV of the 1964 case Aro II, Justices Brennan, Stewart,
White, and Goldberg circumvented Congress' single recovery
category scheme by usurping Congress' law making power to revive
one of the two pre-1946 recovery categories eliminated by the 1946
Congress: namely, the pre-1946 recovery category of damages, with
the included definition of claimant's damages excluding recovery of
the infringer's profits. 2 1 To account for unconstitutionally removing Congress' laws relating to recovery of an infringer's profits,
these four Justices again usurped Congress' law making power to
create the post-1964 reasonable royalty recovery category, with a
definition of reasonable royalty that amounts to nothing more than
a compulsory license.
Thus, by asserting their own "damages" recovery category and
their own "reasonable royalty" recovery category, the plurality dicta

I").

Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 502-13 (1964) ("Aro
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view had masterfully distorted the body Congress' meaning of the
terms in R.S. 4921 (1946) into something the body Congress never
intended. With the "fidelity" portion of their work done, all that
remained necessary was the issuance of the Aro II opinion. Justice
Brennan chose Monday, June 8, 1964 to announce that decision.229
When America woke up on Monday morning, June 8, 1964, the
newspapers again signaled that the existing state of things in
America would no longer be preserved. On that morning, Americans read that United States Supreme Court Chief Justice Earl
Warren had spent over three hours taking testimony from condemned slayer Jack Ruby in the Dallas County Jail, even though
no Chief Justice had ever before visited a jail to take testimony
from a prisoner, and though such a case was likely to reach the
Supreme Court. 23 They read about 223 constitutional lawyers,
including fifty five law school deans, making a plea to Congress to
oppose any amendment to the Constitution that would permit
school religious exercises,"' and that the biggest headache for the
workers of Planned Parenthood was breaking down old attitudes
concerning birth control. 23 2 The Los Angeles Times had printed
part eight of its accounting of President Kennedy's 1961 failure at
Cuba's Bay of Pigs, 3 and Jack Ruby's defense attorney, Melvin
Belli, announced plans to sue the president of the American Bar
Association for injudicious and insulting remarks. 234 Rounding
up the news of that Monday, thirty three years ago, United States
Ambassador to the United Nations, Adlai E. Stevenson, unbelievably ignored his constitutional oath of office2 5 by proclaiming to
young Americans and non-Americans in his Colby College commencement speech that, in demanding civil rights, "a jail sentence
is no longer a dishonor but a proud achievement," after which

Id. at 476.
Warren Talks 3 Hours With Ruby in Jail, L.A. TIMES, June 8, 1964, § 1, at 1.
231223 Lawyers FightPlan to Permit School Prayer,LAL TIMES, June 8, 1964, § 1, at 7.
"2 Harry Nelson, Catholic Opposition to Family PlanningDenied, LA TIMES, June 8,
1964, I, at 2.
" Haynes Johnson, The Bay of Pigs: Lack of Planes Spells Failure,LA TIMES, June 8,
1964, § 1, at 2.
234 Belli to Sue President of U.S. Bar, LA TIMES, June 8, 1964, § 1, at 5.
m U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.
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Stevenson was given an honorary degree of Doctor of Humane
Letters by Colby College." 6
Even with all of these signs, when America woke up on that
Monday morning of June 8, 1964, they had no reason to expect that
four members of our Supreme Court were about to subvert the
United States Constitution through their usurpation of Congress'
power to make all laws. Moreover, for a moment, put yourself in
the position of Elliott I. Pollock, the attorney who represented the
claimant in Aro II before the Supreme Court. Imagine that just
two days after your thirty-seventh birthday," 7 you go into work
on Monday morning and see this Aro II opinion sitting on your
desk. With your jaw dropped, you read the plurality dicta view in
section IV and realize that the plurality dicta view has decimated
your client's chances of recovering anything more than a nominal
amount, despite the fact that you never even had a chance to brief
the compensation issues. As you fall back into your desk chair
concerned with your client, there is no way for you to know that
you are the first among millions over the next thirty-three years to
be driven under by the judicial weight of the plurality dicta view as
justified by the so-called living Constitution.
When the Aro II majority opinion was issued on Monday, June
8, 1964, it carried with it the plurality dicta view's "damages"
recovery category and the plurality dicta view's "reasonable royalty"
recovery category in section IV of the Aro II opinion. By piggybacking their "laws" onto Aro I's majority holding, these "Mondaymorning legislators""8 tied the Supreme Court's ultimate authority as the analyzer of the terms of the laws of the United States to
the "laws" of the Aro II plurality dicta view.
This tying arrangement between (i) the Supreme Court's
Constitutional authority to issue legal opinions and (ii) the laws
judicially enacted by the plurality dicta view imparted the misconception that the plurality dicta view's laws were statutory laws of
the United States enacted by Congress and the President. Under
the great influence of the Aro II Supreme Court's authority, the
Stevenson Says Rights Bill Just a Beginning, L.A. TIMEs, June 8, 1964, § 1, at 15.
4 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL, LAw DIRECTORY DC 780B (1997).
' Orrin Hatch, JudicialNominees: The Senate's Steady Progress,WASH. POST, Jan. 11,
1998, § Op-Ed, at C09 ("Judges must understand their role in our constitutional system as
impartial magistrates, not Monday-morning legislators.").
2N

"
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lower courts have wrongfully been convinced for the past thirty
three years that the application of § 284 only allows awards of
amounts that constitute either damages (lost profits) under the pre1946 recovery category of damages or a "reasonable royalty" under
a post-1964 recovery category of reasonable royalty. 2 9 When the
American People look at § 284, Title 35 of the United States Code
and see the word "damages" and the words "reasonable royalty,"
our belief is that the elected members of Congress used their power
to make all laws and passed both the terms and their meanings
into the statute. The truth is that these words were given meaning
and enacted by the four unelected Supreme Court Justices of Aro
Irs plurality dicta view.
B. EFFECT OF ARO

'S PLURALITY DICTA VIEW

America's road to destruction is paved by those propagating our
Constitution as a living constitution. One of the more divisive
means the Court uses to subvert Congress and the Constitution is
the Court's Doctrine of Prospective Decisionmaking. Prospective
decisionmaking is "the [Court] practice of [making a new judicial
law] but applying it neither to the parties involved in the watershed case nor to others similarly situated."2 4 ° This forked tongue
assault from within simultaneously usurps Congress' vested power
to make all law under Article I, Section 8, Clause 18 as well as
violates the Constitution's cases or controversies mandate under
Article III, Section 2, Clause 1. Chief Justice Earl Warren, who
viewed prospective decision making as part of the judicial process,
stated in 1969 that "the problem inherent in prospective decisionmaking... must be balanced against the impetus the [usurpation]
technique provides for the implementation of long overdue [legislative] reforms, which otherwise could not be practicably effect24
ed."
To believe that five to nine, unelected citizens, immune from the
economic and political fallout of their own law, are sufficient to

2397 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 20.02[4][c], at 20-74 (1997) (noting that

Aro IFs plurality dicta view caused a shift in the course of many lower court decisions).
2' In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 925 (8th Cir. 1997).
241Jenkins v. Delaware, 395 U.S. 213, 218 (1969).
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make law effecting over two hundred million people is sheer
arrogance. Deleterious in its nature, prospective decisionmaking
is pessimism at its worst. It is to hold the belief that, but for the
knight-errant living constitutionalist, all things American ultimately tend towards evil. Such chimerical idealism pays no regard to
the practicality of operating a country, to the visionary of our
democratic process, or to the majesty of the American people. It is
to wander into extrajudicial territory in search of adventures to
prove their chivalry to their fellow living constitutionalists on the
backs of those who they seek to protect. Striving to put an end to
the Court's doctrine of prospective decisionmaking, Justice Scalia
wrote:
Prospective decisionmaking is the handmaid ofjudicial activism, and the born enemy of stare decisis. It was formulated
in the heyday of legal realism and promoted as a techniqu[e]
of judicial lawmaking in general, and more specifically as a
means of making it easier to overrule prior precedent... . In
the eyes of its enemies, the "doctrine smacked of the legislative process," "encroached on the prerogatives of the legislative department of government," removed one of the great
inherent restraints upon this Court's departing from the field
of interpretation to enter that of lawmaking, caused the
Court's behavior to become assimilated to that of a legislature, and tended to cut the courts loose from the force of
precedent, allowing them to restructure artificially those
expectations legitimately created by extant law and thereby
mitigate the practical force of stare decisis. All this was not
denied by the doctrine's friends, who also viewed it as a
device to augment the power of the courts to contribute to
the growth of the law in keeping with the demands of
society, as a deliberate and conscious technique of judicial
lawmaking, as a means of facilitating more effective and
defensible
judicial lawmaking. (internal citations omit2
ted)

24

This brings us to Justice Brennan's et al. Aro II plurality dicta
view. By distorting Congress' carefully constructed R.S. 4921

"2

Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 105-108 (1993).
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(1946) statutory scheme through prospective decisionmaking,
Brennan, Stewart, White, and Goldberg's plurality dicta view has
caused devastating effects on court opinions and the rule of law, on
litigants who seek justice, and on Congress and the judicial system.
The following analysis of the effects of Aro II's plurality dicta
view will bring into reality the American burden caused by the
idolatrical support of Justice Brennan's quixotic view that the
United States Constitution is a living constitution as well as his
imperial promotion of the Judicial Branch as final and infallible.2" Springing to life from "the great first principles of the
social compact,"2 " these mystical ideas, which can only be described as subversive to our system of Government by Constitution,
are best characterized in a laudatory speech Justice Brennan gave
twenty three years after the Aro II plurality dicta view. Standing
before the 1987 Association of the Bar of the City of New York,
Justice Brennan claimed in a self-contradictory statement that
"[t]he Constitution will endure as a vital charter of human liberty
as long as there are those with the courage to defend it, the vision
to interpret it, and the fidelity to live by it."2 '4 Given Justice
Brennan's lead role in the Aro II plurality dicta view, Washington
Times reporter Peter Parisi's statement about Justice Brennan's
legacy seems more accurate: "Mr. Eisenhower's 1956 selection of
Mr. Brennan ... who legislated from the bench, rather than
adjudicated-was a mistake that outlasted Ike's presidency by
three decades, and one that has had profoundly negative consequences for the culture and governance of this country."2" The
following analysis validates Mr. Parisi's observations.
1. Effect on Court Opinions & Rule of Law. Income is defined as
an accession to wealth, clearly realized, over which the infringer
has dominion.2 47 Merely by infritiging, the infringer has an

2' See Judicial Activism: Defining the Problem and Its Impact 1997: Before the
Subcomm. on the Constitution,Federalism, and PropertyRights of Senate JudiciaryComm.
Cong. (1997) (statement of Edwin Meese III) ("rather than making one branch final and
'infallible' (in the word of former Justice William Brennan)").
Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798).
William J. Brennan, Reason, Passion,and 'The Progress of the Law,' 42 Rec. Assoc.
Bar. City of N.Y. 948, 962 (1987) (the Cardozo Lecture).
2" Peter Parisi, JudicialLimitation, THE WASHINGTON TIMEs, Aug. 13, 1997, at A17.

" Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955).
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undeniable accession to wealth as being better off than before the
infringement. Realized gain (or loss) is gain (or loss) resulting from
an identifiable event, such as a sale or an exchange of property.'
In the case of patent infringement, the infringer clearly realizes
wealth upon completing the identifying event, namely infringement.
At this point, the infringer has complete dominion over the
accessed, clearly realized wealth. In circumstances such as
infringing by making, the economic value of realized income may
be nominal, but the income is realized nonetheless.
In patent infringement suits, every infringer realizes gross
income merely by infringing. Often, the infringer's gross income
will be an extremely large amount, anywhere from one to three
million dollars to over 800 million dollars.2 49 Moreover, an
individual or small business claimant typically will have lacked the
capacity to exploit their now-at-issue patent claim at the time of
the infringement and thus cannot prove at trial beyond speculation
the claimant's "actual damages."
The dilemma that courts face under this typical scenario is that
on one hand, the infringer became rich by practicing the claimant's
intellectual property; and on the other hand, the claimant's lack of
exploitation capacity precludes the claimant from the plurality dicta
view's recovery category of "damage." Thus, under the Aro II
plurality dicta view, the only other recovery category that has been
available post-1964 has been the "plurality dicta view reasonable
royalty" recovery category. Since the awarding of a true reasonable
royalty under such circumstances would be the equivalent of
disgorging a license from the claimant and giving this windfall to
the infringer, no court could, in good conscious, award a true
reasonable royalty under such circumstance. For the sake of
equity, the lower courts have subsequently contorted any reasonableness out of the royalty awarded under the post-1964 recovery

wBLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY

1264 (6th ed. 1990).
See RUSSELL L. PARR, INTELLEcTUAL PROPERTY INFRINGEMENT DAMAGES

12
(Cumulative Supp. 1995) (Figure 1.18 "Breakdown of Patent Damages - All Cases Included
for the Period 1982 - June 1994" listing $873,158,971 as the highest award). See also GNB
Battery Techs., Inc. v. Exide Corp., 886 F. Supp. 420, 434 (D. Del. 1995) (Russell L. Parr
providing expert testimony regarding hypothesized royalties, reflecting the cost of changeover
to a non-infringing alternative), affd, 78 F.3d 605, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1506 (Fed. Cir.
1996).
29
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category of Aro II reasonable royalties. This contortion of reasonableness, in turn, decimated patent law's Willing Buyer/Willing
Seller rule.
The first case to articulate that a reasonable royalty was to be
based in the Willing Buyer/Willing Seller rule was the post-1964
case of Georgia Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp.'
The court in Georgia Pacific adopted this rule from the pre-1946
case of Horvath v. McCord Radiator & Manufacturing Co.2 1 In
Horvath, the Sixth Circuit stated:
In fixing damages on a royalty basis against an infringer, the
sum allowed should be reasonable and that which would be
accepted by a prudent licensee who wished to obtain a license
but was not so compelled and a prudent patentee, who
wished to grant a license but was not so compelled.25 2
However, in setting out this Willing Buyer/Willing Seller rule, as
the rule became known, the Sixth Circuit in the 1938 case of
Horvath stated that it was faced with a pre-1946 "case present[ing]
many difficulties. 25 3 Although R.S. 4921 (1922) provided for
damages and profits,' 5 the court noted, "Horvath has not availed
himself of his patent rights by granting sufficient licenses nor are
his license fees of such uniformity as to prove his damage by
established royalties." 5 Further, the Horvath court noted that
"[n]o basis [was] in the record on which to award Horvath the
precise amount of profits to which he is entitled."25 6 Thus, the
court7 concluded that "[tihis case is one for a reasonable royal25

ty."

The Willing Buyer/Willing Seller rule was the appropriate
rule-a good rule-in Horvath's case since Horvath could not prove

20 318
25'
252 100

F. Supp. 1116, 166 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 235 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
F.2d 326, 335, 40 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 394, 403 (6th Cir. 1938).
at 335.

I
Id.
25 Patent Act of 1922, ch. 58, sec. 8, § 4921, 42 Stat. 389, 392 (1922) (providing that
"profits to be accounted for by the defendant, the damages") (amended 1946, codified as
revised in 1952 at 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1994)).
25 Horvath, 100 F.2d at 334.
2W

26Id.
7
2

at 335.

id.
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beyond speculation the claimant's damages or the infringer's
profits. In this narrow circumstance, the pre-1946 Horvath court
held that compensation may be found or assessed by requiring that
the compensation found or assessed be in excess of or equal to the
royalty income reasonable for the practice made of the invention by
the infringer.'
In this narrow circumstance, the Willing Buyer/Willing Seller is a good test-an appropriate test-that provided
an optional basis for the Horvath court to do justice under R.S.
4921 (1922). As the Bible states, "[w]e know that the law is good,
if a man use it lawfully." 9 The proposed amendments to 35
U.S.C. § 284(b) (1994), in Appendix I provide this optional basis to
do justice in a patent infringement action in proposed section
284(b).
However, Aro I/s post-1946 plurality dicta view "legislatively"
compels the lower courts to award a reasonable royalty in this
federal statutory law area, even where the claimant who lacks
exploitation capacity can prove the infringer's gross income. The
lower courts understood that the equitable question before them
was whether a poor claimant, who lacks the capacity to mine that
claimant's gold claim, is actually injured ("actually loses profits")
when a rich infringer enters the claimant's land without permission, mines the claimant's gold, and keeps it. Aro I/'s plurality
dicta view stated that, because the plurality personally believed
that there was no injury to such a claimant as a result of the
infringer's illegal ditation, that claimant would not recover more
than the "plurality dicta view's reasonable royalty" (i.e., nominal
damages). Since the personal view of these four Justices flew in
the face of the common sense of equity, the lower courts were forced
by the plurality dicta view to (i) conclude incorrectly that the
Willing Buyer/Willing Seller is a bad test 2" and (ii) that a reasonable royalty can best be discerned by running an unbelievable

'5 Id.

' Joseph Bancroft & Sons Co. v. Shelley Knitting Mills, Inc., 374 F.2d 28, 31 n.2 (3d Cir.
1967) (quoting Mayer v. Walter, 64 Pa. 283, 285-286 (1870)).
' Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1554 n.13 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (in banc)
(finding that the " 'willing licensor/willing licensee' negotiation... is an inaccurate, and even
absurd, characterization"); Fromson v. Western Litho Plate & Supply, Co., 853 F.2d 1568,
1574-76 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (devoting three pages to the improper willing licensor/willing
licensee methodology).
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gauntlet of nineteen factors, any of which may be ignored in
reaching a conclusion, where the court may ignore the conclusion
reached. 261 This, in turn, has resulted in the courts awarding 1%
or less as a "reasonable" royalty rate, 2 but more often awarding
more than 20% as a "reasonable" royalty rate.2 One court even
awarded a 70% royalty rate.2"
Since these reasonable royalty awards either fall into one of two
cases-deficient compensation cases, resulting in a windfall for the
infringer and forfeiture for the claimant,2 or excessive compensation cases, resulting in a forfeiture for the infringer and a

2

" See, Brunswick Corp. v. United States, 36 Fed. Cl. 204, 211-12 (1996) (setting out and
analyzing the fifteen factors plus four additional factors).
2 See, e4g., Fromson v. Western Litho Palte and Supply, Co., 853 F.2d 1568 (Fed. Cir
1988) ("Fromson IV) (stating that infringer challenges' royalty rate of .825% on appeal);
Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 86 F.3d 1566, 1568, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065, 106768 (Fed. Cir. 1996), vacated for other reasons, 117 S. Ct. 1466 (1997) (noting trial court
finding that 1% was a reasonable royalty under "willing buyer/willing seller" rule); Devex
Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 667 F.2d 347, 356, 212 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 643, 649 (3d Cir.
1981) (holding trial court award of a royalty of.75% unconscionably low), affd, 461 U.S. 648
(1983). See also State Indus. v. Mor-Flo Indus., 883 F.2d 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1989)
(awarding 3% against an infringer who urged the effective rate of .163%).
' Williams v. Skid Recycling, Inc., No. 92 C 7026, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5219 (N.D. Ill.
Apr. 21, 1994) (35%); TWM Mfg. Co. v. Dura Corp., 789 F.2d 895,900 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (30%);
TP Orthodontics, Inc. v. Prof'l Positioners, Inc., 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1017 (E.D. Wis. 1991),
modified, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1628 (E.D. Wis.), affd, Nos. 92-1203,92-1253, 1992 U.S. App.
LEXIS 26639 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 14, 1992) (unpublished) (30%); Additive Controls & Measurement Sys. v. Flowdata, Inc., 986 F.2d 476,25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1798 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (25%);
SmithKline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Lab. Corp., 926 F.2d 1161, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1922
(Fed. Cir. 1991) (25%); Bandag, Inc. v. Al Bolser Tire Stores, Inc., 750 F.2d 903, 223 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 982 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (23.75%); DNIC Brokerage Co. v. Morrison & Dempsey
Communications, Inc., 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1043 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (22%); ALM Surgical
Equip., Inc. v. Kirschner Med. Corp., 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1241 (D.S.C. 1990) (20.3%). See
also Russell L. Parr, Intellectual Property Infringement Damages 12 (John Wiley & Sons
Cumulative Supp. 1995).
2" In Hartness Int'l, Inc. v. Simplimatic Eng'g Co., 819 F.2d 1100, 1112, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1826, 1830 (Fed. Cir. 1987), proof of infringement of claims covering a device used to
load bottles into cartons by drop packing resulted in the CAFC affirming the Western
District of Virginia's award of a 70% royalty where the defendant argued at trial that a 3 to
5% royalty was reasonable. The CAFC implied that the district court confused [Aro Irs]
reasonable royalty recovery category with [Aro Irs] actual damages recovery category. Id.
at 1112.
' King Instruments Corp. v. Perego, 65 F.3d 941, 951, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1129, 1136
(Fed. Cir. 1995).
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windfall for the claimant 26---the plurality dicta view's patent
compensation scheme has degraded the progress of science and
useful arts into legal tools of forfeitures and windfalls. The current
solutions that are being offered to this problem of inadequate
compensation under the "plurality dicta view's reasonable royalty"
scheme include judges wholly abandoning their judicial role by
impermissibly tapping into the delicately structured patent
infringement recovery categories of "treble damages, attorney fees
and prejudgment interest" to bolster the claimant's award when
that award is based on a reasonable royalty.267
2. Effect on Litigants Who Seek Justice. In the business world,
a royalty rate between a patent licensor and patent licensee
generally falls in the area of 4% to 10%.26 An infringer litigant
told by the infringer's attorney that the claimant is seeking a
"reasonable royalty" would not expect to pay 20% and certainly not
up to 70% as a "reasonable royalty." A claimant litigant, on the
other hand, views the claimant's property as stolen by the infringer. Thus, a claimant litigant would not expect to receive less than
20%, 70% or even 100% as a "reasonable royalty."
For example, in Pentech International v. Hayduchok,6 9 the
infringer asserted that "a reasonable royalty would be three to five
percent of its net sales of the marker kits. [Claimant] on the other
hand, [sought] fifty percent of [the infringer's] profit on the
ERASABLES." 27 °

In Zegers v. Zegers, Inc.,271 the plaintiff

contended that "a reasonable royalty should be at least 250% of the
net sales price of defendant's infringing clips."

272

In Fromson v.

SmithKline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Labs. Corp., 926 F.2d 1161, 1163 (Fed. Cir
1991) (providing that fifty percent of the claimant's profit (i.e., forty-eight percent of the
infringer's price), which is the "reasonable royalty" theory advanced by the claimant, "is not
credible because that amount would be a windfall to' the claimant and would result in

forfeiture by the infringer.").
King Instruments Corp., 65 F.3d at 951 n.6 (observing that the suggested solutions to
"the problem of inadequate compensation ... based on a reasonable royalty ... include
awards of treble damages, attorney fees and prejudgment interest").

m Interview with Robert P. Hart, Patent Counsel to the Gas Research Institute, in
Chicago, Ill. (May 23, 1997) (indicating that, among other factors, the business type and
accounting basis for the percentage multiplication affects the numerical range).
= 931 F. Supp. 1167 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
270 Id. at 1173.
27' 458 F.2d 726, 173 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 385 (7th Cir. 1972).
m Id. at 730.
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Western Litho Plate & Supply Co. ("Fromson IV"), 2 73 Chief Judge

Markey observed that "Fromson challenge[d] the 0.825% rate as
'unreasonable'. Western, not surprisingly, says the 0.825% rate is
perfectly reasonable."274
Of course, the entire patent law concept of having the jury
determine a reasonable royalty rate is nonsensical since a court
cannot actually award a percentage. A percentage is merely a
mathematical device that can neither be taxed nor put food on the
table. Moreover, awarding a percentage gives advocates an
unbelievably wide latitude to make arguments as to what tangible
item or numerical figure should be applied to the royalty rate. In
Fromson IV, Chief Judge Markey poignantly brought this out by
stating: "percent of what? (price? gross sales revenue on all
infringing plates? net revenue? gross profits? net profits?)"275
Nonetheless, our courts continue to evaluate "reasonable royalty"
awards in the form of a percentage rather than a numerical
monetary amount due to the tremendous weight of the Aro II
plurality dicta view.
Since there always is a perceived unfairness in this deficient/excessive compensation dichotomy set up by Aro I/s plurality
dicta view, one litigant to an infringement suit always has a strong
motivation to appeal awards of a reasonable royalty. This, in turn,
has created more work for the Court of Appeals, thus ringing true
President Roosevelt's apt observation that "[iut is difficult to make
our material condition better by the best of laws, but it is easy
enough to ruin it by bad laws."2 76 The plurality dicta view's effect
on Congress and the judicial system bears this out.
3. Effect on Congress & the Judicial System. On Wednesday,
November 4, 1981, the House released the Court ofAppeals for the
FederalCircuitAct of 1981 that identified the patent validity issue
as the virus causing the crisis that patent law was facing. 277 The
symptoms described in this report amazingly read as a 1981
medical case report of a patient infected by an unknown second
273 853 F.2d 1568
274 Id. at 1576.
275

(Fed. Cir. 1988).

Id. at 1570 n.2.

Theodore Roosevelt, 18 Works of Theodore Roosevelt (1925), in THE WORLD ALMANAC
OF PRESIDENTIAL QUOTATIONS 125 (Elizabeth Frost-Knappman ed., Pharos Books 1988).
27

27

H.R. REP. No. 97-312 (1981).
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virus where the second virus had just been discovered as the Aro
IT plurality dicta view virus.
The 1981 House Report begins by detailing the crisis in the
federal appellate system over the previous twenty years. From the
period just prior to the 1964 issue of the Aro II plurality dicta view
to the 1982 creation of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
the report noted that appellate court filings had not only increased
more than fivefold from 4,832 cases to a crisis level of 26,362 cases,
but that the increase itself experienced an increase-an acceleration-to the point where the federal appellate system was facing a
crisis that was actually worsening.278 The House Report expressly stated that the crisis had spilled out beyond the time, docket,
and intracircuit conflict pressures of the courts and into the rule of
law, to
the litigants who sought justice, and to the Nation it9
27

self.

In the House Committee report's section titled The Need for
IncreasedUniformity in PatentLaw, the Committee concluded that
Congress needed to increase the predictability of litigation under
patent rules and needed to eliminate expensive, time-consuming,
As noted by
and unseemly patent litigation forum shopping.'
the report, the forum shopping in the patent law area was caused
by different outcomes in different courtrooms in substantially
similar cases resulting from the application of the same law to
similar facts. 1 Gerald Mossinghoff, a key figure in the bipartisan effort to establish the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals, later
explained:
[Effectively there were] nine different patent laws depending
on which circuit you were in. Patent lawyers spent a fortune
of their clients' money arguing about where a case would be
tried, because once you knew that, you knew how the case
would come out. The 8th circuit, for example, simply did not
respect patents. The 5th circuit usually did hold them

278

Id. at 17.

2" Id.

(citing STAFF OF DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE COMMITTEE ON REVISION OF THE

FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 1, 95 CONG., REPORT (Comm. Print. 1977)).
8
2 0Id. at 21.
81id.
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With the overwhelming evidence before it, the Committee
concluded that the judiciary's application of the law was inconsistent,' although the law itself, including 35 U.S.C § 284, was
consistent nationwide. The House Report characterized this
inconsistency of application as a "widespread ...

uncertainty of

[patent law] legal doctrine" resulting in "a great variety of approaches and attitudes towards the patent system."' Although
these symptoms describe the effects of Aro I/'s plurality dicta view
judicially enacted "damages" and "reasonable royalty" recovery
category scheme, the authors of the House report focused on the
liability phase of a trial-specifically the patent claim validity
issue-to establish the House report's assertion of forum shopping.
Focusing on the validity issue makes sense. Before recovering
compensation in all patent trials, the patent claim must be valid
and infringed. Of the percentage of those patent claims found
valid, a percentage would be proven infringed. For those found
infringed, a percentage of claimants would lack exploitation
capacity and thus be compelled to seek an Aro II plurality dicta
view reasonable royalty. Thus, between the validity issue and the
plurality dicta view reasonable royalty issue, the validity issue is
more significant in its impact and thus plays a greater role in
patent litigation than infringement conduct compensation.'
Since establishing forum shopping through the validity issue was
sufficient for the House Report's purposes, it neither included nor
excluded compensation recovery as a cause of the 1981 crisis facing
patent law. However, the House report's generalizing statement

' Bruce Rubenstein, Patent Litigation is Expensive, But Worth Every Penny, ILLINoIS
LEGAL TIMES, June, 1997, § Intellectual Property, at 14 ("The system ... became an

anachronism the nation could ill afford when high-tech industries emerged as economic
powerhouses in the late 1970s. Soon it became a recognized fact, first in corporate
boardrooms and then in Washington, that without exclusivity, the investment in research
and development required to make the United States a high-tech leader would not be
forthcoming.").
m H.R. REP. No. 97-312, at 21 (1981).
2NId,

' For court cases coming to the same conclusion, see Cardinal Chemical Co. v. Morton
Int'l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83, 100, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1721, 1729 (1993) and Sinclair & Carroll
Co. v. Interchemical Corp., 325 U.S. 327, 330, 65 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 297, 299 (1945).
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about the patent system inferentially includes the problems of
compensation recovery through Aro II's plurality dicta view
"reasonable royalty" recovery category as a part of the crisis.
Further, because the accelerating increase in appeals substantially
paralleled the 1964 issue date of Aro II plurality dicta view, it is
logical to infer that an attorney's decision to file in one jurisdiction
over another was based in part on the disparity in the amount of
money recoverable. The infringer would forum shop for a deficient
compensation court whereas the claimant would forum shop for an
excessive compensation court, each hoping to take advantage of the
inconsistent application of the Willing Buyer/Willing Seller rule to
the facts of their specific case.
Congress was moved by this 1981 crisis facing patent law to form
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, thereby significantly
impacting the federal appellate system. Aro Irs plurality dicta
view's "damages recovery" category and the plurality dicta view's
"reasonable royalty" recovery category are still followed as of this
writing because the validity issue overshadowed the compensation
issue at the time of the 1981 House report. Today, this is no longer
the case. The Aro I's plurality dicta view has been revealed for
what it is: usurpation of Congress' Constitutional power to make
all laws by four Supreme Court Justices.
C. CONCLUSION

Simply stated, we have worked ourselves into a conceptual box
by adopting the artificial construction of the patent laws as
proffered by the plurality dicta view in Aro II. The windfallforfeiture scheme of Aro II's plurality dicta view has fostered
degradation rather than promotion of the useful arts-the primary
purpose of the patent system as mandated by the Constitution. By
usurping Congress' carefully constructed 1946 statutory scheme,
Brennan's et al. prospective decisionmaking forced contorted money
awards, decimated the Willing Buyer/Willing Seller rule, compelled
litigants to appeal their cases, maneuvered Congress into forming
the Federal Circuit, and drove lower court judges to the brink of
wholly abandoning their judicial role.
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There is no need to stretch the imagination to understand that
these results are so unlikely that Congress could not have intended
35 U.S.C. § 284 (1994) to exclude the infringer's profits from
recovery by a claimant who lacks exploitation capacity as compelled
by the Aro H plurality dicta view. As the Supreme Court wrote in
1982: judicial analysis for the body Congress' meaning of a
statutory term is not conclusive where "the ...

application of a

statute will produce [or produces] a result demonstrably at odds
with the intentions of its drafters [for the meaning of a statutory
term], and those intentions must be controlling."'
It is because
Congress' Constitutional power to make all laws does not permit
this undemocratic Judiciary lawmaking that this author recognized
the need to analyze § 284's statutory terms for Congress' meaning
of these terms as expressed through the undisputed Article I,
Section 5, Clause 3 public record.
This author's statutory term analysis in Part III was undertaken
with the understanding that Congressional will is not the will of
the elected members of Congress, but the will of the People of the
United States of America-all 250,000,000 plus. The fundamental
power structure of our Government flows from the People, into the
Constitution, to Congress, to the President, and into law, where
upon the Judiciary is given the duty of analyzing each term in the
statute for Congress' meaning of that term. Under Congress'
Constitutional power to make all laws, there is no possible way
that the judiciary's analysis task was meant to provide the
Judiciary with a child's "telephone game" opportunity to substitute
in the judiciary's own meaning of Congress' statutory terms by
selectively ignoring Congress' Article I, Section 5, Clause 3 intrinsic
evidence and regaling extrinsic Court opinion evidence to a
higher-or even-intrinsic evidence status.
The Judiciary's
Marbury v. Madison task is but one of the six fundamental power
structure steps involved in implementing the law: 1. People -> 2.
Constitution ->

3. Congress ->

4. President ->

5. Law

->

6.

Judiciary. In most situations, this will-of-the-people analysis task
will be enormous because there are 250,000,000 plus Americans.
More important, without the analytical aid of the Judicial Branch,
"the effectiveness and rationality of congressional commands are
2 Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982).
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inevitably eviscerated. " 28 7 However, this enormous task is what
is required of the Judicial Branch by the People through our
Constitution. The Judicial Branch cannot avoid participating in
our tripartite system of checks and balances that exclusively allows
the Legislative Branch to define Congress' meaning of a statutory
term, exclusively allows the Judicial Branch to analyze the intrinsic
and extrinsic evidence for Congress' meaning of a statutory term,
and exclusively allows the Executive Branch to enforce Congress'
meaning of a statutory term. Regardless of any perceived shortcomings by living constitutionalists in the judicial goal of being
wholly objective, the courts must uphold the judiciary's end of our
tripartite system of checks and balances and eschew the illegitimate exercise of Congress' Article I, Section 1 legislative power. 2
The analysis of the intrinsic and extrinsic evidence for Congress'
meaning of the terms in § 284 has been done. The results are
above in Part III of this Article; the action for Congress to take
concerning § 284 is to enact the proposed amendments to 35 U.S.C.
§ 284 (1994) and 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1994) in Appendix I of this
Article.
As lawyers skilled in the art of analysis, it is relatively easy for
members of the Judicial Branch to take from the many pieces of the
intrinsic and extrinsic evidence that make up the relevant record
and create an analysis that supports a pre-determined conclusion.
As advocates for clients, that is what we do; that is our job. With
opposing pre-determined conclusions and their supporting antipodal
analysis presented before a court of law, the will of "We the People
of the United States" will be analyzed correctly and the truth will
prevail for everything of relevance will have been presented to the
tribunal who will make the right decision. This is because the
tribunal's ethics are beyond question. That the tribunal's ethics are
beyond question is best seen through comparison of the Model Rule
of Professional Conduct (hereinafter "MRPC") to the Code of
Judicial Conduct (hereinafter "CJC"). MRPC Rule 3.3 sets out the

27 Note, Intent, Clear Statements, and the Common Law: Statutory InterpretationIn the
Supreme Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 892, 904 (1982).
' Compare id. (often quoted, but unsigned thesis centered around flawed argument that,
as a result of perceived shortcomings in the judicial goal of being "wholly objective, courts
cannot avoid... defining [Congress' legislative] policies").
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duty of candor owed by advocates toward the tribunal, 289 but
there is no reciprocal CJC rule. Considering the extreme judicial
activist behavior of Brennan et al. as evidenced by the Aro II
plurality dicta view, perhaps there ought to be. The following
section corrects this judicial activist behavior through proposed
amendments to 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1994) and 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1994).
V. BACKGROUND: PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO SECTION 284
& SECTION

285

If we desire respect for the law we must first make the law
respectable.
29
-Mr. Justice Brandeis 0
Title 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1994) has ten structural flaws. 291'

The

text of the statute fails to parallel chronologically the proceedings
in a patent infringement suit. The statute states, "[u]pon finding
for the claimant the court shall award" without explaining what is
supposed to be found before the final step of the court making the
compensation award. The statute implies that "damages" are to be
awarded, despite Congress' 1946 removal of this Patent Act of 1922
recovery category. The statute did not maintain the Patent Act of
1946's recovery category of "compensation." The phrase "adequate
to compensate for the infringement" is a qualitative statement, not
quantitative, since the adjective "adequate" cannot grammatically
modify the transitive verb phrase "to compensate" (which itself
lacks the grammatically necessary object). The statute improperly
states the phrase "but in no event less than," instead of the proper
phrase "but shall not be less than." Since the royalty under Section
284 (1994) is based on the "use" made of the invention, the statute
fails to consider that the infringer may not be infringing by use, but
by other "practices" under 35 U.S.C. § 271 such as making, selling,
importing, or even the practice of submitting an application under
Section 505Q) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. The

MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCT

Rule 3.3 (1997).

In re Cohen, 195 N.Y.S.2d 990, 1003 (N.Y. App. Div. 1959) (quoting LOUIS DEMBrrZ
BRANDEIS, THE BRANDEIS GUIDE TO THE MODERN WORLD 166 (Alfred iUef ed., 1941)).
29 For this discussion, see generally 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1994) in Appendix I.
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statute states, "[w]hen the damages ARE not found by a jury"
(emphasis added). Does this mean that there is more than one type
of "damages" for the jury to find? Does this mean that, although a
jury asserts a compensation amount, it may be held that such an
assertion is not a finding by the jury? Further, the statute fails to
state expressly why the judge may further award up to three times
the compensation amount found or assessed. Is it because the
judge feels like it? Is it because of improper litigation conduct?
And, most egregiously, the statute states "to the determination...
of what royalty would be reasonable under the circumstances."
Reasonable for what purpose? The purpose of an award? Congress
ONLY authorized the courts to award compensation.
As is evident from the above observations, between 1946 and the
present, something went wrong. Where the 1964 plurality dicta
view in Aro II states, "the [19221 statute was changed to approximately its present form" by the 1946 amendment, 2 2 the reality
is that the 1946 amendment has been masterfully distorted by four
Supreme Court Justices from Congress' meaning into something
that Congress never intended. The loser in this game of judicial
manipulation is the American public for whom the U.S. Constitution serves as our Government's promise to promote the progress
of the useful arts.2 93 Without the right to obtain the compensation provided for by Congress, the collective right-to-exclude
granted to claimants by the U.S. Government under § 154 has only
a fraction of the value it was intended to have and diminishes the
overall incentive "to engage in the toils of scientific and technological research."2 4 The American public has a right to expect that
its inventors enjoy the full value of their invention in the marketplace, free from nefarious plurality dicta views, deceitful politicos,
and foreign influences who would have it otherwise. It is with this
in mind that amendments to 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1994) and 35 U.S.C.
§ 285 (1994) are proposed as follows.

Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 505 (1964).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
2" Smith Intl, Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co., 718 F.2d 1573, 1578,219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 686,690
(Fed. Cir. 1983).
22
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A. THE WORD "DAMAGES"

First and foremost, the word "damages" has been obliterated from
Section 284. Like a malleable nose of wax,2 95 patent law "damages" has been proffered over the last 178 years for litigation
purposes that have altered statutory compensation, depending on
whether being offered by the hammer or the nail. The tradition of
using the all encompassing, fictile word "damages" as a means to
proffer the patent advocate's position is traced to the 1800 Circuit
Court, District of Massachusetts patent law case of Whittemore v.
Cutter ("Whittemore P) 2" and the 1818 Supreme Court patent
law case of Evans v. Eaton,97 the Supreme Court's first patent
infringement decision.
In Whittemore I, the infringer's advocate proffered the word
"damages" for the statute's express term "damage" (which lacks the
terminal "s") by asserting that there can be no "actual damages" for
an infringement-by-making situation because only an action for
"actual damage" is allowed under Section 3 of the Patent Act of
1800.298 Ignoring the advocate's use of the word "damages" for
the statute's term "damage," Circuit Justice Story held that where
the law provided a civil action for proscribed infringement conduct,
the mere doing of that infringement conduct imported a damage to
the claimant. As Justice Story put it, "[w]e are however of the
opinion, that where the law gives an action for a particular act, the
doing of that act imports of itself a damage to the party."2M If
the claimant could not prove this imported damage, Circuit Justice
Story held that the law allowed a nominal damage. 3 °° This
meant that, in a typical infringement-by-making situation under
the existing patent statute, the decision maker was to find or

Case of Fries, 9 F. Cas. 826,899 (C.C.D. Pa. 1799) (No. 5,126) ("If the constitution only
intended the three definitions of levying war which I have laid down, it is clear that a man

cannot overstep those constitutional limits without intending to do it. Go beyond this, and
you leave jurors and judges to make the constitution anything or nothing-a mere nose of
wax, to be molded into any form at their will..
").
296 29 F. Cas. 1120 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600) (Story, J.).
m 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 454 (1818).
2 Whittemore, 29 F. Cas. at 1121. See also Patent Act of 1800, ch. 25, § 3, 2 Stat. 37, 38
(1800) (repealed 1836) (enacting compensation for breach of patent right).
' Whittemore, 29 F. Cas. at 1121.
300 Id.
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assess the economic value of this allowed nominal damage as a
numeric amount and then to multiply that amount by three to
obtain the compensation to be awarded. 0 1 As Whittemore I
stated, its holding both effectuated Congress' intent to provide a
remedy in the typical infringement-by-making situation and
conformed to the clear import of the language structure of the
Patent Act of 1800.302
Eighteen years later, the Supreme Court reproduced the
Whittemore I holding in the appendix to Volume sixteen of the
United States Reports as part of footnote (a) of the 1818 case of

Evans v. Eaton,0 3 reasoning that "[ilt may be useful ...

to ...

bring in review the [patent act] adjudications in the courts of the
United States."3 4 The Evans Court's sole purpose was to publish
Whittemore I, stating "[ilt is a matter of regret that so few of them
have been published." 5 But in an unfortunate turn of events for
patent law and for no listed reason, the Court in Evans v. Eaton
added the terminal "s" to the word "damage" and stated that
Whittemore I stood for the proposition: "[Where the making only,
without a user, is proved, nominal damages only are to be [awarded
to the claimant]."3°

30' See Patent Act of 1800, 2 Stat. at 38 (stating that "any person [who] shall make,
devise, use, or sell the thing... shall... pay [the claimant] a sum equal to three times the
actual damage sustained by [the claimant]* as compensation for the infringement). As an

aside, if the Patent Act of 1800 read, "three times the actual damages sustained" (through
the addition of the terminal Va), the enhanced amount would be a mandatory punitive
remedy, not compensation remedy since the term "damages" is different and particular from
the term "damage," which subtly lacks the terminal "s." Compare Patent Act of 1836, ch.
357, § 14, 5 Stat. 117, 123 (1836) (-[Ilt shall be in the power of the court to render judgment
for any sum above the amount found by such verdict as the actual damages sustained by the
plaintiff, not exceeding three times the amount thereof ....

*). With this in mind, see SRI

Int'l, Inc. v. Advanced Tech. Labs., Inc., 127 F3d 1462, 1468, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1422,
1427 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("The history of enhancement of damages demonstrates a long-standing
legislative policy. In the Patent Act of 1793 all patent infringement damages were required
to be enhanced at least threefold. The Patent Act of 1836 made increased damages
discretionary, recognizing the injustice of treating all infringement damages the same.
Thereafter enhancement of damages was consigned to the court's discretion, the statutes
varying the ceiling between twofold and threefold.") (internal citations omitted).
'o Whittemore, 29 F. Cas. at 1121.
16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 454 (1818).
4
3
3w

ld. at 519 n.(a) app. at 13.
'Id. at 23.

Id. at 26.
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Thus, rather than the decision maker finding or assessing the
economic value of the nominal damage as a numeric amount and
then multiplying that amount by three to obtain the compensation
to be awarded, the claimant, per the Court in Evans, was only
entitled to nominal damages. While providing a remedy, the
holding Whittemore I as reproduced by the Supreme Court in Evans
now failed to conform to Congress' clear import in the language
structure of the Patent Act of 1800 that mandated-through the
jussive term "shall"-that treble multiplication was to be performed
once infringement was proven. Nonetheless, the incongruent
damage/damages holding of Whittemore I as mistranscribed by the
Evans Court has been one of the foundations upon which patent
law remedies have been built."7
Confusion between the word "damages" and the word "damage"
is common place because of the awkward grammatical structure the
use of these two words imposes on writers and speakers who seek
to use these words with various meanings. For example, during
the House Committee meetings on patents, Mr. C. Henry stated,
"[d]amages, in a legal sense, means compensation."'
Note how
Mr. C. Henry's use of the subject "damages" does not agree in
number with the verb "means."
Even in a modern, sophisticated society, the Supreme Court has
difficulty in distinguishing the difference between the words
"damage" and "damages."
In American Stevedores, Inc. v.
Porello,' 9 the Court went to great lengths to distinguish between
damage and damages.3 10
However, in United States v.
James,3 1 ' the Court completely ignored the distinction between
damage and damages. 12 Because of the judicial gamesmanship
that has developed around the legally ambiguous words of damage

's It is possible that the Evans Court took the incorrect "damages" word from a pre-1818

version of The Public Statutes at Large of The United States of America. The authors of The
Public Statutes at Large could have easily confused the word "damage" for the word

"damages" since these two words are only one letter apart. See 2 The Public Statutes at
Large 320, Footnote (a) (Richard Peters, Esq. ed., 1861) ("If there be a mere making, and no
use proved, nominal damages are to be recovered.").
30 Recovery in PatentInfringement Suits: Hearingon H.R. 5231, supra note 101, at 11.
'o
330 U.S. 446 (1947).
1
' o Id. at 450 n.6.
31 478 U.S. 597 (1986).
3 2 Id. at 616.
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and damages (whose numerous, valid meanings bizarrely make
these words simultaneously ambiguous and vague), this author
recommends that Congress replace the words damage and damages
in the 1,244 federal statutes that currently use either of the words
damage or damages. 313 Particularly, before some clever patent
attorney seizes upon the cauldron of the vague and ambiguous uses
of damage/damages that percolate and bubble gray throughout
patent law, this author recommends that Congress quickly replace
the uses of the words damage or damages within Congress' pending
patent legislation House Bill 400314 and Senate Bill 50731r as
well as the enacted terms in the patent statutes 35 U.S.C. § 118,
183, 271, 284, 287, and 296.16
As is clear, encompassing different-meaning legal terms such as
harm suffered, enjoyed enrichment, harm inflicted, unjust enrichment, loss, injury, injury suffered, detriment, deterioration,
diminution, loss suffered, actual and real harm suffered, actual and
real loss suffered, compensation, reparation, indemnity, interest,
cost, punitive remedy, and attorney fees all under the imprecise
rubric of "damages," fails to promote the useful arts. Since the
malleable word "damages" fails to promote the useful arts, the word
"damages" has conclusively been removed from patent law compensation in the proposed amendments to 35 U.S.C. § 284 and 35
U.S.C. § 285, as set out in Appendix I.

313
Number of federal statutes obtained by search of LEXIS, Genfed Library, USCS File
(Oct. 19, 1997) (search string <text (damage)>).
1421st Century Patent System Improvement Act H.R. 400, 105th Cong. (1997).
S"' Omnibus Patent Act of 1997 S. REP. 507, 105th Cong. (1997) (A bill to establish the
United States Patent and Trademark Organization as a Government corporation).
3's See 35 U.S.C. § 118 (1994) ("to prevent irreparable DAMAGE"); § 183 (1994) ("for
compensation for the DAMAGE caused by the order of secrecy," "in full settlement for the
DAMAGE and/or use," "considers just compensation for the DAMAGE and/or use," "shall
constitute just compensation for the DAMAGE and/or use," "for just compensation for the

DAMAGE caused by reason of the order"); § 271(eX4XC) (1994) ("DAMAGES or other
monetary relief may be awarded against an infringer"); § 284 (1994) ("section 284.
DAMAGES," "the court shall award the claimant DAMAGES adequate to compensate for the
infringement," "When the DAMAGES are not found," "the court may increase the
DAMAGES," "an aid to the determination of DAMAGES or of what royalty"); § 287(a) (1994)
("no DAMAGES shall be recovered," "in which event DAMAGES may be recovered"),
§ 287(bXl) (1994) ("shall be subject to all the provisions of this title relating to DAMAGES");
§ 296(b) (1994) ("Such remedies include DAMAGES, interest, costs, and treble DAMAGES
under section 284.") (emphasis on the terms "damage" and "damages" added).
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B. CLAIMANT/INFRINGER VS. PLAINTIFF/DEFENDANT

There is a logical trap lurking between Title 35 (Patent) and Title
28 (Judiciary and Judicial Procedure) of the United States Codes.
The wrongdoer in a 35 U.S.C. § 271 patent infringement action may
be the plaintiff in a 28 U.S.C. § 2201 "Declarationof Noninfringement" action. 3 17 Where this is the case, the plaintiff may be
found subsequently liable on a counterclaim of 35 U.S.C. § 271
infringement as asserted by the defendant patent holder. To avoid
this confusion, the terms "claimant," "accused infringer," and
"infringer" are used for clarity in the proposed amendments rather
than the familiar terms "plaintiff" and "defendant."
C. SECTION 284(a)(2)(A)(ii) "CLAIMANT'S UNREALIZED INCOME"

The use of the term "lost profits" has been replaced with the term
"claimant's unrealized income" in the proposed amendments. In a
simple sense, only patent law profits remain after fixed costs are
subtracted from the gross income. The term "profits" implies that
fixed costs are to be subtracted first before determining the
numerical amount of profits. In this case, the term "profits" means
net income. However, in practice, the claimant may use the
incremental income approach under the appropriate circumstances 318 and not be required to subtract fixed costs in determining
profits. Under these circumstances, the term "profits" means gross
income.
Thus, the patent law term "profits" is ambiguous-susceptible of meaning gross income or net income.
The term "unrealized income" is more precise than the term "lost
profits" in that, under the appropriate circumstances, the claimant's
unrealized income may be either claimant's unrealized gross income
or claimant's unrealized net income, thus accounting for incremental income approach circumstances. Further, the term "lost" in the
term-phrase "lost profits" implies that something will be "found" by
the claimant rather then being "realized" by the claimant after

317 28
'""

U.S.C. § 2201 (1994). See supra note 6.
See Paper Converting Mach. Co. v. Magna-Graphics Corp., 745 F.2d 11, 22, 223

U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 591, 599 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (demonstrating the incremental income approach
using a first group (or N group) and a second group (or N+1 group)).
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receiving the section 284(f)(1)3 19 compensation award.
As set out in the proposed amendments, the term "unrealized" in
the section 284(a)(2)(A)(ii) phrase "unrealized income" serves as a
necessary textual device to distinguish the claimant's unrealized
income under section 284(a)(2)(A)(ii) from both the infringer's gross
income under section 284(a)(2)(B)(ii) and the royalty income under
section 284(b). Moreover, the claimant's income is held as unrealized when the 284(a)(2XA)(ii) claimant's unrealized income is
shown to be causally connected to the section 284(a)(2)(A)(i)
claimant's impoverishment. Since realized gain (or loss) is gain (or
loss) resulting from an identifiable event, such as a sale or an
exchange of property,3 2 the claimant's receipt of the section
284(f)(1) compensation award is an identifiable event resulting in
gain-and thereby realizing gain-for the claimant.
Note that as used in tax law, the terms "unrealized," "no
accession," and "no dominion" are the three ways to avoid income
that may or may not subsequently be taxed.3 2 ' However, tax law
nomenclature uses "unrealized income" as a shorthand method of
referring to any of the three ways to avoid income. This is
consistent with the proposed use of the term "unrealized" in patent
law.
D.

SECTION

284(a)(2)(B)(ii) "INFRINGER'S GROSS INCOME"

The proposed amendments in Appendix I use the term "infringer's gross income" as a numerical measure. This use of the term
"infringer's gross income" as a numerical measure in combination
with both the modem approach of viewing patent claims as a whole
and the modern approach that, to be entitled to section 284(e)
compensation, the section 284(a)(1) infringement conduct must be
causally connected to the section 284(a)(2XB)(i) infringer's enrichment, eliminates just about every problem the pre-1946 equity
courts were having in awarding compensation based on the
"infringer's profits."
319 All section 284 and section 285 citations without the symbol "§*refer to the proposed
amendments to 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1994) and 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1994) in Appendix I.
m BLA~CS LAw DICTIONARY 1264 (6th ed. 1990).
"21 See Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955) (Income is
undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the infringer has complete
dominion.).
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Before 1946, a patent claim was generally, but, as we know now,
wrongly viewed as having two sets of elements: the non-patented
elements belonging to the public and the remaining elements
belonging to the inventor, which were deemed the inventive portion
of the claim. The source of this historical accident was the patent
practice in foreign countries brought to the United States before
1917 and codified in 37 C.F.R. § 1.75(e) (1976) Jepson claim which
lists old or so-called "non-patented" elements in the preamble and
the "new" or so-called "inventive" elements after the phrase
"wherein the improvement comprises:.""2
Also at that time, to be essentially recoverable, the infringer's
enrichment was at times required by the courts to be causally
connected to the infringing device, not the infringement conduct,
even though R.S. 4921 prohibited the infringement conduct of
making, using, or selling. Thus, although an infringing device
would use all five elements of a hypothetical patented claim having
three inventive elements and two non-inventive elements, only
three of the infringing device's elements at most could be found to
use the inventive portion of the claim.
For example, assume that a pre-1946 infringer made a transformer covered by the claimant's patent claim and that this transformer
embodies the three elements of the claimant's "improvements" in
the claimant's five element patent claim. 3 ' Further assume that
the transformer also embodies four elements of another patentee's
invention for a total of seven inventive elements embodied in the
Before the Patent Act of 1946, the
infringing transformer.
claimant's job was to apportion the profits attributable to the
claimant's three improvements and the profits attributable to the
four improvements of the other, independent patentee. Learned
Hand observed that "[t]he difficulty of allocating profits in such
cases has plagued the courts from the outset, and will continue to
do so, unless some formal and conventional rule is laid down, which

an Ex parte Jepson, 1917 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 62, 65, 243 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 525, 528
(1917) (approving and encouraging the use of the British or German type of claim); Williams
Mfg. Co. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 316 U.S. 364, 369, 53 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 478, 480-81

(1942) (approving Jepson type claims).
' This example is loosely taken from Westinghouse Elec. and Mfg. Co. v. Wagner Elec.
and Mfg. Co., 225 U.S. 604, 15 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 46 (1912) (cited in Recovery in Patent
Infringement Suits: Hearingon H.R. 5231, supra note 101, at 3, 7).
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is not likely. Properly, the question is in its nature unanswerable."32 4 Even if the claimant's accountant could perform this
apportionment successfully, the court then reduced this amount by
the infringer's own valuation of the infringer's material and
services provided in generating the infringer's illegal enrichment,
rather than by the industry standard valuation of the material and
services provided by the infringer. This pre-1946 final amount
(value of three claimant's improvements minus value of four other's
improvements minus infringer's valuation of material and services
costs) was labeled the "infringer's profits."
After 1946, all elements of a patented claim make the whole
invention; the pre-1946 requirement of patent law apportionment
of inventive and non-inventive claim portions is dead. More
importantly, whether the claims are viewed as a whole is irrelevant
concerning § 284 compensation recovery. The Federal Circuit
brought American patent law into the 21st century by holding in
banc in Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co. that the infringer's enrichment
must have been caused in fact and proximately caused by the
infringement conduct, not the infringing device or devices covered
by the infringed patent.3 25 This makes sense because § 284
proscribes infringement conduct by reference to § 271, the claimant
devotes much effort during the § 271 liability phase of the trial to
prove infringement conduct, the accused devotes much effort to
counter the claimant's charges of infringement conduct, and the
jury evaluates whether there is infringement conduct. It is
ludicrous to require the jury and the parties to turn their attention
away from the infringement conduct litigated at the § 284 liability
phase of the trial in order to focus on the infringing device or
devices covered by the infringed patent at the remedy phase of the
trial. For the last 221 years, such historical vestiges of legal
fantasy have distorted patent law's legal theory away from the
well-established legal theories in other bodies of laws, namely,
torts. These historical vestiges of legal fantasy are better off dead.
The proposed, megadont amendments in Appendix I use gross
income under section 284(a)(2)(B)(ii) in the sense of 26 U.S.C.

' Cincinnati Car Co. v. New York Rapid Transit Corp., 66 F.2d 592, 593, 19 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 40, 41 (2d Cir. 1933).
m 56 F.3d 1538, 1548, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065, 1072 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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§ 61326 regardless of whether such income is taxable, since the
use of tax law concepts concerning the Federal Circuit is consistent
with the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction over federal tax refund
cases.127 The infringer's gross income for purposes of section
284(a)(2)(B)(ii) includes not only 26 U.S.C. §61(a)(2) (gross income
derived from business), but all income from whatever source
derived so long as the infringer's gross income has been proven by
the claimant to a reasonable probability" as the economic value
of the section 284(a)(2)(B)(i) infringer's enrichment causally
connected to the section 284(aXl) infringement conduct.
Using gross income avoids the gross-to-net income accounting
games that plague intellectual property. For example, in Railroad
Dynamics, the patent owner waived his injunction rights until
decision on appeal, only to later learn that the infringer corporation's two stockholders received $2,200,000 and $1,000,000 from the
infringer during litigation, thereby increasing the corporate
infringer's "fixed costs" and lowering the corporate infringer's net
income or "infringer's profits."3 29 Another intellectual property,
gross-to-net income accounting example that comes to mind is Art
Buchwald's percentage of the net for his writing contribution to the
1988 movie Coming to America. As of November 29, 1988, Coming
to America grossed over $128,000,000, but after the accountants
deducted costs for the movie, writer Art Buchwald's net percentage
award amounted to $150,000 where Buchwald's legal expenses
were reported to exceed $6 million.330
Moreover, using gross income takes into account that The
(a)(2)(A) Amount claimant, by definition, lacked the timely capacity
to exploit the patent claim at issue and thus is unlikely to have the

26 U.S.C. § 61 (1994).
Kane v. United States, 43 F.3d 1446, 1449 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (noting that the tax code
expressly provides that gross income includes "all income from whatever source derived.").
See also 28 U.S.C. 1291, 1295(aX2) (1994) (demonstrating the Federal Circuit's statutory
authority for jurisdiction).
m See Rite-Hite Corp., 56 F.3d at 1545 (stating "[t]o recover [compensation], the patentee
must show to a reasonable probability").
32 Railroad Dynamics, Inc. v. A. Stucki Co., 727 F.2d 1506, 1520, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
929, 942 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
''See Stan Soocher and Andrew Neuwirth, Net Profits Litigation Reaches Flashpoint;
The 'Buchwald' & 'Huggins' Suits, ENT. L. & FIN., Jan. 1991, at 1 and Stan Soocher,
Buchwald Sets Test for Damages, ENT. L. & FIN., Apr. 1992, at 1.
'2

'
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economic capacity to carry out protracted discovery once in
litigation. By holding out as a carrot the possibility of decreasing
the infringer's gross income under section 284(c), the infringer will
be encouraged to cooperate fully during discovery of the accounting
evidence within the infringer's control without the court resorting
to one of the court's sticks. It is important to note that the
infringer's gross income under section 284(a)(2XB)(ii) is not money
to be awarded to the claimant, but a numerical measure upon
which the jury may fimd or the judge may assess the compensation
amount to be awarded under section 284(e). In other words, under
section 284(a), the claimant is entitled to section 284(e) compensation, not the section 284(a)(2)(B)(ii) infringer's gross income.
E. STRUCTURE OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO

§ 284

One of the difficulties in drafting an intellectual property
infringement compensation statute to arrive at the point in the
statute's text where the court awards the claimant compensation
is the understanding of what structural steps must be completed
before the court makes its section 284(f)(1) award. This understanding requires a 5-step logical chain, beginning with the section
284(a)(1) infringement conduct and ending with the section
284(f)(1) award of compensation. A nautical analogy aids in
understanding the necessary statutory structure. The possible
courses the claimant may take have already been plotted out in
Appendix I.
To begin to understand the five structural steps, picture, if you
will, a flowing river parted by a small island in the river's middle.
As you sit upstream of this ait, you see that there are two navigable courses of travel: to the left (port) and to the right (starboard).
Similarly, there are two navigable courses to the necessary
statutory structural step understanding, yet both courses start out
at Infringement Conduct point and end at The Dock of Compensation. The river's name is Remedy and the island is dubbed
Claimant's Capacity.
1. The (a)(2)(A) Amount NavigableCourse of Travel (Exploitation
Capacity). If, under certain circumstances, the claimant had the
exploitation capacity to tap timely into the claimant's patent claim
in the marketplace, the claimant will generally travel to the right,
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down the navigable course tersely, but intentionally named "The
(a)(2)(A) Amount." This navigable course was previously, but
improperly named "actual damages" or "lost profits."
The claimant proceeds. First the accused infringer's conduct is
section 284(a)(1) infringement conduct. Second, the section
284(a)(1) infringement conduct results in section 284(a)(2XA)(i)
claimant's impoverishment. Third, the section 284(a)(2)(A)(i)
claimant's impoverishment has the economic value of section
284(a)(2)(A)(ii) claimant's unrealized income in the form of The
(aX2)(A) Amount. Fourth, the jury or the judge uses The (a)(2)(A)
Amount as a numeric measure to arrive at section 284(e) compensation. And fifth, the court section 284(f)(1) awards this section
284(e) compensation to the claimant. It is important that section
284 expressly account for these five steps to avoid use of imprecise
terminology such as "The claimant is entitled to the claimant's
unrealized income." Under these circumstances, the purpose of
section 284(a)(2XA)(ii) claimant's unrealized income is to direct the
form of section 284(e) compensation. Under section 284(a), the
claimant is entitled to section 284(e) compensation, not section
284(a)(2)(A)(ii) claimant's unrealized income.
2. The (a)(2)(B)Amount Navigable Course of Travel (No Exploitation Capacity). If, under certain circumstances, the claimant lacked
the exploitation capacity to tap timely into the claimant's patent
claim in the marketplace, the claimant will generally travel to the
left, down the navigable course tersely, but intentionally named
"The (aX2)(B) Amount." This navigable course was previously
removed from Congress' law by the Aro H plurality dicta view.
The claimant proceeds. First the accused infringer's conduct is
section 284(a)(1) infringement conduct. Second, the section
284(a)(1) infringement conduct results in section 284(a)(2XB)(i)
infringer's enrichment. Third, section 284(a)(2)(B)(i) infringer's
enrichment has the economic value of section 284(aX2)(BXii)
infringer's gross income in the form of The (a)(2)(B) Amount.
Fourth, the jury or the judge uses The (a)(2)(B) Amount as a
numeric measure to arrive at section 284(e) compensation. And
fifth, the court section 284(f)(1) awards this section 284(e) compensation to the claimant. It is important that section 284 expressly
account for these five steps to avoid use of imprecise terminology
such as "The claimant is entitled to the infringer's gross income."
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Under these circumstances, the purpose of section 284(a)(2)(B)(ii)
infringer's gross income is to direct the form of section 284(e)
compensation. Under section 284(a), the claimant is entitled to
section 284(e) compensation, not section 284(aX2)(B)(ii) infringer's
gross income.
3. Section 284(b)s Rare Quality of Travel. In rare circumstances
(such as where the claimant primarily desires a § 283 injunction)
or circumstances with little monetary return on litigation expenses
(such as § 271 infringement conduct by making, infringement
conduct by importing," or infringement conduct by submitting
an application under § 505(j) of the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act), the claimant will be low on gas on the claimant's
trip down the river named Remedy.8 3 While this claimant may
choose to navigate down section 284(a)(2)(A) [impoverishment] or
section 284(a)(2)(B) [enrichment], the claimant's gas gauge needle
will point to section 284(b) royalty income.
The claimant proceeds as the river's current gently urges the
claimant's boat forward. First the accused infringer's conduct is
section 284(a)(1) infringement conduct. Second, because the section
284(a)(1) infringement conduct is a certain practice made of the
invention by the infringer, the income to be proven under section
284(a)(2) may be less than the royalty income reasonable for the
practice made of the invention by the infringer. Thus, under the
third step, the claimant may prove to a reasonable probability the
section 284(b) royalty income as The (a)(2)(A) Amount under section
284(a)(2)(A)(ii) or as The (a)(2XB) Amount under section 284(a)(2)(B)(ii). Fourth, the jury or the judge uses the appropriate (a)(2)
Amount as a numeric measure to arrive at section 284(e) compensation, such that the compensation found or assessed shall be in
excess of or equal to any amount proven under section 284(b). And
33 1

Under 35 U.S.C. § 281, a patent infringement claimant has remedy by civil action for
35 U.S.C. § 271 (1994) importation infringement and may bring a civil action 28 U.S.C.

§ 1651 (1994) writ proceedings before the United States International Trade Commission
(a.k.a. tariff commission, see William Cunningham, United States International Trade
Commission, USITC:HomePage (last modified Jan. 5, 1998) <http//www.usitc.gov/>) to stop
an infringer from importing these products. See In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in
Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 185 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 449,452 (D. Minn. 1975) (note in particular
the first page and item 33).
"' See Horvath v. McCord Radiator & Mfg. Co., 100 F.2d 326 (6th Cir. 1938) (example
of rare quality of travel); supra text accompanying notes 236 through 245.
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fifth, the court section 284(f)(1) awards this section 284(e) compensation to the claimant. It is important that section 284 expressly
account for these five steps to avoid use of imprecise terminology
such as "The claimant is entitled to the royalty income." Under the
rare quality of travel circumstances, the purpose of the section
284(b) royalty income is to ensure that the section 284(e) compensation, whether found or assessed, be in excess of or equal to the
section 284(b) royalty income. Under section 284(a), the claimant
is entitled to section 284(e) compensation, not section 284(b) royalty
income.
The term "in excess of or equal to" brings up Aro Irs plurality
dicta view. By removing the term "or equal to" from § 284(e),
Congress will wipe out the last vestiges of Aro IIs plurality dicta
view's reasonable royalty recovery category with little to no impact
on the substantive law. For example, if the section 284(e) compensation found or assessed was $1 over the section 284(b) royalty
income, section 284(e)'s "in excess of' term would still satisfy
section 284(e) even if Congress removed the "or equal to" term.
However, this removal requires Congress' authority. Thus, this
author recommends that Congress remove the § 284 requirement
of "or equal to" when recodifying section 284(e) of the proposed
amendments.
Note that the imagery of the claimant's low gas boat brings to
mind that the river's current (i.e. the judge or the jury) aids the
claimant in powering the claimant's boat by ensuring speed greater
than or equal to the river's current for the claimant's trip down the
river named Remedy. Moreover, it is important to note that the
claimant can navigate down section 284(a)(2XB) under any
circumstances of infringement conduct. This is because the
infringer will always be enriched with gross income by the mere act
of infringing under section 284(a)(1) as discussed above. These
intentional results derive from combining the infringement harm
to the claimant that always exists in at least a nominal amount
with the federal tax code's all encompassing definition of gross
income under 26 U.S.C. § 61. Where the infringer is nominally
enriched with causally connected gross income, the section
284(a)(2)(B) claimant MAY choose to rely on section 284(b). The
permissive section 284 (b) term "may" allows the claimant to avoid
what "is almost always an interminable delay in connection with
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the recovery sought."'
And, probably more in legal theory then
in fact but necessary for completeness, where the claimant is
nominally impoverished with causally connected unrealized income,
the section 284(a)(2)(A) claimant may choose to rely on section
284(b). While it is unlikely that one path under section 284(b) will
make any difference over the other path under section 284(b), if it
does, then so be it. The law takes care of itself, properly expressed
and applied.
F. STATUTORY TITLES
The statutory titles in the proposed amendments to 35 U.S.C.
§ 284 (1994) and 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1994) are intentional, intended
only as labels, and are not to be given legal weight as terms. The'
title "The (a)(2)(A) Amount" and the title "The (b)(2)(B) Amount"
are intentionally stated in this manner to avoid the (aX2) Amounts
being given other labels as an advocacy device to impart a characteristic into that amount other than as a numeric measure. "The
(a)(2)(A) Amount" is not to be referred to as "claimant's impoverishment" or "claimant's unrealized income amount." "The (a)(2)(A)
Amount" is to be referred to as the neutral "The (a)(2)(A) Amount."
"The (a)(2)(B) Amount" is not to be referred to as "infringer's
enrichment" or "infringer's gross income amount." "The (aX2)(B)
Amount" is to be referred to as the neutral "The (a)(2)(B) Amount."
It is important to use these neutral terms, especially in instructions to the jury, as one method of emphasizing that the (a)(2)
Amounts are but numeric measures to be used in finding or
assessing section 284(e) compensation.
Under the proposed
amendments, this neutrality is intended to avoid the perception of
mathematical precision in the section 284(a)(2)(A)(ii) claimant's
unrealized income, the section 284(a)(2)(B)(ii) infringer's gross
income, and the section 284(b) royalty income. These income
amounts are not compensation, but numeric amounts on which to
find or assess section 284(e) compensation. This neutrality in
presentation to the decision-maker gives them the necessary
flexibility in finding or assessing section 284(e) compensation.

3s

92 CONG. REC. 9188 (1946) (statement of Sen. Pepper).
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As an example, if the claimant offers proof that "The (a)(2)(A)
Amount" or "The (a)(2XB) Amount" was numerically $100,000 and
the jury found or the court assessed that section 284(e) compensation is $110,000 or even $90,000, the finding or assessment is
subject to the appropriate standard of review and may be affirmed
or reversed based on that standard of review. It is important that
section 284 expressly account for this neutrality in presentation to
avoid any advocate characterization that could be used to circumvent the neutrality objective of this statutory strict liability tort as
set out in the proposed amendments. The proper terminology is:
"the claimant is section 284(a) entitled to the section 284(e)
compensation" and "the court section 284(f)(1) awards the section
284(e) compensation to the claimant."
G. IMPOVERISHMENT/ENRICHMENT

There are two reasons that the proposed amendments in
Appendix I expressly use the term impoverishment and the term
enrichment: as a necessary and proper transitional tool and as a
necessary and proper distinguishing tool.
1. Necessary & ProperTransitionalTool. First, each term serves
as the necessary and proper transitional link between the section
284(a)(1) infringement conduct and the appropriate income amount:
(i) section 284(a)(2XA)(i) claimant's impoverishment links
section 284(a)(1) infringement conduct to the section
284(a)(2)(A)(ii) claimant's unrealized income as The (a)(2XA)
Amount; and
(ii) section 284(a)(2XBXi) infringer's enrichment links section
284(a)(1) infringement conduct to the section 284(a)(2XBXii)
infringer's gross income as The (a)(2)(B) Amount.
2. Necessary & ProperDistinguishingTool. Second, each term,
having the mirror meaning of the other, serves as the necessary
and proper technique for distinguishing The (a)(2XA) Amount from
The (a)(2)(B) Amount.
a. Section 284(a)(2)(A)) Claimant's Impoverishment". As
used in the proposed amendments, section 284(a)(2)(A)(i) claimant's
impoverishment is defined as:
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im-pov.er.ish-mentlnoun/The state of being deprived by
infringement conduct of the right to exclude others from the
practice of the claimed invention resulting in the claimant
not realizing wealth, the infringement conduct depleting or
draining something causally connected to the claimant's
untapped richness or productiveness in quantity, quality,
content, power, or value.
The benefit of using impoverishment is that impoverishment is
the antonym of enrichment. To date, only one case has used
impoverishment as a legal term-the uncelebrated and rarely cited
Louisiana Supreme Court case of E.F.Minyard v. Curtis Products,
Inc.334 This French law based case is distinguished below. Since
impoverishment lacks the sordid history of so many other remedytype words associated with the word "damages," the term "claimant's impoverishment" is well suited to use in patent law.
b. Section 284(a)(2)(B)(i) 'Infringer'sEnrichment". As used in
the proposed amendments to 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1994), section
284(a)(2)(B)(i) infringer's enrichment is defined as:
en.rich-ment/nounIThe state of depriving the claimant by
infringement conduct of the right to exclude others from the
practice of the claimed invention resulting in the infringer
realizing wealth, the infringement conduct supplying or
filling something causally connected to the infringer's illicit
richness or productiveness in quantity, quality, content,
power, or value.
The benefit of using enrichment is that enrichment is the
antonym of impoverishment. The drawback of using enrichment is
that enrichment opens the door to those who would choose to
obfuscate patent law by distorting the body Congress' meaning of
infringer's enrichment into one of "unjust enrichments," with or
without the terminal "s."
c. Distinguishing Minyard & Unjust Enrichment. Since the
compensation awarded under section 284(f)(1) is based upon strict
liability, the claimant's impoverishment is not to be modified by an

3m 205 So. 2d 422 (La. 1967).

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol5/iss1/3

112

Tassinari: Patent Compensation Under 35 U.S.C. § 284

1997]

PATENT COMPENSATION

adjective (such as harmful, suffered, injurious) and the infringer's
enrichment is not to be modified by an adjective (such as just,
unjust, inequitable). Impoverishment is singular and is not to be
written as impoverishments or apocoped to impoverishment.
Enrichment is singular and is not to be written as enrichments or
apocoped to enrichment. Further, because American patent law is
not governed by French based law, the common law recovery of
unjust enrichment under the test set out in Minyard is irrelevant
to the statutory recovery of 35 U.S.C. § 284 compensation. Under
section 284(a), the claimant is entitled to section 284(e) compensation, not unjust enrichments.
3. Clear Guidance vs. Damages Example. Again, one of the
difficulties in drafting an infringement compensation statute to
arrive at the point in the statute's text where the court awards the
claimant section 284(e) compensation is the understanding of what
structural steps must be completed before the court makes its
section 284(f)(1) award. This understanding requires a 5-step
logical chain beginning with the section 284(a)(1) infringement
conduct and ending with the section 284(f)(1) award of compensation. Omitting even one of these five steps from the statute invites
the same chaos from which patent law has suffered for over 200
years, primarily through the all-meaning word "damages."
For example, compare the wording of the proposed amendments
in this Article's Appendix I to the wording of the current (1994)
patent infringement compensation statute in Appendix II. The
proposed amendments state:
Under the proposed amendments, section 284(e) compensation is to be section 284(f)(1) awarded to the claimant and
this section 284(e) compensation amount may be based to a
reasonable probability on the section 284(a)(2)(A)(ii) claimant's unrealized income amount that is proven as the
economic value of the section 284(a)(2)(A)(i) claimant's
impoverishment to the extent that the claimant's impoverishment is causally connected to the section 284(a)(1) infringement conduct.
Note that the section 284 subsection designation marks decrease in
sequential order. The sentence can be reversed so that the
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subsection designation marks increase in sequential order; yet the
law remains unchanged: For a claimant to be entitled to section
284(e) compensation, the claimant must prove to a reasonable
probability that the section 284(aXl) infringement conduct is
causally connected to the section 284(a)(2)(A)(i) claimant's impoverishment shown causally connected to the section 284(a)(2)(A)(ii)
claimant's unrealized income amount in the form of The (a)(2)(A)
Amount as the basis for the section 284(f)(1) award of section 284(e)
compensation. Also note how the singular terms compensation,
compensation amount, claimant's unrealized income amount,
claimant's impoverishment, and infringement conduct grammatically fit within sentence structure.
Now note how the verbs in the sentence structure with the word
"damages" need to be altered so that the subject "damages" agrees
in number with verbs, even though the subject "damages" is
singular like those terms used in the proposed amendments:
Under current practice, § 284 (1994) damages is to be
awarded to the claimant and this damages is to be based to
a reasonable probability on the claimant's damages that is
proven as the economic value of the claimant's damages to
the extent that the claimant's damages is causally connected
to the infringement damages.'
Is there any wonder why the plural/singular word "damages" can
legally mean whatever the user wants it to mean.
H. SECTION

284(a)(2) "CAUSALLY CONNECTED"

Concerning the section 284(aX2)(A)(i) term "causally connected,"
the proposed amendments require the court or jury, as is appropriate, to make two separate determinations. The first determination
is whether the section 284(a)(1) infringement conduct was the cause
in fact 3 of the section 284(a)(2)(A)(i) claimant's impoverishment.
a Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelly Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
3
' Id. See also Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minnesota Moline Plow Co., 235 U.S. 641, 648
(1915) ("During the period of infringement several other manufacturers were selling drills
in large numbers in the same localities in direct competition with the plaintiffs drill, and
under the evidence it could not be said that, if the sales in question had not been made, the
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The second determination is whether the section 284(a)(1) infringement conduct was the proximate cause 7 of the section
284(a)(2)(A)(i) claimant's impoverishment. The equivalent two
separate determinations are also made for section 284(a)(2)(A)(ii)
"causally connected" term.
Concerning the section 284(a)(2)(B)(i) term "causally connected,"
the proposed amendments require the court or jury, as is appropriate, to make two separate determinations. The first determination
is whether the section 284(a)(1) infringement conduct was the cause
in fact of the section 284(a)(2)(B)(i) infringer's enrichment. The
second determination is whether the section 284(aX1) infringement
conduct was the proximate cause of the section 284(aX2)(B)(i)
infringer's enrichment. The equivalent two separate determinations are also made for section 284(a)(2)(B)(ii)'s "causally connected"
term.
By expressly revealing that patent law does use cause in fact tort
law tests, the proposed amendments are designed to include, but
not be limited to, general cause in fact tort law tests such as the
"but foe test, the rule of concurrent liability, the "substantial
factor" rule, the rule of alternative liability, and market share
liability as circumstances permit.3 s
By expressly revealing that patent law does use proximate cause
tort law tests, the proposed amendments are designed to include,
but not be limited to, general "proximate cause" tort law tests such

defendants' customers would have bought from the plaintiff rather than from the other
manufacturers. Besides, it did not satisfactorily appear that the plaintiff possessed the
means and facilities requisite for supplying the demands of its own customers and of those
who purchased the infringing drills.*).
" Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258 (1992) (describing

proximate cause as a means oflimiting legal responsibility); Rite-Hite Corp., 56 F.3d at 1546
("Judicial limitations on damages, either for certain classes of plaintiffs or for certain types

of injuries have been imposed in terms of'proximate cause' or 'foreseeability' "); id. at 1546
("Being responsible for lost sales of a competitive product is surely foreseeable; such losses
constitute the full compensation set forth by Congress, as [concluded] by the Supreme Court,
while staying well within the traditional meaning of proximate cause. Such lost sales should
therefore clearly be compensable"). While the diverted sales issue may clearly satisfy the
proximate cause test without any discussion, other types of compensable injuries-such as

unpatented products, convoyed items, spare parts-brings proximate causes' foreseeability
into issue.
n8 SeegenerallyWILLIAM LLOYD PROSSER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS (8th ed. 1988)
(describing these tests cogently).
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as the foreseeability approach or other test as circumstances
permit. 9 Under the section 284(a)(2)(A) foreseeability approach,
the infringer's conduct will be the proximate cause of the claimant's
impoverishment where the foreseeable result occurred in a
foreseeable manner to a foreseeable claimant. Under the section
284(a)(2)(B) foreseeability approach, the infringer's conduct will be
the proximate cause of the infringer's enrichment where the
foreseeable result occurred in a foreseeable manner to a foreseeable
infringer. Under either foreseeability approach, a foreseeable result
is the strongest factor. Because the intangible aspects of intellectual property are worth more than the tangible embodiments made
by an infringer,' foreseeable infringement conduct includes, but
is not limited to, infringement conduct results which (i) deplete or
drain something causally connected to the claimant's untapped
richness or productiveness in quantity, quality, content, power, or
value or (ii) supplying or filling something causally connected to the
infringer's illicit richness or productiveness in quantity, quality,
content, power, or value. These include, but are not limited to, past
market sales, customer loyalty, premium selling prices, market
dominance, present goodwill, future goodwill, and deprivation of
learning curve embodied within the unharvested portion of the
patent claim grant at issue.
The rationale for allowing these tests is that infringement is a
tort.341 However, at best, infringement has often been described
as a tort, 2 but only in a loose way,' and never in the sense

Id,
'oKing Instruments Corp. v. Perego, 65 F.3d 941,950 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("[T]he 'entire
market value rule' recognizes that the economic value of a patent may be greater than the

value of the sales of the patented part alone.").
34 Orthokinetics, Inc. v. Safety Travel Chairs, Inc., 806 F.2d 1565, 1579, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1081, 1090 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (citing Carbice Corp. of Am. v. American Patents Dev.
Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 33, 8 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 211, 213 (1931)).
42 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 985 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (in banc)
('The analogy of a patent to a contract is not useful, however, in the context of a patent
infringement suit. Patents are not contracts per se and patent infringement actions have
never been viewed as breach of contract actions. Patent infringement has often been
described as a tort."), affd, 517 U.S. 370, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1461 (1996).
' See North Am. Philips Corp. v. American Vending Sales, Inc., 35 F.3d 1576, 1579, 32
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1203, 1205 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (arguing that 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1988) does
not speak generally of the "tort of patent infringement," but specifically of a liability that
arises upon the making, using, or selling of an infringing article.).
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of a common law tort.3 " Maybe the rationale lies in an analogy
between the invention patent grant and the land patent grant.34 5
This is unlikely since, under 35 U.S.C. § 261, "patents... have the
attributes of personal property,"3M although 35 U.S.C. § 261
doesn't seem to address the attributes of the claims within a
patent. Perhaps the rationale could be found by analogy to other
forms of intellectual property. 7
However, government logic
should be given its due weight since copyrights are governed by the
same Constitutional provision as patents3 8* but issued by a
different government administrative agency,u 9 whereas, trademarks are issued by the same government administrative agency
that issues patents,35 0 but governed by a different Constitutional
provision than patents.35 1 In any event, if the rationale for
allowing these causation tests is to be found in an analogy to a
Jim Arnold Corp. v. Hydrotech Sys., Inc., 109 F.3d 1567, 1572, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1119, 1123 (Fed. Cir. 1997), cert. denied, sub nom, Baker Hughes, Inc. v. Jim Arnold Corp.,
118 S. Ct. 338 (Oct. 20, 1997) ("It is well settled that if the patentee pleads a cause of action
based on rights created by... the common law of torts, the case is not one 'arising under'
the patent laws.*); Belknap v. Schild, 161 U.S. 10, 18 (1896) (common-law tort of patent
infringement case cited in Idaho v. Coeur D'Alene Tribe of Idaho, __U.S_ 117 S. Ct.
2028, 2035-36 (June 23, 1997)).
' See Filmtec Corp. v. Allied-Signal Inc., 939 F.2d 1568, 1572, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1508, 1511 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (stating "early cases have pointed to the myriad ways in which
patent rights-that is, property in patents-are closer in analogy to real than to personal

property").
3 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1994); see Filmtec Corp., 939 F.2d at 1572 (holding that 35 U.S.C.
§ 261 "establishes as a matter of law that patents today have the attributes of personal
property."). Compare Marsh v. Nichols, Shepard & Co., 128 U.S. 605 (1888) (describing the
patent grant in terms of land patents as a way of relying on real property grant execution
rights to take advantage of the fact that the requirements for land deed execution have
traditionally been mandatory, not discretionary).
" See High Tech Med. Instrumentation, Inc. v. New Image Indus., 49 F.3d 1551, 1556,
33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2005, 2009 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("Reasoning by analogy from decisions
involving other forms of intellectual property, this court has held that a presumption of
irreparable harm arises when a patentee makes a clear showing that a patent is valid and
that it is infringed.").
" U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
39 The United States Copyright Office issues copyrights, whereas the United States
Patent and Trademark Office issues patents.
3o'The United States Patent and Trademark Office issues beth patents and trademarks.
" Trademarks are governed by U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2 (Commerce clause), whereas
as patents are governed by U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (authors and inventors). See, e.g.,
Fairway Foods, Inc. v. Fairway Mkts., Inc., 227 F.2d 193, 197, 107 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 253, 255
(9th Cir. 1955) (observing that "Congress gains its power over trademarks under the
Commerce clause of the Constitution.*).
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Supreme Court holding, the Supreme Court holding had better be
a decisive holding. 2
Make what you will of the above discussion. The important
points are that:
(i) by "cause in fact" the proposed amendments to 35 U.S.C.
§ 284 (1994) and 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1994) are designed to
include, but not be limited by, general tort law tests such as
the "but for test," the "rule of concurrent liability," the
"substantial factor rule," the "rule of alternative liability,"
and "market share liability" as circumstances permit; and
(ii) by "proximate cause" the proposed amendments are designed to include, but not be limited by, general tort law
tests such as the "foreseeability approach" as circumstances
permit.
The best rationale for these points is that the Federal Circuit
currently uses cause in fact's "but for test"3" and "market share
liability"3 " as well as proximate cause's foreseeability approach."5 There is no reason to exclude ipso facto a general tort
52

Paper Converting Mach. Co. v. Magna-Graphics Corp., 745 F.2d 11, 17, 223 U.S.P.Q.

(BNA) 591, 595 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ("We must be cautious in extending five to four [Supreme
Court] decisions by analogy.*).
' Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1545, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065, 1069
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (in banc) (remarking "[t]his surely states a 'but for' test.").
' State Indus. v. Mor-Flo Indus., 883 F.2d 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (considering
whether compensation can be based on black market share liability). See also Sindell v.
Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980) (discussing
California's tort view of Market Share liability). As an example of black market share
liability, assume there are four infringer's-A, B, C, and D-in a multiple infringement case
and that the black market of infringement comprises 100% made up of each of the four
infringer's percentage (e.g. A: 40%; B: 20%; C: 10%; D: 30%). As the claimant sues each
infringer, one at a time, the black market still comprises 100%, but the weighted percentage
of the not-yet-sued infringers increases by the downfall of one of their tacit co-conspirators.
Their proportionate black market share remains the same, but their individual liability
percentage increases: SuingA results in B: 33% [= 20/(20+10+30)]; C: 17% [=10/(20+10+30)];
Then, suing B results in C: 25% [=171(17+50)1; D: 75%
D: 50% [--301(20+10+30)].
[--501(17+50)]. Then, suing C results in D: 100% (=75/75). And suing D results in the
claimant completing its causes of actions. The seriatim order of the lawsuits can be
strategically arranged by the claimant on a cost/benefit analysis.
m King Instruments Corp. v. Perego, 65 F.3d 941, 947, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1129, 1133
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (stating that "the section's broad language awards [compensation] for any
injury as long as it resulted from the infringement.").
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law test merely because it is a test that has yet to be applied
within patent law.
Each "causally connected" requirement of section 284(aX2)(A) and
section 284(a)(2)(B) in the proposed amendments works in both
usual and unusual situations. In Rite-Hite, the in banc opinion of
the court stated that the claimant's impoverishment such as "a
heart attack of the inventor or loss in value of shares of common
stock of a patentee corporation" are not recoverable where they are
remote consequences, indirectly caused by the infringement
conduct.'
The court did not address the question of whether
such impoverishment types would be recoverable in those unusual
circumstances where such impoverishment was other than a remote
consequence, indirectly caused by the infringement conduct. Under
general tort legal theory, where the "cause in fact" test fails to
settle the recovery issue, the "proximate cause" test will. Properly
expressed and applied, the law takes care of itself.
I. COMPENSATION AWARD SPLIT

Typically, infringement of another's patent rights only involves
one infringer-a "single infringer" situation (under present patent
nomenclature, the two-supplier market). However, the Federal
Circuit court in State Industries v. Mor-Flo Industries was faced
with a "multiple infringer" situation (under present patent
nomenclature, multiple competitors) where the first infringer had
been brought before the district court by the claimant and the other
infringers had yet to be brought to justice for one reason or
another. 3 7 In Rite-Hite, the in banc opinion of the court approved the holding in State Industries v. Mor-Flo Industries which
held that claimant State Industries could split the compensation
award between the two available forms of compensation. 3 This
is consistent with the 1946 Congress' action of maintaining the
infringer's profits and the claimant's damages within the recovery
category of compensation. Thus, it is important that section 284
allow for this award split between the two available forms of

37
3w

56 F.3d 1538, 1546, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065, 1069 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
883 F.2d 1573, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
Rite-Hite Corp., 56 F.3d at 1545.
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compensation while eliminating any possibility of double recovery
or interminable delay.
1. ParentheticalsAllow Split. The proposed amendments contain
two parentheticals that allow for the (a)(2)(A) + (a)(2)(B) = (M(1)
situation split, but prevent double recovery and interminable delay:
parenthetical section 284(a)(2)(A)(i) reads, "under circumstances
where the claimant has not proven that the infringer's enrichment
is causally connected to the infringer's gross income"; and parenthetical section 284(a)(2)(B)(i) reads, "under circumstances where
the claimant has not proven that the claimant's impoverishment is
causally connected to the claimant's unrealized income." 3r 9 The
flexibility of the parentheticals lies within the term "under
circumstances where." This term allows the meaning to be as
broad or narrow as circumstances dictate, subject to the (a)(2)
reasonable probability standard and the appropriate standard of
review. Since the term "has not proven" in each parenthetical
allows the claimant to choose the path to travel (The (a)(2)(A)
Amount or The (a)(2)(B) Amount), the term "has not proven" does
not mean the phrase "cannot prove." Since construing the term
"has not proven" as "cannot prove" would make section 284(b)
irrelevant under certain circumstances, a "cannot prove" meaning
is wrong.
2. Observationson the Four "PanduitFactors". In PanduitCorp.
v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., the Sixth Circuit set out four
factors that have been adopted into patent law by which the
claimant must prove "(1) demand for the patented product; (2)
absence of acceptable non-infringing substitutes; (3) manufacturing
and marketing capability to exploit the demand; and (4) the
This deamount of the profit it would have made."3"
a
non-exclusive
as
is
seen
test
mand/absence/capacity/amount
Further, the fourth factor is ignored as not relevant to
test. 361
this issue since the claimant's unrealized income under the fourth
factor is conditioned on the existence of claimant's capacity under
the third factor. This observation alone is enough to conclude that
the Sixth Circuit's Panduittest is the wrong test for patent law, for

See Appendix I.
575 F.2d 1152, 1156, 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 726, 730 (6th Cir. 1978).
381State Indus., 883 F.2d at 1577.
'o
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nothing in law is wasted. 62 In addition, that the infringer
infringed by selling the product means that there was a demand for
the patented product under the first factor. In other words, the
claimant's impoverishment under the first factor is relevant to
causally connected analysis under section 284(a)(2)(A)(ii) only to the
extent that the claimant has already proved the claimant's
impoverishment under section 284(a)(2)(A)(i). So the first factor is
not directly relevant. The claimant's market can be defined as a
niche market 3" such that there are no second factor acceptable
non-infringing substitutes. So the second factor is not really
relevant. The only question left is how could the Sixth Circuit
classify three of their four "Panduitfactors" as factors when they
are, for the most part, irrelevant to the proof that the claimant's
impoverishment is causally connected to the claimant's unrealized
income under section 284(a)(2)(A)(ii). The Sixth Circuit's Panduit
test needs to be replaced with the following discussion in mind.
It is important to understand that the area of this immediate
discussion is 35 U.S.C § 271(a) infringement by selling. In
infringement by selling, the infringer has created and entered a
black market to sell goods or services that the claimant may or may
not have sold had the claimant possessed such goods or services.3
Irrespective of the claimant's actions, income is generated

' For example, in capturing the function of a means through use of § 112(6), the phrase
.perforation means for tearing" is analyzed first as "means for tearing" whereby the claimant
is entitled to the function scope embodied around the means disclosed in the specification
and embodied around the equivalents to the means disclosed in the specification; then the
phase is subsequently limited by the term "perforation" such that the claimant is only
entitled to perforation function. In invoking § 112(6), a "means plus function" limitation is
further limited by reciting definite structure for performing the described function. See Cole
v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 102 F.3d 524, 531, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1006 (Fed. Cir.
1996), cert. denied, 1185 S. Ct. 56 (1997) ("To invoke [35 U.S.C. § 112, P 6 (1994)], the alleged
means-plus-function claim element must not recite a definite structure which performs the
described function."). Thus, "perforation means for tearing" can be written as "means for
tearing, limited to perforation," both having the same claim construction.
msYarway Corp. v. Eur-Control USA, Inc., 775 F.2d 268, 272, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 352,
355 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (stating "[the court found that the products at issue filled a 'special
niche' in the market").
' In contrast, gray market goods are products made by the claimant under the patent
claim, shipped outside the United States, and imported back into the United States by the
infringer to be sold on the black market. See generally 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1994); Shashank
Upadhye, Rewriting the Lanham Trademark Act to Prohibit the Importation of All Gray
Market Goods, 20 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 59 (1996) (arguing that since the essential function
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because there is an accession to wealth, clearly realized, over which
In the infringement by selling
the recipient has dominion.3
situation, the recipient of the wealth will be the infringer. This
income wealth had always existed within the claimant's patent
claim. It is just that the infringer unlawfully sold this borderless,
intangible, intellectual wealth embodied in a tangible form to
realize money as economic value. Thus, this money had always
existed within the claimant's patent claim.
The key factor that separates the claimant who will seek to have
the compensation award based upon the (a)(2)(A) Amount (claimant's unrealized income number) and the claimant who will seek to
have the compensation award based upon the (a)(2)B) Amount
(infringer's gross income number) is the claimant's timely capacity
to exploit the market demand that was satisfied by the infringer.
For a given patent claim under § 284, the claimant with exploitation capacity and the claimant without exploitation capacity will
experience the same section 284(a)(2)(A)(i) claimant's impoverishment. However, only the claimant with exploitation capacity can
prove the causal connection of section 284(a)(2)(A)(ii) beyond mere
speculation-to a reasonable probability. For the claimant without
exploitation capacity, in most cases proof of the claimant's unrealized income will not rise beyond a level of speculation.
At this point, an accounting valuation of this "money" is needed
for the court to make its section 284(f)(1) award. The valuation
need only be a reasonable inference, "approximate," more than
mere speculation, or more than a mere guess.3' If the valuation
numbers come from the black market set up and run by the
infringer, does that mean that the black market numbers are "not
a reasonable inference" or "not approximate" or "equal to or less

of the Lanham Act is to reinforce Congress' goals of eliminating consumer confusion and

protecting the trademark owner's investment in goodwill, the Act should be enforced to
eliminate the Gray Market completely).
'U Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955).
Lam, Inc. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 718 F.2d 1056, 1065, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 670,675
(Fed. Cir. 1983) (=[While the [The (aX2XA) Amount or (aX2XB) Amount] may not be

determined by mere speculation or guess, it will be enough if the [claimant's] evidence
show[s] the extent of the [claimant's impoverishment or the infringer's enrichment] as a

matter of just and reasonable inference, although the [claimant's unrealized income or the
infringer's gross income] be only approximate.") (quoting Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson
Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563 (1931)).
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than mere speculation" or "equal to or less than [a] mere guess"?
Of course not. Similarly, if the claimant lacks the timely capacity
to exploit the claimant's patent claim, does that mean that the
black market numbers are "not a reasonable inference" or "not
approximate" or "equal to or less than mere speculation" or "equal
to or less than [a] mere guess"? Again, of course not. Markets take
care of themselves--even illicit black markets.
What this means is that the infringer's numbers typically will be
lower than the numbers that would be generated if the claimant
were the one to make the sale. This is because between a lazy
infringer who steals and a hard working claimant, the claimant will
be the frugal business operator who seeks out the lowest fixed and
variable costs. Low fixed and variable costs increase the net
income numbers, whereas high fixed and variable costs decrease
the net income numbers. Thus, all things being equal between a
section 284(a)(2)(A) claimant with exploitation capacity and a
section 284(a)(2)(B) claimant without exploitation capacity, the
section 284(a)(2) Amount will be greater for the section 284(a)(2)(A)
claimant. This is because the claimant without exploitation
capacity must rely on the less efficient black market numbers,
rather than that claimant's non-speculative work ethics. The
reliability of the black market numbers is accounted for by three
things: the fundamental principle of justice requiring that the risk
of uncertainty is to be thrown upon the infringer, as set out in the
Supreme Court case of Story ParchmentCo. v. PatersonParchment
Paper Co. ;367 the section 284(c) permissive adjustment to a section
284(a)(2)(B)(ii) infringer's gross income; and the flexibility of the
decision maker in finding or assessing § 284(e) compensation.
There is little equity for an intellectual property infringer in the
United States. For example, in the Federal Circuit case of Atlas
Powder Co. v. Ireco Chemicals,s Judge Rich found little need to
discuss the courts finding that the injury to claimant's patent rights
outweighed the injury to an infringer who would lose 66% of his
total sales and be required to lay off 200 of his employees. 369
Moreover, as Federal Circuit Court Chief Judge Markey concluded

282 U.S. 555, 563 (1931).

773 F.2d 1230, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 289 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
Id at 1234.
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in 1988: Distinguishing a claimant's statutory right to full compensation on whether that claimant lacks money and manufacturing
capacity disserves the public's Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 interest
in technological advancement by favoring corporations over
individuals and creating a" 'survival of the fittest' jungle
mentality
3 70
...intended to be replaced, not served, by the law."
J.

SECTION

284(b) "ROYALTY INCOME" AMOUNT

As is clear by now, the current use of the plurality dicta view's
post-1964 reasonable royalty recovery category is no longer
workable or even salvageable regarding patent law and thus is not
literally encompassed within the proposed amendments to 35
U.S.C. § 284 (1994) and 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1994). Further, the
analogy of a "reasonable royalty" to a "floor" has been eliminated.
Under the proposed amendments, the section 284(b) royalty income
amount is not a floor onto which nefarious plurality dicta views,
deceitful politicos, and lawless foreigners may force America's
individual inventors and small business to eat scrap bones like a
dog, but rather, section 284(b) royalty income amount is a big
American butcher's thumb on the scales of justice, with the
claimant-owner, judge, and jury working behind the counter, forced
into selling the claimant's prime choice meat to an infringer who
has taken advantage of the claimant's child; it is the hydraulic lift
of justice that raises the claimant's nominal compensation to an
award of reasonable compensation, under the circumstances of the
claimant's right to exclude; and, it is the unsheathed sword of
Damocles brought to bear against an infringer who tempts a king's
immunity.
Under the proposed amendments to 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1994), the
claimant may prove to a reasonable probability the section 284(b)
royalty income as The (a)(2)(A) Amount of the claimant's impoverishment or as The (a)(2)(B) Amount of the infringer's enrichment.
Under section 284(b), the claimant may prove the section 284(b)
royalty income as an equivalent to either the claimant's or
another's established royalty income that is reasonable concerning

370 Fromson v. Western Litho Plate & Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
("Fromson IV").
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the practice made of the invention by the infringer. Alternatively,
the claimant may prove the section 284(b) royalty income under
the
section 284(b) Claimant Licensor/Infringer Licensee rule. 3 7' The
section 284(b) Claimant Licensor/Infringer Licensee rule provides:
Section 284(b) Claimant Licensor/InfringerLicensee rule
In fixing section 284(b) royalty income, the amount allowed
as The (a)(2)(A) Amount or as The (a)(2)(B) Amount should
be reasonable for the practice made of the invention by the
infringer and that which would be accepted by the claimant
from an imprudent infringer who fails to obtain a license but
now is so compelled, where the claimant may or may not
have wished to grant a license but now is so compelled.
The Claimant Licensor/Infringer Licensee rule stands in contrast
to the Willing Buyer/Willing Seller rule as first modified by the
1970 court in Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood
Corp.372 In an earlier case, the 1965 court in Georgia-Pacific
cited in detail Aro II's plurality dicta view as authority and held
that the infringer's profits are not recoverable because § 284 text
says "damages" and that Mr. Justice Brennan "completely dispelled" the issue in Aro II.17 ' To the extent the Willing Buyer/Willing Seller rule has subsequently been distorted as the result
of Aro II's plurality dicta view, the Willing Buyer/Willing Seller
rule is invalidate by the proposed amendments in Appendix I.
When applying the Claimant Licensor/Infringer Licensee rule,
the court should sift the evidence and set out the basis in the
record for the determination of the amount of section 284(b) royalty
income to avoid an arbitrary and reversible conclusion.3 74 Further, when The (a)(2)(A) Amount or The (a)(2)(B) Amount from

371 Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (in banc) (allowing
the claimant to prove the royalty under an alternative basis).
72 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1121, 166 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 235, 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
73 Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp., 243 F. Supp. 500, 542-46
(S.D.N.Y. 1965).
"" Horvath v. McCord Radiator & Mfg. Co., 100 F.2d 326, 336 (6th Cir. 1938) (stating
that "the court should sift the evidence and place its determination of reasonable royalties
on something tangible if it can be found in the record in order to avoid an arbitrary
conclusion").
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section 284(b) is used as a numeric measure to find or assess the
section 284(e) compensation, the section 284(e) compensation
finding or assessment must be sufficiently supported by the
evidence of record to avoid the appellate conclusion that the award
of section 284(f)(1) compensation is so outrageously high or
outrageously low that The (a)(2) Amount could not support the
finding or assessment in section 284(e). 7 '
It is also important to keep in mind that, regardless of any other
circumstances, the infringer did drag the claimant into court to
protect that claimant's property rights. In PanduitCorp. v. Stahlin
Brothers Fibre Works, 76 the court characterized the claimants
legal burdens:
As a result of Stahlin's election to infringe its property right,
Panduit has suffered substantially. Though unable to prove
the actual amount of lost profits or to establish a damage
figure resulting from Stahlin's price cut, Panduit was clearly
damaged by having been forced, against its will, to share
sales of the patented product with Stahlin. Further, Panduit
has been forced into thirteen years of expensive litigation,
involving $400,000 in attorney fees, a trial, a contempt
proceeding to enforce the court's injunction, a hearing on
damages, and three appeals. For all this, the "damages
adequate to compensate for the infringement," 35 U.S.C.
§ 284, have thus far been found to total $44,709.60. 377
Moreover, in Lam, Inc. v. Johns-Manville,7s 8 the court observed:
Lam was hurt and it was hurt badly by the litigation. Its
ability to compete against a giant was almost destroyed
because of the trade's belief that Lam had nothing to sell
r75Rite-Hite Corp., 56 F.3d at 1554 (stating that"[o]ne challenging only the court's finding
as to amount of damages awarded under the 'reasonable royalty' provision of § 284,
therefore, must show that the award is, in view of all the evidence, either so outrageously
high or so outrageously low as to be unsupportable as an estimation of a reasonably royalty*)
(citing Lindemann Maschinenfabrik GmbH v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 895 F.2d 1403,
1406, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1871, 1874 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
376 575 F.2d 1152 (6th Cir. 1978) (internal citations omitted).

'7 Id. at 1158.
378 718 F.2d 1056, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 670 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
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which wasn't available from defendant. This was just a little
bit of the injury Lam sustained. The real injury was the
drain on Lam's resources resulting from the expensive
litigation. Lam was drained of its cash and came under the
control of its bankers-a situation which rarely leads to
growth and success. Its limited human resources had to be
devoted to the lawsuit instead of to business. On top of all
of this, the record shows that the [infringer's] hastily
developed CLASSPAK didn't work very well, and the entire
concept of the fixture received a bad name. The market
reasoned that if the giant couldn't make a good product, the
pygmy surely couldn't.3 79
K. SECTION

284(c)

"INDUSTRY STANDARD VALUES"

Under section 284(c), the court may, under certain circumstances,
decrease the infringer's gross income amount proven under section
284(a)(2)(B)(ii) using industry standard values for materials
rendered by the infringer or services rendered by the infringer or
both material and services rendered by the infringer. This provides
flexibility for the court in ultimately awarding section 284(f)(1)
compensation to the claimant and assuages opponents' concerns,
doubts, fears, and perceived evils of using section 284(a)(2)(B)(ii)
infringer's gross income to eliminate the competition.
This "eliminate the competition" ploy was brought up during the
Committee Hearing on the Patent Act of 1946. As adopted in
Georgia-Pacific,Mr. C. Henry, an invited Hearing witness and a
1946 Assistant Commissioner of Patents, stated:
I fully agree with Judge Evan A. Evans, senior judge of the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals,... when he said, that the
rule holding an infringer liable as a wrongful trustee for the
patent owner - is not workable or practicable and is used by
plaintiffs and their counsel to beat and bludgeon a competitor until he, or it, be exterminated. It is not damages that
are sought, but the extermination of a competitor. 3s
'7 Id. at 1063.
Georgia-Pacific Corp., 243 F. Supp. 500, 525 n.23 (quoting Recovery in Patent
Infringement Suits: Hearingon H.R. 5231, supra note 101, at 7).
'
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All courts should eschew this "eliminate the competition" ploy.
The claimant is not a sycophant attempting to live off the infringer's illicit riches. The infringer is not an usufructuary with the
right to use and enjoy the claimant's intellectual property.
Moreover, regarding the market covered by the claimant's claimed
invention, the infringer is not a competitor or a competitor to be
eliminated, but a wrongdoer who has infringed upon the claimant's
35 U.S.C. § 154 right to exclude others from practicing the claimed
invention. Further, because it is within the infringer's own control
to limit its conduct, the infringer is held liable by section 284(a)(2)
for that conduct to the extent of the infringement conduct, even if
this liability exceeds the scope of the market covered by the
claimant's claimed invention and spills into the proverbial "entire
market."3"'
Even further, when such an infringer engages in
culpable infringement conduct or culpable litigation conduct, it is
the infringer who seeks to impede and obstruct the claimant from
market participation, or, where the claimant has already entered
the market, it is the infringer who seeks to delay, thwart, and even
eliminate the claimant's activities.
With this in mind, the circumstances under section 284(c) that
the court may decrease the amount proven under section
284(a)(2)(B)(ii) become clearer. Under circumstances where the
court awards a section 285(a)(1) punitive remedy or section 285(b)
attorney fees as set out in Appendix I, it would be legally and
equitably inconsistent to decrease the amount proven under section
284(a)(2)(B)(ii). Under the circumstances where the court does not
make a section 285 award, there will be cases where the court may
decrease the amount proven under section 284(a)(2)(B)(ii). Factors
for section 284(c) may include, but not be limited to, degree of culpa
for the infringement conduct (e.g., due care, slight negligence,
ordinary negligence, gross negligence), degree of litigation misconduct, and the relative economic status of the parties at the time of
infringement or at the time of trial. The question comes down to
this: if a wealthy infringer negligently enters the claimant's land
381

In the context of existing case law, Rite-Hite Corp., 56 F.3d at 1549, and the proposed

amendments in Appendix I, the scope of the entire market resides in the causal connection
between the claimant's impoverishment and the claimant's unrealized income or between the
infringer's enrichment and the infringer's gross income, to the extent either is caused by the
infringement conduct.
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without permission and mines out any gold, under circumstances
where the claimant lacked or lacks the capacity to work the claim,
should the claimant now be compelled to pay for the infringer's
rendered material and services just because the infringer was
caught and thereby forced the claimant into court to retrieve the
claimant's gold?
L. SECTION 285 PUNITIVE REMEDY, ATTORNEY FEES

Since the punitive remedy of section 285(a)(1) and the attorneys2
fees of section 285(b) share a finding of willfulness together
and are not compensation, interest, or costs, these two are appropriately set out in Appendix I under the same statutory section in
Title 35 (patents). This adjustment will aid the district courts in
sorting out that willfulness is not relevant under section 284
Compensation, Interest, Costs, but that willfulness is relevant
under section 285 Punitive Remedy, Attorney Fees. One small
point, infringement under section 284(a)(1) is neither innocent
infringement nor non-willful infringement. The correct patent law
terminology for section 284(a)(1) infringement itself is "infringement" since section 284(a)(1) infringement is a strict liability tort.
The section 285(a) infringement conduct is either nonwillful
conduct that does not lead to the punitive remedy of multiple
compensation or section 285(a)(1) willful conduct that leads to the
punitive remedy of multiple compensation.
M. 28 u.S.c. § 1498 INFRINGEMENT BY U.S.
Certain patent infringement remedies are conditioned on who are
the defendants. For example, a patent infringement claimant has
no 35 U.S.C. § 283 injunction remedy against the United States
Federal Government because such a claimant is limited by 28

' Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1523 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(in banc) rev'd on other grounds, 117 S. Ct. 1040, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (1997) (finding
that "[i]ntent becomes a requirement only if and when the patent owner seeks enhanced
damages or attorney fees for willful infringement"); Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc.,
66 F.3d 1211, 1221,36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225, 1232 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (observing that "willful
infringement' is a punitive finding, and can have the consequence of multiplication of
damages), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1243 (1997).
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U.S.C. § 1498 to suing the Federal Government in the United
States Court of Federal Claims for compensation under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1498 rather than under 35 U.S.C. § 284.m
Although the
analysis in this Article addresses 35 U.S.C. § 284, it will also
impact cases that are pending or cases that are brought against the
Federal Government under 28 U.S.C. § 1498. Since the analysis of
this Article will impact these patent infringement compensation
cases, this author recommends that Congress rewrite 28 U.S.C.
§ 1498 to a form similar to the Appendix I proposed amendments
to 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1994) and 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1994). Within this
new § 1498, Congress must, among other things, expressly set out
whether Congress wants to entitle the United States Federal
Government to a compulsory license in those circumstances where
the United States Federal Government improperly practices the
claimed invention. As stated in Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm &
Haas Co.,' "[clompulsory licensing of patents often has been
proposed, but it has never been enacted on a broad scale."'
The
Dawson court also noted that "[a]lthough compulsory licensing
provisions were considered for possible incorporation into the 1952
revision of the patent laws, they were dropped before the final bill
was circulated."'
VI. FINAL THOUGHTS: PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Of all the duties of the judge, imposing sanctions ... is
perhaps the most unpleasant. A desire to avoid doing so is
understandable.But if judges turn from Rule 11 and let it
fall into disuse, the message to those inclined to abuse or
misuse the litigationprocess will be clear. Misconduct, once
tolerated, will breed more misconduct and those who might.
seek relief against abuse will instead resort to it in selfdefense.
-William W Schwarzer, Senior District Judge

7

See generally Gargoyles, Inc. v. United States, 113 F.3d 1572, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1760 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (discussing a patentee's claim against the government under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1498 for infringement of an eyewear patent).
3" 448 U.S. 176, 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 385 (1980).
m Id. at 215 n.21.
Id,
8 William W Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New FederalRule 11 - A Closer Look, 104
F.R.D. 181, 205 (1985).
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There are some unctuous advocates who continue to revive legal
concepts in patent law that are dead,m either in exchange for
"thirty pieces of silver"m or out of ignorance."9 These necroadvocates 9 1 sell their guile concepts 392 to the district courts
through the polluting current of prejudice against patent rights and
the body of law that protects the same. A patent grant is not a
grant of a monopoly.39 Patent law is just as worthy as other
Law that is dead is "necrotized law." See United States v. De Lucia, 256 F.2d 487,491
(7th Cir. 1958) ("Surely [in denaturalization proceedings,] the defense [of res judicata] here
has been thoroughly necrotized.").
' Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 55 (1945) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("A man who

voluntarily assists one known or believed to be an enemy agent may not defend on the
ground that he betrayed his country for only thirty pieces of silver.*).
39 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.1 (1997) ("MRPC") (Competence)

(stating that lawyers shall provide competent representation requiring legal knowledge).
Earning an LL.M. (Intellectual Property) master's degree or passing the United States
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) "RegistrationExaminationfor PatentAttorneys" is
not merely an academic exercise, but a necessary study to comply with the jurisdiction's
equivalent to MRPC Rule 1.1 (Competence) -a rule so important, it is listed first in the
MRPC. Lawyers unassociated with LL.M. (IP) degreed attorneys or licensed patent
attorneys assume a serious risk of professional discipline and malpractice in representing
clients in patent litigation, patent prosecution, and patent licensing.
"9 Necroadvocacy is the act of asserting dead law before a court, tribunal or other
administrators of law and justice. See Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch.
Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that "[1like some ghoul in a
late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after
repeatedly being killed and buried, Lemon stalks our Establishment Clause jurisprudence
once again, frightening little children and school attorneys....").
See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCT Rule 3.3(aXl) (1997) (making false
statement of material law), Rule 3.3(aX3) (1997) (omitting directly adverse legal authority
to advance position), and see FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (1997) ("FRCP") (sanctions for misleading
legal arguments). See also Judin v. United States, 110 F.3d 780, 783-85, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1300, 1303-1305 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (discussing FRCP Rule 11 sanctions).
The Statute of Monopolies, from which tho United States patent laws were based,
expressly listed a monopoly grant as distinct and separate from a patent grant, stating
"[tihat all monopolies, and all commissions, grants, licenses, charters, and letters patent.... "
Are monopolies, while other patents are not, if they are granted to the inventors. Evans v.
Eaton, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 454, 518 n.(a) app. at 13-14 (1818); see also Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 104 (1872) (excluding patents from monopoly prohibitions).
Despite the Court's best efforts, patent law has attempted to struggle away from the
improper monopoly characterization since the Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 4, 1 Stat. 109, 111
(1790) (repealed 1793). See United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186
(1933) and Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, 575 F.2d 1152, 1160 n.8 (6th Cir.
1978) (distinguishing a patent which "gives to public.., that which the public never before
had," from a monopoly which "takes something from the people."). Others choose to keep
this monopoly characterization alive as a divisive means to their patent grant prejudicial
end. See, e.g., Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 530, 173 U.S.P.Q.
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bodies of law."9
The district courts must encourage proper
advocacy 95 through active use of the jurisdiction's rules of professional conduct."'
When an advocate seeks success through
distortion or ignorance of the patent laws, 97 the court must
(BNA) 769, 774 (1972) ("We must consider petitioner's [patent] claim in light of this Nation's
historical antipathy to monopoly .... *).
"' Before 1983, the standard for granting a preliminary injunction was unusually
stringent in that the "probability of success on the merits" standard was raised to a "success
beyond question" standard in patent cases. This stringent standard was traced to a distrust
of an unfamiliarity with patent issues as well as the misguided belief that the ex parte
examination by the PTO is inherently unreliable. See generally Smith Intl., Inc. v. Hughes
Tool Co., 718 F.2d 1573, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 686 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (stating that movant must
show patent is definitely valid and infringed). Gerald Mossinghoff, presently senior counsel
at Oblon, Spivak, McClelland, Maier & Neustadt in Arlington, Va. and the former 1981 to
1985 PTO commissioner, later commented on this prejudice against patents, "It was like a
dog chasing its tail. The motion for preliminary injunction failed because the court was so
tough on patents. It's still not easy. The plaintiff bears a pretty good burden, but it is a lot
easier." Bruce Rubenstein, PatentLitigation is Expensive, But Worth Every Penny, Merrill's
ILLINOIs LEGAL TiMES, June, 1997, at 14.
' See TRW Fin. Sys., Inc. v. Unisys Corp., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1460, 1468-70 (E.D.
Mich. 1995) (Rosen, J.) (finding that attorneys from Townsend & Townsend as well as Jones,
Day, Revis & Pogue, acted "wholly irresponsibly with respect to [patent related] document
production," engaged in "mindless 'litigation for litigation's sake' lawyering that gives
attorneys a bad name." The Court sanctioned a total $45,000, cost, & fees for engaging "in
careful 'non-disclosure' which amounted to misleading the Court by their failure to bring the
issue of the P Document's production or non-production in BancTec and failure to bring to
the Court's attention the fact that copies of the Maker documents were in Townsend &
Townsend's possession."); Sherman Treaters LTD., v. Ahlbrandt, 115 F.R.D. 519 (D.D.C.
1987) (properly denying defendant's district court motion for attorneys' fees and expenses
incurred at the Federal Circuit and U.S. Supreme Court levels, although upholding trial
court's $30,253.26 Rule 11 award). See also O'ConnorChides Lawyers for Rudeness, Large
Fees, THE ORLANDO SENTINEL, Mar. 6, 1994, at A20 (Justice Sandra Day O'Connor: "I have
watched with great sadness the decline in esteem held by our society of lawyers." "There
must be a rediscovery of civility in the profession." "We need a fundamental change in
attorney conduct.").
"6 See 37 C.F.R. § 1.344 (1997) (both patent attorneys and patent agents must conform
to the standards of ethical and professional conduct set forth in the MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY adopted by the American Bar Association (e.g. MRPC)). See,
e.g., Energy Conversion Devices, Inc. v. Manbeck, 741 F. Supp. 965, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1574 (D. D.C. 1990) (denying petition for a writ of mandamus seeking to remove a specific
primary patent examiner for personal bias against inventor Ovshinsky, where inventor
Ovshinsky claimed that the examiner's derogatory and derisive remarks about Ovshinsky
violated the standards of professional conduct).
' See Fromson v. Western Litho Plate & Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568, 1570 (Fed. Cir.
1988) (Markey, C.J.) ("Fromson IV") ("This is the eighty-fourth case in which the court has
been forced, ad nauseum, to remind counsel that it is a court of review, i.e., that it will not
find the facts de novo, that it is not a place for counsel to retry their cases, that its judges
do not participate as advocates to fill gaps left by counsel at trial, and that the function of
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decisively and effectively correct these misrepresentations, 39"
mischaracterizations,3 ' and misleading statements.4 "
Only
then will the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 19824°' truly
"strengthen the United States patent system in such a way as to
foster technological growth and industrial innovation, '
as
Constitutionally mandated by Article I, Section 8, Clause 8.

appellant's counsel in relation to the district court's findings is to show that those findings
are clearly erroneous or, if correct, cannot support the district court's legal conclusion.").
See Paulik v. Rizkalla, 796 F.2d 456,460,230 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 434,437 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
(stating that "[tihis conduct by Rizkalla's counsel, involving flagrant misrepresentations of
the record, was a gross violation of the high standards of professional conduct that we expect
and demand of the members of our bar. There is no possible excuse for a lawyer distorting
the record in the way that Rizkalla's counsel has done. In the circumstances, Paulik is
awarded double his costs....').
'" See Panduit Corp. v. Dennson Mfg. Co., 774 F.2d 1082, 1102,227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 337,
351 (Fed. Cir. 1985), vacated on anotherground, 475 U.S. 809, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 478
(1986) (stating that [iun sum, Dennison's presentation on appeal is disingenuous, containing
mischaracterizations, misleading statements, and improper submissions. It has unnecessarily burdened the court with extraordinary need to check the record in respect of each of its
assertions, only to find in too many instances a lack of candor. Accordingly, Panduit is
awarded double its costs on appeal.").
" See Amstar Corp. v. Envirotech Corp., 730 F.2d 1476, 1486, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 649,
656-57 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (stating that "[d]istortion of the record, by deletion of critical
language in quoting from the record, reflects a lack of the candor required by the MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 3.3 (1983), wastes the time of the court and of
opposing counsel, and imposes unnecessary costs on the parties and on fellow citizens whose
taxes support this court and its staff. A quotation containing deletions that so clearly distort
the meaning and relevance of the quotation as to render it misleading will not in this court
be encouraged by acquiescence. Because Envirotech's brief relies on a reverse statement of
the law of infringement, ignores the numerous and unanimous contrary authorities called
to its attention by Amstar's main brief, distorts a quotation, and presents an estoppel
argument based on that distortion, Envirotech shall pay to Amstar an amount equating to
double Amstar's costs on this appeal.").
401 Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. 97-164, § 302, 96 Stat. 25 (1982)
(effective Oct. 1, 1982).
' See 9 Chisum, supra note 239, § app. 21 (creation of the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit) (citing House and Senate Reports on the Creation of the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit, H.R. REP. No. 97-312 (1981).

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 1997

133

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [1997], Art. 3

192

J. INTELL. PROP.L.

[Vol. 5:59

APPENDIX 1. Proposed Amendments to 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1994) and
35 U.S.C. § 285 (1994)
The following are proposed amendments to 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1994) and 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1994) that this
author recommends Congress enact into law. The objective of the proposed amendments is to realign the
award of patent infringement compensation to be consistent with the body Congress' meaning of each
statutory term, the conclusions of this article, current legal theory, and existing judicial authority. For
comparison, see 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1994) and 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1994) in Appendix II of this article.
Title 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1994) and 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1994) should be amended as follows:

SECTION 284. COMPENSATION, INTEREST, COSTS
(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

()

To be entitled to subsection (e) compensation the claimant shall prove
(1)
that the accused infringer's conduct is an act of infringement under section 271 of this title and
(2) that there is a reasonable probability that either
(A) The (a)(2)(A) Amount
the subsection (aX 1) infringement conduct is causally connected to the claimant's
(i)
impoverishment (under circumstances where the claimant has not proven that the
infringer's enrichment is causally connected to the infringer's gross income), and
(ii)
that the subsection (aX2XAXi) claimant's impoverishment is causally connected
to the claimant's unrealized income as The (aX2XA) Amount, or
(B) The (a)(2)(B) Amount
(i)
the subsection (aX1) infringement conduct is causally connected to the infringer's
enrichment (under circumstances where the claimant has not proven that the
claimant's impoverishment is causally connected to the claimant's unrealized
income), and
(ii) that the subsection (aX2)(BXi) infringer's enrichment is causally connected to the
infringer's gross income as The (aX2XB) Amount.
Where the income to be proven under subsection (aX2) may be less than the royalty income
reasonable for the practice made of the invention by the infringer, the claimant may prove to a
reasonable probability the royalty income as The (aX2XA) Amount under subsection (aX2XAXii) or
as The (aX2XB) Amount under subsection (aX2XBXii).
The court may decrease the infringer's gross income proven under subsection (aX2XBXii) using
assessed industry standard values for materials rendered by the infringer or services rendered by
the infringer resulting in The (aX2)(B) Amount under subsection (aX2XBXii).
The court may receive expert testimony as an aid to the determination of
the claimant's unrealized income under subsection (aX2XAXii);
(1)
(2)
the infringer's gross income under subsection (aX2)(BXii);
(3)
the royalty income under subsection (b);
the industry standard values for materials rendered by the infringer under subsection (c); and
(4)
(5)
the industry standard values for services rendered by the infringer under subsection (c).
The jury may find compensation using the appropriate Amount under subsection (aX2) as a numeric
amount or, when the jury does not find compensation, the court shall assess compensation using the
appropriate Amount under subsection (aX2) as a numeric amount. The compensation found or
assessed shall be in excess of or equal to any amount proven under subsection (b).
The court shall award the claimant
the compensation found or assessed under subsection (e) and
(1)
interest and costs as assessed by the court.
(2)

SECTION 285. PumvE REMEDY, ArrosNEY FEES
(a) Punitive Remedy
The court as a punitive remedy for culpable infringement conduct may further award the
(1)
claimant up to three times the compensation awarded under section 284(f0(1) of this title.
(2) The punitive remedy under subsection (aX1) shall not apply to provisional rights under section
154(d) of this title.
(b) The court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.
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APPENDIX U. 35 U.S.C. § 284,285 (1994)
35 U.S.C. § 284 (1994) and 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1994) with legislative history are
reproduced from the United States Code Service and are provided for comparison
to the proposed amendments in Appendix I of this article.
SECTION 284. DAMAGES
Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the claimant damages
adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a
reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer, together
with interest and costs as fixed by the court.
When the damages are not found by a jury, the court shall assess them. In
either event the court may increase the damages up to three times the amount
found or assessed.
The court may receive expert testimony as an aid to the determination of
damages or of what royalty would be reasonable under the circumstances.
HISTORY:
Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 4, 1 Stat. 109, 111 (Apr. 10, 1790) (repealed 1793);
Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 5, 1 Stat. 318, 322 (1793) (amended 1800, 1819)
(repealed 1836); Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 14 , 5 Stat. 117, 123 (1836)
(repealed 1870); Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 55, 16 Stat. 198, 206 (1870)
(amended 1897, 1922, 1946) (codified as revised in 1952 at 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1994)).
See generally 7 D. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS, § 20.02, at 20-9 (Matthew Bender
Release No. 61 ed. Mar. 1997) (citing House and Senate Reports on the Creation
of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, H.R. REP. No. 97-312 (1981)).
SECTION 285. ATTORNEY FEES

The court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the
prevailing party.
HISTORY:
(July 19, 1952, ch. 950, § 1, 66 Stat. 813.)
This section is based on 35 U.S.C., 1946 ed., § 70 in part (R.S. § 4921; Mar. 3,
1897, ch. 391, § 6, 29 Stat. 694; Feb. 18, 1922, ch. 58, § 8, 42 Stat. 392; Aug. 1,
1946, ch. 726, § 1, 60 Stat. 778).
"This section is substantially the same as the corresponding provision in R. S.
§ 4921; 'in exceptional cases' has been added as expressing the intention of the
present statute as shown by its legislative history and as interpreted by the
courts.'
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APPENDIX M. House Bill 4143 (1945)
The below, hard-to-obtain text of H.R. 4143, 79th Cong. (1945) was obtained from the
United States National Archives by this author and provides the last piece of an otherwise
accessible H.R. 5311, 79th Cong. (1946) legislative history. For a printed copy of House Bill
4143 and letters exchanged concerning House Bill 4143 (1945), write: National Archives,
Washington, DC 20408, stating "Folder for H.R. 4143 in Papers Accompanying Specific Bills
and Resolutions-Committee on Patents (HR 79A-D27); Records of the U.S. House of
Representatives, Record Group 233." The National Archives can be reached at: National
Archives and Records Administration, Committee on Patents (1837-1946), (last modified Aug.
26, 1996) <http'//www.nara.gov/nara/legislative/house-guidehgch14b.html> (setting out the
coverage the National Archives has for the Records of the Committee on Patents, 25th-79th
Congresses (1837-1946), including Minute Books, Docket Books, Petitions & Mem., Comm.
Papers, and Bill Files).
** See, 91 Cong. Rec. 8879 (1945) for House Bill 4143's introduction to the House.

H.R. 4143, 79th Cong., 1st sess.**
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
September 20, 1945
Mr. Henry introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Patents
A BILL
To amend Revised Statutes, 4921 (U.S.C.A., title 35, Patents, sec. 70), providing that
damages be ascertained on the basis of compensation for infringement, as in actions for
infringement in the United States Court of Claims.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America
in Congress assembled, That Revised Statutes, 4921, of the United States Code Annotated,
title 35, Patents, section 70, be amended as follows:
Substitute for the provision beginning, line 1, "The several Courts," and ending line 36,
"existing causes of action," the following: T"he several courts vested with jurisdiction of cases
arising under the patent laws shall have power to grant injunctions according to the course
and principles of courts of equity, to prevent the violation of any right secured by patent, on
such terms as the court may deem reasonable; and upon a decree being rendered in any such
case for an infringement the complainant shall be entitled to recover general damages which
shall be due compensation for making, using, or selling the invention, not less than a
reasonable royalty therefor, together with interest from the time the infringement began.
"The court is hereby authorized to receive expert or opinion evidence upon which to
determine in conjunction with any other evidence in the record, due compensation for
making, using, or selling the invention, and such expert or opinion evidence is hereby
declared to be competent and admissible subject to the general rules of evidence applicable
thereto.
'The courts shall assess said damages, or cause the same to be assessed, under its
direction and shall have the same power to increase the assessed damages as is given to
increase the damages found in an action at law, but recovery shall not be had for any
infringement committed more than six years prior to the filing of the complaint in the
action."
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